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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Technology-intensive landscape has changed and new business models, based on 
research and development (R&D) alliances, are increasingly being adopted. Particularly 
in high-technology sectors, R&D alliances - contractual asset pooling or resource 
exchange agreements between firms - appear to have become a routine strategic initiative 
(Stuart, 1998). Partnerships between airlines, joint ventures between car manufacturers, 
co-development contracts between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, 
production sharing between oil majors and national oil companies, collaborations 
between telecommunications and mobile technology companies, are just some examples 
of industries where alliances are significant drivers of value (Savva, 2006). As a matter 
of fact, R&D collaborations are argued to offer multiple benefits such as access to 
complementary resources, taking advantage of more business opportunities, as well as 
sharing of both development costs and risks (Hagedoorn 2002;  Gassmans, 2006;  Du et 
al. 2013). These agreements represent one of the most important Open Innovation 
practices. Chesbrough (2003) coined the term “open innovation” to indicate how big 
companies changed their traditional way of new business development by opening the 
firm’s boundaries to external inputs and combining external and internal technology 
development. This new paradigm suggests that organizations should put even greater 
emphasis on R&D collaborations. Accordingly, R&D alliances – that gained increased 
popularity in the 1990s with more than 20,000 new alliances formed in the U.S from 
1987 to 1992 (Harbison and Pekar, 1998) - have continued to rise by as much as 25 
percent every year (Deloitte 2008) and they are expected to grow in future (Deloitte 
2012). However, as stated in Lukas (2008, p. 3), the overall growth of technology 
alliances, is somewhat odd since firms have hitherto preferred to internalize their R&D 
activities. In fact, on the one hand, collaborations with other firms could help to access 
complementary resources (such as information, tangible and intangible resources, 
technological knowledge), which are critical to foster the introduction of innovations, and 
give the opportunity to share the risks and costs involved in the process (Powell et al., 
1996). On the other hand, there might be different reasons to reach the final market with 
products whose revenue are not shared with the partner in order to appropriate higher 
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profits. In fact, the income coming directly from the alliance as well as all the benefits it 
could offer are likely subject to significant uncertainty from each partner’s perspective, 
especially in the initial stage of their joint operation. For instance, two firms may 
establish an alliance to develop some new technology that is expected to benefit both. 
However the outcome of their joint effort may turn out to suit one partner’s needs much 
better than the other partner’s (Chi, 2000, p.6). As a result, firms are constantly being 
confronted with the decisions whether to develop a particular technology in-house, or 
whether to source it externally (Vanhavarbeke et al. 2008).  
Given these considerations, it is interesting to understand under what conditions R&D 
alliances would perform better than the corresponding activity traditionally conducted in 
house. Yet, surprisingly, there has been very little attention to this important issue. As a 
matter of fact, according to Huizing (2011), a decent cookbook, i.e. an integrated 
framework that helps managers to decide when and how to deploy open innovation 
practices (R&D alliances in particular), is missing. This consideration is especially true if 
a portfolio of R&D collaborations is considered. In fact, little is known on how to 
manage several R&D collaborations simultaneously. Studying the challenges of 
simultaneous management of multiple R&D collaborations is a neglected issue in both 
research and managerial practice (Harbison and Pekar, 1998; de Man and Duysters, 
2002). Financially constrained decision-makers should select projects accurately, being 
sure to choose the most promising, and must consider new paradigm solutions including 
next-generation licensing and effective precompetitive collaborations with other 
companies (Dhankhar et al., 2012), without neglecting interdependencies among 
products and strategic goals. However a framework that helps managers in making this 
critical decision is missing. Also, the stage of the innovation process where collaboration 
is the most effective is still not very clear and it is currently one of the key issues debated 
in the open innovation literature (Huizing, 2011).  
This thesis attempts to contribute to these issues. Generally speaking, it enhances our 
understanding of when, and under what circumstances it is advantageous for firms to 
engage in the use of either in-house R&D activity, or R&D alliances. On the one hand it 
discusses the implications of managing a portfolio of R&D projects, with the main aim 
of investigating the key factors that influence the important choice to develop them 
resorting to an internal or an external path. On the other hand, this work sheds light on 
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when, i.e. in which stage (if any) of the innovation process, collaboration is the most 
effective, by taking into account the important role of competition. Moreover, since 
these kinds of decisions are traditionally made in a stochastic environment, I address 
these issues by adopting a real options approach. The results have also important 
practical implications for business professionals involved in alliance process 
management.  
 
1.2 Research context, motivation and thesis outline 
An alliance can be defined as any independently initiated cooperation between firms. It 
involves an exchange, sharing or co-development of capital, technology, or firm-
specific asset, and is performed by either joint ventures, marketing and distributions 
agreements, or technology licensing or transfer agreements (Gulati 1995, Lukas 2008). 
Usually, R&D alliances
1
 not only generate stochastic benefits (uncertainty) but also 
bring sunk costs (irreversibility). In addition, a  key element in these agreements is 
flexibility: firms have the opportunity, not the obligation to sign an alliance, or 
sometimes the right to renew an existing one. In other words they can wait to form an 
alliance when more information is available. Therefore, analyzing these kinds of 
alliances in a real options framework can precisely capture these important three 
aspects (Nischide and Tian, 2011). As a matter of fact, real options analysis (ROA) has 
been recognized to evaluate investments which involve a significant amount of both 
uncertainty as well as irreversibility (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Traditionally, ROA has 
been concerned with the valuation of projects with real options owned exclusively by 
one firm. However this assumption is often unrealistic: more frequently, projects are 
developed by a consortium of firms (Savva, 2006). Very little research has focused on 
the evaluation of uncertain R&D partnerships through ROA (Lukas, 2008) and it 
traditionally dealt with the evaluation of the single R&D partnership. Several 
interesting aspects have not been sufficiently investigated. 
First, it is very interesting to take a holistic point of view and model the whole R&D 
portfolio of the alliances as a series of options whose exercise depends on the 
performance of all the constituent parts of the portfolio. While valuing portfolios of 
options is one of the most important problems in both real options and corporate 
                                                 
1
  Throughout the thesis  I adopt the terms:  alliance, partnership, collaboration without distinction.  
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finance in general, it has not been satisfactorily addressed (Brosch, 2008). Obviously, 
managers are financially constrained and then they cannot buy all the options: as a 
consequence, a portfolio perspective is needed to properly allocate the limited budget 
and to consider the interdependencies among projects. Considering R&D collaborations 
in a projects portfolio management, is a key for any corporation facing strategic 
resources allocation decisions. Also, when considering entry into a new R&D project 
development, firms must first make a decision between separate and cooperative 
operations with other firms (Nischide and Tian, 2011), i.e. between  developing projects 
on their own or adopting new paradigm solutions. In this context, interesting questions 
arise that have not yet found any answer.  
 
i. What are the managerial implications of considering an R&D collaboration in a 
portfolio of R&D projects?  
ii. Under which conditions do R&D alliances perform better than the traditional 
innovation practices conducted in house, when the whole projects portfolio is 
considered? (What are the portfolio parameters that push to an open way (by 
signing partnerships) rather than to a closed way to innovate?) 
 
Second, since R&D project development is a dynamic process (Pinto and Prescott, 
1988) during which partnerships are initiated, developed or terminated at different point 
of time, one important aspect of R&D collaborations is the optimal timing to sign a 
partnership during the R&D development process. Very little is known on the optimal 
timing to establish an R&D alliance. Extent research focused on this issue (Kalamas et 
al. 2002; Nicholson 2005; Rogers et al. 2005; Lukas 2008), but it does not consider the 
important role of the competition. Savva (2006, p.3) states that “ In a number of 
industries, firms that undertake investments have an impact on market price and thus 
affect the profits of all firms in the industry. These firms must base their decisions not 
only on the stochastic underlying, but also on the actions of other firms in the industry.” 
As a consequence, it is more realistic to incorporate the possible re-action of 
competitors in the decision-making process. Given this important consideration, 
interesting questions that have not yet found any answer are: 
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i. In which stage of the uncertain innovation process is (if any) R&D collaboration 
most effective, when competition is taken into consideration?  
ii. What are the factors that induce firms to welcome or disregard the opportunity of 
collaborating with other firms in a competitive and uncertain environment? 
 
By adopting a real options approach, I attempt to answer these research questions. 
Specifically, the present research focuses on the evaluation of R&D alliances under 
uncertainty in two research areas of practical importance: portfolio management 
literature and alliance timing literature. Accordingly, in the first part of this dissertation 
(chapter 3 and chapter 4) I analyze how R&D alliances impact projects portfolio 
decisions, whereas in the second part (chapter 5) I analyze how competition impacts 
alliance timing decisions. Particularly, in my analysis, I refer to the biopharmaceutical 
industry. As a matter of fact, the pharmaceutical industry has experienced the advent of 
biotech newcomers in an increasing number of R&D collaborations (Gupta et al., 
2007). In this industry, strong portfolio management is pivotal in helping to focus 
company resources effectively on the most attractive projects, especially in the very 
uncertain first stages of the R&D development process (Betz, 2011). In addition, the 
biotechnology industry is characterised by the presence of many competitors (Deloitte, 
2005; FierceBiotech, 2007). Deloitte survey reports that a solid majority of both large 
and small companies in this industry believes that the alliance market will become even 
more competitive (Deloitte, 2005). By contrast, research that includes competition in 
the dynamic setting of biopharmaceutical collaborations is missing. These apparent 
lacunae motive the present Ph.D. dissertation. In details, I organize this thesis around 
the following chapters.  
Chapter 2 provides a wide discussion of the existing literature on the main topics 
covered in this thesis, in order to highlight the gap this research aims at filling and 
collect necessary elements for the models proposed in the further chapters. Specifically, 
the first section of Chapter 2 provides an overview of the theoretical background on the 
investments under uncertainty, illustrating the main real options approaches used to 
evaluate R&D investments. In the second section, an extensive discussion of relevant 
studies - including ROA based contributions - in portfolio management literature is 
offered. The third section discusses that part of option analysis which combines with 
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game theory, that is, the ROG  (real options game) literature is discussed. Section 2.4  
points the attention to the benefits of open innovation that can be partly explained by 
applying the real option approach, while in section 2.5 a discussion of relevant studies 
in alliance literature – with a particular focus on theoretical modeling in the setting of 
R&D alliances-  is offered. Finally, in section 2.6, the goal this research aims to reach is 
also provided. 
Chapter 3 is the outcome of the collaborative work with Giovanna Lo Nigro and 
Gianluca Enea (Lo Nigro et al. 2014) and deals with R&D collaborations managed 
simultaneously in a pharmaceutical R&D portfolio. By taking the perspective of 
pharmaceutical firms, I introduce a stochastic portfolio optimization model for making 
optimal project selection decisions when potential R&D alliances with biotechnology 
firms are considered. Indeed the developed model is able to select which R&D projects 
to finance and how to carry them out- that is, developing them in-house or in alliance 
with a biotechnology company, which represents an operative way to deploy open 
innovation practices. In addition, the self-financing option is modelled, that is, once 
commercialized, some products can finance other projects in the pipeline. Research 
findings suggest that considering R&D collaborations in the analysis makes an 
important contribution to the value of the chosen portfolio. In fact, the results obtained 
for the developed numerical case suggest the selection of a multi-balanced portfolio: the 
most valuable products that have reached the last stage of the development process are 
chosen in-house, in order to maintain their total ownership. Conversely, R&D 
collaboration is preferred in the case of products at their early stages of development 
(and thus characterized by higher uncertainty) and that will not necessarily come to 
market: the pharmaceutical company shares both development costs and potential 
revenues of these projects with the biotechnology company. Interestingly, the mix 
between in-house activity and R&D collaborations as well as the presence of a self-
financing policy, cause an overall increase of the real option value of the portfolio 
compared to its value estimated without considering the alliance option and the self-
financing option. 
Chapter 4 is the outcome of joint work with Giovanna Lo Nigro and aims at 
understanding what are the portfolio parameters that would push to a strategy of open 
innovation rather than to a closed one, which means under which conditions 
12 
 
pharmaceutical companies should collaborate with biotechnology companies when the 
whole portfolio of real options is considered. To this aim, starting from the model 
illustrated in the previous chapter, a DSS (Decision Support System), more and more 
used in literature to answer to similar questions, is proposed. Research findings show 
interesting managerial and academic implications: the main driver in product robustness 
(resilience in the optimal portfolio) and in determining the way the product is developed 
(in-house or in alliance) is the Net Present Value (NPV) of cash flows that result from 
the commercialization of the product (that represents the underlying of the related real 
option): specifically, the higher this value, the higher the convenience to select the 
project and develop it in house. Also the potential added value from the partner plays an 
important role in product selection: indeed, as it increases, the convenience to select and 
develop the product in alliance increases, confirming the importance of complementary 
resources in open innovation literature. 
Chapter 5 is the outcome of collaborative work with Giovanna Lo Nigro, Serena Robba 
and Paolo Roma (Lo Nigro et al. 2013) and focuses on the time aspects of R&D 
biopharmaceutical collaborations in presence of competition. Some authors highlight 
the optimal time to sign a partnership during the R&D biopharmaceutical process 
(Kalamas et al. 2002; Nicholson 2005; Rogers et al.  2005), but they do not consider 
competition. However, it is more realistic to incorporate the possible re-action of 
competitors in the decision-making process, especially in the biotechnology industry, 
which is characterised by the presence of many competitors (Deloitte, 2005; 
FierceBiotech, 2007). In this part of the thesis I introduce and analyse the effect of 
competition in biotechnology industry by modelling the decisions of whether and when 
ally with a pharmaceutical company through a two-stages real options game. Research 
findings suggest that the timing decisions depend on the level of the competition, 
synergies obtained through the alliance and contract terms offered by the 
pharmaceutical company as well. Interestingly, I also show that the first mover might 
not always pre-empt the follower in partnering with the pharmaceutical company. 
Finally, chapter 6 concludes and presents the main theoretical contributions and 
managerial implications of this dissertation. It also outlines the limitations of this work 
and suggests further research developments. Among the others, a very interesting 
development could aim at testing some results of this research in laboratory through an 
13 
 
experimental laboratory approach. Does real options theory describe actual investment 
behaviour? Recent studies (Yavas and Sirmans 2005; Oprea et al. 2009; Anderson et al. 
2010) focused on this issue, considering investments decisions. Therefore, future 
research  could aim at investigating human choice behaviour in R&D alliance decisions, 
by developing quantitative models in order to predict and explain behaviour in this 
particular context.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
 
2.1 Real options analysis: theoretical background 
A major advance in development of R&D project selection tools came with the 
application of options reasoning to R&D. The evaluation of investment projects is 
generally done by using discounted cash flows based methods such as the net present 
value (NPV). However, in the field of R&D projects, where high uncertainty and risks 
are prominent, these methods lose a large amount of their effectiveness. In fact they fail 
to correctly assess the real value of these projects which results, among other things, 
from the flexibility possessed by the management and from the several opportunities 
these kinds of investments offer (Myers 1987, Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Trigeorgis 
1988, Trigeorgis 1995, Smit 1996). Although traditional methods are still the most 
frequently used to evaluate R&D projects (Hartmann and Hassan 2066), the enormous 
pressure to innovate, especially in the knowledge-intensive industries, forces the 
companies to use sophisticated instruments which are more accurate in evaluation of 
chances and risks of R&D projects, in order to choose the right ones and avoid the risk 
of missing profitable opportunities. Therefore, in recent years, the evaluation of R&D 
projects through real options based methods has gained growing attention. As a matter 
of fact, real options methods are able to model the uncertainty and the flexibility 
embedded in the R&D process and to consider the value of future opportunities.  
A real option is “the right, but not the obligation, to take a specific action in the future” 
(Amram and Kulatilaka 1999, p. 5). A real option gives the right, but not the obligation, 
to undertake a business decision, which generally is the chance to make, abandon, 
expand, or contract a capital investment. To use Trigeorgis (1996) words, “the owner of 
a discretionary opportunity has the right -but not the obligation- to acquire the present 
value of expected cash flows by making an investment on or before the anticipated date 
when the investment will cease to exist” (Trigeorgis 1996, p. 124). 
Real options are options whose underlying asset is a real asset and not a financial 
instrument. As with financial options, it is possible to distinguish between real call 
options giving the right to buy the underlying asset at a predetermined price and real put 
options giving the right to sell the underlying asset at a given price. For example, the 
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opportunity to invest in the expansion of a firm’s production capacity if the market 
grows is a call option, whereas the opportunity to abandon a project can been seen as a 
put option (Munari and Oriani 2011). In this dissertation the focus is on real options in 
R&D that are a precondition to open up opportunities for future growth, i.e. call 
options. In addition, another distinction is between American or European put and call 
options dependently if it is possible to exercise the option before or at a fixed date 
respectively.  
The real options analysis (ROA) applies the financial options evaluation techniques, 
like the Black & Scholes formula (Black & Scholes, 1973) or the binomial model (Cox 
et al., 1979) to capital budgeting decisions (Brealey and Myers, 2000). These financial 
options models usually require input variables such as the underlying value, the 
exercise price, the volatility, the time to maturity, as well as the riskless interest rate. 
These input variables have real counterparts in actual capital investments, as shown in 
Table 1, and have to be estimated before valuing a real option. 
 
Variable Financial option Real option 
Underlying Current value of the stock Present value of project expected 
cash flows 
Exercise 
price 
Stock  price Current value of  project investment 
cost 
Time to 
maturity 
Expiration date of the stock Length of time in which the 
investment opportunity exists 
Volatility Volatility of returns on stock Project value volatility 
Interest rate Riskless interest rate Riskless interest rate 
Table1: Input variables used in financial options and real options evaluation. 
 
When valuing investments as real options, generally these input parameters can easily 
be observed or approximated (Lint, 2004). For instance, the riskless interest rate can be 
derived from government bonds that have the same time to maturity as the R&D option. 
The exercise price, i.e. the expenditure required to acquire the project asset, can be a 
known exercise price or a stochastic exercise price. According to Lint (2004), the 
exercise price is relatively short-term oriented since it is possible to obtain reasonable 
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estimates of this cost by means of the interviews with managers involved in the R&D 
process. Literature offers also some contributions, such as that provided by McDonald 
and Siegel (1986), which consider the exercise price not known in advance. In such a 
case, it  has to be replicated as a stochastic variable. Computing the time to maturity 
could be not easy. The time to maturity generally is the time to go to market. It can be  
can be a fixed date (as in European options) or a not known date (as in American 
options). In the latter case, different circumstances can influence its value. According to 
several authors, in absence of competition, delaying the market introduction (delaying 
the exercise of the option) is beneficial, in order to obtain more information in the 
future that makes the option more valuable. However, under competitive circumstances, 
a company may anticipate the market entry for first-mover reasons (this issue is 
discussed more in details in section 2.3). In such cases, the R&D option should be 
considered as an American option, whose evaluation is more complicated than 
European options. As a matter of fact, many applications of R&D option valuation 
focus on projects modeled as European options, i.e. with a fixed time to maturity, and 
assuming that the option will be exercised at that date (Lint 2004). Another important 
key parameter is represented by the underlying value, which is the present value of 
expected future cash flows upon commercialization of the project. The underlying is 
treated as a stochastic variable
2
 with a given volatility, i.e. the volatility of the same 
expected cash flows. Both underlying and volatility, are hard to measure.  The former is 
generally estimated through managers’ interviews. As far as the volatility is concerned, 
depending on the specific case to model, managements estimates as well as past data 
from the volatility of completed R&D projects, have been used as an approximation
3
 
(Lint 2004; Perlitz et al. 1999). 
Different options methods have been used in literature to evaluate R&D investments 
and they can be classified, according to some classifications proposed in literature 
(Cassimon et al. 2011b; Munari and Oriani 2011), in  numerical approaches such as the 
                                                 
2
 Different approaches have been used in literature to model the stochastic process of the underlying and 
one has to distinguish between continuous time and discrete time contemplation of the underlying 
movements. In particular, if the continuous time approach is applied, several processes are conceivable: 
the Diffusion-Process (such as the Brownian Motion), the Jump-Process and the Mean Reverting process 
(Dxit and Pindyck 1994). 
 
3
 For example, Merck (the first pharmaceutical company that has explicitly embraced  real  option pricing 
to R&D in order to evaluate its investments process), uses the historic volatility of a biotechnology index 
of related stocks which are traded at NASDAQ (Nichols, 1994). 
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binomial model and closed-form solutions such as the Black and Sholes (B&S) formula 
and the Geske model, based on B&S, which is able to evaluate compound options (a set 
of subsequent options that are dependent on each other).  
In the following sub-sections I first briefly review some of the above-mentioned models 
used to evaluate call options and, secondly, I show both weaknesses and strengths in 
using numerical and closed-form methods respectively.  
 
2.1.1 The Black and Sholes formula 
Black and Sholes analyze the option pricing problem in a continuous-time framework 
by assuming that the value of the underlying asset (S in the following formulae) follows 
a geometric Brownian motion. The geometric Brownian motion assumption 
corresponds to assuming a lognormal distribution for the underlying at the end of any 
finite interval time (please refer to Figure 1). Other assumptions of the model are (Black 
and Sholes 1973, p. 640): 
 The riskless interest rate is known and is constant through time; 
 The variance rate of the return on the stock is constant; 
 The stock does not pay any dividend; 
 The option is “European”, that is, it can only be exercised at maturity; 
 There are no transaction costs in buying or selling the stock; 
 It is possible to borrow any fraction of the price of a security to buy it or to hold 
it, at the riskless interest rate; 
 There are no penalties to short selling. A seller who does not own a security will 
simple accept the price of the security from a buyer, and will agree to settle with 
the buyer on some future date by paying him an amount equal to price of the 
security on that date. 
 
Under these assumptions, the value of the option will depend only on the price of the 
stock (i.e. the underlying), on time and on variables that are taken to be known 
constants (the riskless rate, the volatility as well as the exercise price). Specifically, the 
value of a call option - C in equation (1) - in terms of the Black and Sholes parameters 
is:   
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            (1) 
 
With: 
    
  
 
         
        
       
   
 
(2) 
 
                 (3) 
 
Where: 
S = the price of the underlying; 
K= the exercise price; 
r = the riskless interest rate; 
T= the time to maturity; 
t = the current time; 
  = the standard deviation of the stock’s returns; 
N(.) = the cumulative normal density function. 
 
Let me illustrate how the model works. Figure 1 represents the underlying process 
according to a geometric Brownian motion which originates a lognormal distribution at 
the maturity, with mean and variance equal respectively to (Dixit and Pindyck 1994): 
 
             (4) 
 
                   
      
 
(5) 
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Figure 1: Replications of the underlying process of a project  according to a GBM. On the right 
side the lognormal distribution at maturity obtained with 10.000 replications. 
There are two important points in time: the current time t=0 and the time to maturity 
T=2 (see Fig. 1). At t=0, the holder of the option acquires the right, but not the 
obligation, to make another investment at maturity T=2, i.e. to exercise the option at 
maturity. In fact, at maturity new information is available, i.e. the realization of S at T 
(ST) from the lognormal distribution is known. The option will be exercised only if the 
net payoff at maturity is positive, that is only if ST will exceed the exercise price K (in 
such a case the option is called “in the money”). Accordingly, the payoff at maturity 
will be: 
               (6) 
Of course we have to compute an expected value of the option at t=0, so that we can 
obtain the formulation as in equation 1. According to Nielsen (1993), it is useful to 
split the call value in equation 1 in two components. A first component is the payment 
of the exercise price, contingent on the option finishing in the money. In equation 1, 
N(d2) is the probability, P, that the event of the option will finish in the money, i.e. 
N(d2)=       . As a consequence, the expected payment at maturity is         
and the present discount at t=0, is         
   . 
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The second component is the receipt of the stock, again contingent on the option 
finishing in the money and thus is exercised. The expected future value of this 
component is not simply the conditional expectation of the stock price given exercise. 
Rather it is the conditional expectation of the stock price given exercise times the 
probability of exercise. In mathematical formulation it is: 
 
                    
        4
 (7) 
 
 
and so the current value at t=0 is        (Nilesen, 1993  p. 5and 6). 
By putting together the values of the two components, it is straightforward to get the 
Black and Sholes formula as in equation 1. 
An important consideration is that the investment at t=0, is a sunk cost, i.e. it does not 
affect the option value, but decreases this value.  
Finally, the B&S formula for a call option can be seen as a simple option, or a 1-fold 
option (Cassimon et al. 2004). In other words, this model works very well in a general 
R&D environment where the decision to exercise the option is made only once at 
maturity, that is, the simple option is characterized by one expiration date and one 
exercise price. 
 
2.1.2 The Geske model 
To better evaluate sequential R&D projects, in which the staged process allows the 
management to move a product development into the next stage only if the expected 
results appear to be satisfactory, the Geske model should be adopted, well known to 
evaluate European compound options.  
In fact, the R&D process of a generic project is a series of consecutive phases from the 
research phase to the commercialization phase, where each phase represents an option 
on executing the following phase, i.e. a compound option.  
Starting from the Black and Sholes formula, Geske derived in 1979 a closed-form 
solution for the evaluation of an option on an option, or a 2-fold compound option. 
According to Geske model, the holder of the compound option makes decisions in two 
                                                 
4
 In formula 7 note that         is not equal to       
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separate dates. Specifically the compound option is characterized by two expiration 
dates and two exercise prices. If the first expiration date arrives and the 'inner' option's 
market price is over the agreed exercise price the first option will be exercised, giving 
the holder a further option at final maturity. Important assumptions of this model are 
(Geske, 1979 p. 68): 
 
 The changes of the value of the stock follow a random walk in continuous time 
with a variance rate proportional to the square root of the value of the firm; 
 Investors are unsatiated; 
 The security markets are perfect and competitive; 
 The riskless interest rate is known and is constant through time; 
 The trading takes place continuously in time,  
 The firm has no payouts.  
Under these assumptions, the value of the option will again depend only on the price of 
the stock (i.e. the underlying), and time and on known and constant variables. 
Specifically, the value of a call option - C in equation (8)- in terms of the Geske 
parameters is:   
 
                   
                       
             (8) 
 
With: 
    
  
 
          
         
        
   
(9) 
 
    
  
 
  
                 
        
   
 
(10) 
                    (11) 
 
                ; (12) 
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(13) 
 
    the solution of                
 
Where: 
S, r,  , t, N(.) assume the same meaning as in the previous section. Also, let me define: 
  = time to maturity of the compound option C; 
  = time to maturity of the underlying call option; 
  = exercise price of the compound option C; 
  = exercise price of the underlying call option ;  
    bivariate cumulative normal distribution function with    and    as upper limits 
and   as the correlation coefficient between the two variables. 
 
Let me provide an application of the Geske formula, available in literature (Perlitz et al. 
1999), that clarifies how the model works. Assume the evaluation of a project in the 
pharmaceutical industry. For the sake of simplicity, consider the R&D process, 
traditionally divided in several phases from research to market introduction, as split into 
3 main phases (see Fig. 2). Phase 1 serves to identify active substances out of numerous 
possible compounds. Once a substance has been identified as promising enough, the 
testing Phase can start (generally this phase includes four sub-sequent testing phases). If 
this phase turns to be successfully completed, then the pharmaceutical company can 
make an ulterior investment in production capacity and market introduction. Two 
options can be identified in this setting: the option to invest in testing is the first option, 
whereas the second option is represented by the investment in production capacity and 
market introduction. Taken together, both opportunities form a compound option, or 
better, a 2-fold option that can be well evaluated by the Geske model. 
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Figure 2: Simplified illustration of the pharmaceutical R&D process 
 
As in the case of the simple call option discussed in the previous section, at t=0, the 
company makes an initial investment (again a sunk cost that does not affect the 
compound option value) to buy the compound option to make further investments later 
(K1 and K2 in equation 8), based on successfully completion of both the Phase 1 and the 
testing  Phase, in two fixed dates (t1 and t2). In other words, if the asset value at time t1, 
exceeds the investment cost K1 (or alternatively, if the current asset price at t1 is over  
     as defined above), the first option is exercised and the company buys the right to 
exercise the second option at t2. At that date, if the asset value exceeds the production 
and market cost K2, the pharmaceutical company will exercise the second option too, 
that is, the compound option is exercised. 
 
2.1.3 The binomial model 
A simpler, discrete time analysis, which in the limit of very small time steps yields the 
continuous time results obtained by Black and Sholes, was proposed by Cox et al. 
(1983). The key assumption on which this approach, known as the binomial pricing 
approach, is based is to make discrete the continuous-time stochastic process for the 
underlying S and then use dynamic programming to compute the option value C. In 
such a way, the underlying S follows a multiplicative binomial process as shown in 
Figure 3. As a consequence, the first step to solve the model is to build a tree of all 
possible discrete values that S can assume in future.  
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Let me illustrate the stochastic process of S after just one period. As Figure 3(a) shows, 
the current stock price S at the end of one period can assume two values: Su if S goes 
up with probability q and Sd if S goes down with probability (1-q); with: 
 
          (14) 
          =    
(15) 
Where   is the standard deviation of the underlying S and    is the discrete time 
interval. If n is the number of time steps between 0 and T (the maturity of the option), 
   is computed as T/n and represents the length of each interval that constitutes the tree. 
In the illustrated case    is equal to T, since just one time-step is considered.  
 
 
Figure 3: Binomial pricing tree for underlying value (a) and call value (b) 
 
In the model, the risk neutral probability q of an up movement is given by: 
   
       
   
 
(16) 
where r is the riskless rate.  
Once the tree and the values of the underlying are computed,  it is possible to calculate 
the option value C, by recurring to dynamic programming. The value of the option in 
the last period (Cu or Cd in Figure 3(b)), is computed as: 
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                         (17) 
 
where K is the exercise price.  
As a matter of fact, the option is exercised only if the net payoff at the end of the first 
period is positive. The value of the call option C is thus obtained by discounting back 
the two possible values of C (Cu and Cd), weighted by their risk-neutral probabilities (q 
and (1-q) respectively), and using the riskless rate r as the appropriate discount factor. 
  
                     (18) 
 
It is possible to extend the process of the underlying S over multiple time periods, 
solving the model by dynamic programming in order to obtain the call value C at t=0. 
For small enough values of ∆T, i.e. considering a huge number of time steps n, the 
discrete approximation of C will converge to the Black-Scholes continuous-time value.   
 
2.1.4 Numerical approaches vs Closed-form formulae: a comparison 
Binomial approaches show a somewhat misleading intuitive simplicity because they 
still use a discrete numerical method. According to Cassimon et al. (2004, 2011a), two 
problems may arise by adopting binomial approaches. The first problem is that it is not 
known how many time steps are necessary in order to obtain an accurate option price. 
In general, binomial prices converge to an analytical result. However, theory does not 
say how many periods are needed to obtain a good level of accuracy (Cassimon et al., 
2004, p. 49). The second problem is the choice of the up (u) and down ratios (d) and the 
risk of neutral probabilities (q), which are computed using the formulae for pricing 
stock options based on the binomial model provided by Cox et al. (1979). Chriss (1997,  
p. 238) demonstrates that, under given input parameters, the Cox, Ross and Rubenstein 
binomial tree does not work
5
.  
As above said, a real option gives the right, but not the obligation, to undertake a 
business decision, which generally is the chance to make, abandon, expand, or contract 
                                                 
5
 Particularly, Chriss (1997) refers to Kellogs and Charnes’s (2000) work, The authors applied the Cox et 
al. (1979) approach to evaluate a pharmaceutical company. Chriss (1997, p. 238) demonstrates that, 
under given input parameters which are  used to obtain u, d and q, the Cox et al. (1979) binomial model 
leads to calculate a value of q equal to 3,005632, which is an invalid probability.  
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a capital investment. These options can be modeled by American or European put and 
call options dependently if it is possible to exercise the option before or at a given date 
respectively. Whereas numerical expressions are able to model all types of the above 
options, the main limit of closed-form formulae is their inability to solve the American 
put option. However, since the focus of this dissertation is on the growth options 
(modeled as call options), this limitation would not apply. 
Another limitation is represented by the assumed distribution for the underlying: in 
closed formulae this is the Brownian Motion. This particular motion implies a 
continuous arrival of information that changes the underlying value (Pennings & Lint, 
1997). However, information that affects the underlying value (the NPV of future cash 
flows) arrives at discrete points of time and this means that the managers, in real 
markets, do not continuously adjust the underlying value, but rather do so, i.e. only 
when information with strategic impact arrives (Pennings & Lint, 1997). In order to 
overcome this limitation, several authors propose jump-process models, where discrete 
value changes are superimposed on a Brownian process following exponentially 
distributed intervals (Merton 1976; Lint and Pennings 1997).  
In addition, an important consideration is about the risk that characterizes the 
innovative R&D process. This total risk is usually divided in two components, namely 
economic (or commercial) risk and technical risk. The former deals with factors that 
increase market uncertainty, like interest rates, inflation and changes in industry prices. 
This kind of risk is systematic because a company can’t affect it. On the other hand, the 
latter, i.e. the technical risk, stems from the lack of certainty about the process success. 
Technical risk deals with factors related to the projects such as approval probability and 
uncertainty in development costs. Whereas numerical approaches are able to capture the 
technical uncertainties and commercial risk of the R&D process, closed-form solutions, 
such as B&S or Geske model, capture only the economic risk. However, Cassimon et 
al. (2011a) incorporated the technical risk, in the n-fold compound option model, 
preserving the closed-form formula. 
Finally, while the binomial model allows for the widest range of applications and is 
very robust under different conditions, it has some methodological problems. The 
reason has to be searched in the way of contemplation of the underlying: in the 
binomial model the underlying is discrete rather than continuous as in the closed 
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formulae. The continuous time assumption of Black and Sholes and Geske model, 
allows for closed-form solutions that makes the handling easier (Perlitz et al. 1999, p 
264). However, according to Munari and Oriani (2011), the choice of the model may be 
very idiosyncratic to the specific problem to address and no unique recipe can be 
provided ex ante.  
 
2.2 Critical review of portfolio selection methods 
The portfolio selection problem has been one of the most important issues in modern 
finance since the 1950s. The first model for portfolio optimization was developed by 
Markowitz in 1952. In this model the return on the portfolio is measured by the 
expected value of the random portfolio return, while the associated risk is quantified by 
the variance of returns’ distribution. Optimization requires selecting the portfolio with 
the highest expected return for a given level of risk, or, alternatively, the lowest risk for 
a given level of expected return.  
The concept of building business portfolios emerged in the late 1950s and evolved 
through the 1970s (Souder and Mandakovic, 1986) to become an established planning 
tool. During the 1980s and 1990s, companies extended the use of portfolio management 
into new products selection and R&D resource allocation. While the tools have changed 
over time, the basic need remains the same: companies must allocate a limited set of 
resources to projects in order to obtain a balanced portfolio, i.e. diversifying the 
projects in the portfolio in terms of various trade-offs such as high risk versus sure bets, 
internal versus outsourced work, etc (Cooper et al. 1998; Dickinson et al. 2001). 
Methods and techniques for selecting projects have appeared in the literature for at least 
40 years and there have been hundreds of published studies. Approaches tend to be 
either quantitative and qualitative, ranging from rigorous operations research methods 
to social-science-based interactive techniques (Henriksen &Traynor, 1999). Overviews 
on the topic of R&D portfolio selection are provided by Henriksen &Traynor (1999),  
Chien et al. (2002) and Iamratanakul et al. (2008). An update overview of the R&D 
portfolio selection literature is presented in Table 2: in particular, for each paper, the 
evaluation approach and the contribution to the literature are shown. 
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Authors 
(Year) 
Title  Evaluation 
Approach 
Contribution 
Markowitz 
(1952) 
 
Portfolio selection  Mean-variance 
approach 
The authors propose the 
concept of “considering 
a portfolio as a whole”. 
Sharpe (1964);  
Mossin (1966) 
 
Capital asset prices: 
a theory of market 
equilibrium 
Equilibrium in a 
capital asset market.  
Capital asset pricing 
model 
Find the relation 
between risk of an asset 
and its expected return. 
Golaby et 
al.(1981)  
 
Selecting a group of 
dissimilar projects 
for funding.  
 
Hybrid approach 
 Multi attribute 
theory utility 
(MAU) 
 Mathematical 
programming 
 
Use MAU in portfolio 
selection by 
transforming the utilities 
into measurable value 
functions and then 
combined the value 
functions into a 
portfolio index. 
Fox et al. 
(1984) 
Economics models 
for R&D projects 
selection in the 
presence of project 
interactions.  
 
Mathematical 
programming 
 
Take indirectly into 
account interactions 
between projects (both 
cost and outcome 
interactions) in a 
mathematical 
optimization model with 
budgetary constraints. 
The present value 
interrelations is assessed 
indirectly by explicitly 
modeling R&D project 
impacts on profitability. 
Keeney (1987) 
 
An analysis of the 
portfolio of sites to 
characterize for 
selecting a nuclear 
repository.  
 
Mean-variance 
approach 
Apply the mean-
variance approach in 
order to obtain different 
portfolios of three sites 
for selecting a nuclear 
repository  
Bard et al. 
(1988) 
An interactive 
approach to R&D   
project selection and 
termination. 
 
Hybrid approach 
 Screening 
 Mathematical 
programming 
 
Develop a new 2-steps 
methodology (i, 
screening; ii, 
mathematical 
programming) to 
adequately address the 
qualitative aspects 
(organizational, 
29 
 
environmental, and 
technical) in the projects 
selection. 
Liberatore 
(1989) 
An extension of the 
analytic hierarchy 
process for 
industrial R&D 
project selection and 
resource allocation.  
 
Hybrid approach 
  AHP 
 Mathematical 
programming 
 
The purpose of this 
paper is explore the 
applicability of an 
extension of the 
Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) for 
priority setting and 
resource allocation in 
the industrial R&D 
environment. Cost-
benefit analysis and 
integer programming 
are used to assist in the 
resource allocation 
decision. 
Peerenboom et 
al. (1989) 
Selecting  a 
portfolio of 
environmental 
programs for a 
synthetic fuels 
facility.  
 
Hierarchical 
decision framework 
The authors propose a 
hierarchical decision 
framework to establish 
research priorities and 
budget allocations 
within five 
environmental projects.  
Kocaoglu, and 
Iyigum (1994) 
Strategic R&D 
project selection and 
resource allocation 
with a decision 
support system 
application. 
 
Hybrid approach 
 AHP for 
criterion weights 
 Scoring for 
project screening 
 Delphi for 
information on 
requirements 
 NPV for 
analysis of 
benefit 
interactions 
 Mathematical 
programming 
with heuristic 
for resources 
allocation 
 
 
Develop an integrated  
DSS helps searching 
alternative solutions to 
strategic and operational 
R&D problems.  
 
Blau et al. 
(2004) 
Managing a 
Portfolio of 
Interdependent New 
Product Candidates 
Hybrid approach: 
 Simulation 
optimization; 
 Genetic 
Combine discrete 
simulations with 
bubble-chart diagrams 
and genetic algorithms  
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in the 
Pharmaceutical 
Industry.  
algorithms 
 Bubble-chart 
diagrams 
to obtain a robust 
portfolio to changing 
economic conditions, 
acceptable risk, and 
resource levels. 
Rogers et al. 
(2002) 
Real options based 
analysis of optimal 
pharmaceutical 
research and 
development 
portfolios.  
 
Real options 
Optimization 
Integrate ROA (real 
options analysis) in a 
stochastic optimization 
model to select the 
optimal portfolio, given  
a set of limited 
resources. 
Rogers et al. 
(2005) 
Valuation and 
design of 
pharmaceutical 
R&D licensing 
deals.  
 
Real options  
 
Optimization 
Starting from Rogers et 
al.’s (2002) model, the 
authors propose an 
approach by which to 
select the best licensing 
strategy for each 
product in the R&D 
portfolio. 
Bardhan et al. 
(2006) 
Optimizing an It 
Project Portfolio 
With Time-Wise 
Interdependencies 
Real options 
Optimization 
Integrate  ROA (real 
options analysis) in a 
dynamic multi-period 
portfolio optimization 
model, where inter-
dependencies between 
projects are considered.  
van Bekkum et 
al.  (2009) 
A real options 
perspective on R&D 
portfolio 
diversification. 
  
Real Option 
Simulations 
Introduce a real options 
perspective on R&D 
portfolio diversification.  
The study supplements 
the Markowitz (1952) 
approach in that it 
explicitly considers real 
option characteristic. 
The authors demonstrate 
that correlation among 
R&D products with 
Real Options 
characteristics act 
differently than usually 
and in particular 
negative correlation 
only slightly reduces 
portfolio risk. 
 
Table 2: R&D Portfolio Selection Literature Summary  
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The review of the literature in this field highlights that different methods (third column) 
can be used to construct the optimal portfolio. According to Henriksen and Traynor 
(1999) R&D project selection methods can usually be classified in different categories 
such as Scoring, Mathematical programming, Financial/economic models, Decision 
analysis. So, as shown in Table 2, any logical combination of the indicated techniques 
can be used to construct an organization’s “optimal” R&D portfolio. For example, 
scoring may be used to carry out preliminary screening, financial models to evaluate 
single projects and, finally, mathematical programming to allocate resources and to 
select the optimal portfolio. In fact, the most recent trend has been to combine the 
different approaches into an integrated, interactive, manager-friendly, computer-based 
decision support system (DSS) (Chu et al. 1996; Henriksen and Traynor, 1999; 
Ghasemzadeh and Archer, 2000). 
Moreover, though different tools have been used to select an R&D portfolio, according 
to Cooper et al. (2001) and Zapata and Reklaitis (2011), most of them incorporate 
financial performance. Specifically, Cooper et al. (2001) provided a survey to IRI 
(Industrial Research Institute) member companies participating in an ongoing best 
practices study. The results of this study highlight that Financial methods (please refer 
to Figure 4) dominate portfolio management and project selection approaches. 
Specifically, the different portfolio tools considered in the survey are:  
 
 Financial methods. 
 Business’s strategy. The business’s strategy as the basis for allocating money 
across different types of projects is the second most popular portfolio approach. 
In this case, accordingly to the strategy achievement, money is allocated across 
different types of projects considered in the portfolio  
 Bubble diagrams. Two-axes diagrams are typically used to display the trade-off 
between two criteria: e.g., risk versus reward, probability of success versus 
value, or ease of implementation versus attractiveness. 
 Scoring models. 
 Check lists: Projects are evaluated on a set of Yes/No questions. Each project 
must achieve either all Yes answers, or a certain number of Yes answers to 
proceed. The number of Yes’s is used to rank decisions. 
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 Others.  
 
The results of the survey highlight that financial models are the most popular with 77,3 
% of businesses using them, and 40,4 % relying on them as the dominant portfolio 
decision tool. A total of 64,8 % of businesses use a strategic approach to select their 
portfolio of projects: for 26,6 % of businesses, this is the dominant method. 
Bubble diagrams or portfolio maps have received attention in recent literature, since a 
total of 40,6 % of businesses use portfolio maps; however only 5,3 % of businesses use 
this as their dominant method. Moreover, a total of 37,9 % of businesses use scoring 
models and in 13,3 % this is the dominant decision method while only 20,9 % of 
businesses use check lists and in only 2,7 % is the dominant method. Finally, 24% of 
businesses indicate that they use some “other method”, i.e. variants or hybrids of the 
above methods (Cooper et al. 2001) 
 
 
Figure  4: Popularity of Portfolio Methods Employed (Source: Cooper et al. 2001) 
 
The commonly used financial portfolio valuation methods are mainly based on the 
standard application of the net present value. Although the simple NPV method is very 
simple to use, it is not able to adequately capture risk and uncertainty of the R&D 
investments. This is not a trivial question. As a matter of fact, as pointed out by Poh and 
Buy (2001), uncertainty and risk of a project, have become important factors when the 
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effectiveness of an evaluation tool is considered. Specifically, Poh and Buy (2001), in a 
comparative analysis of R&D project evaluation methods conducted by an AHP 
framework, show that seven mayor criteria are important in determining the 
effectiveness of R&D evaluation methods. The seven criteria in this considered study 
are: 
1. Simplicity. This criterion refers to simplicity of the evaluation method. 
2. Multiple objective. This criterion refers to the ability of the evaluation method to 
deal with multiple objectives. 
3. Risk and uncertainty. This criterion refers to the ability of the evaluation method 
to incorporate risk and uncertainty in the analysis. 
4. Cost of implementation. This criterion refers to cost of implementing the 
evaluation method 
5. Adaptivity. This criterion refers to the ability of the evaluation method to 
incorporate knowledge and experience of different decision-makers.  
6. Nature of data. This criterion refers to nature of data (both qualitative and 
quantitative) that are needed by the evaluation method  
7. Availability of data. This criterion refers to the availability of data required by 
the evaluation method 
 
The result of the analysis
6
 (please refer to Table 3) indicates that the two most 
important criteria are “multiple objective” and “risk and uncertainty”.  
Classification Criterion Relative importance 
I Multiple objective 0,309 
II Risk and uncertainty 0,254 
III Simplicity 0,141 
IV Availability of data 0,099 
V Adaptivity 0,094 
VI Nature of data 0,064 
VII Cost of implementation 0,039 
Table 3: Classification of criteria with respect to the goal. (Source: Poh and Bai, 2001) 
                                                 
6
 Poh and Buy (2001) developed an AHP approach where the hierarchical levels consist of the goal 
(identification of the best project evaluation), followed (level 2) by the criteria contributing to the goal 
and, finally, the alternatives (evaluation methods) at the lowest level. Particularly, I refer to level 2 in the 
analysis.  
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As the same Poh and Buy (2001) underline, “the evaluation R&D methods which can 
deal explicitly with the risks and uncertainty of projects, will be more effective and 
therefore preferred to those methods that do not”. This important consideration 
reinforces the need to evaluate the R&D projects portfolio through real options analysis, 
since - as widely discussed in section 2.1- ROA is acknowledged as a powerful tool to 
evaluate uncertain projects that have an intrinsic flexibility (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
In the last decade, as shown in Table 2, mathematical ROA-based models have also 
been developed to evaluate an R&D projects portfolio (this topic is addressed in more 
details in the following section). However, organizations, as pointed out by Hartmann 
& Hassann (2006), while recognizing the importance of ROA, do not apply it very 
often because it is perceived as a complex concept. The complexity of many R&D 
project-selection methods is another important issue. Referring once again to Poy and 
Buy’s study, “simplicity” is another important criterion (see Table 3) considered in 
evaluating the best method to select projects. The next section reviews in details ROA 
methods to evaluate an R&D portfolio and draws attention to the important fact that, 
from a practical standpoint, most of these models are very difficult to implement. It 
follows that future studies in the projects portfolio selection should be direct towards 
the integration of ROA and various methodologies in order to obtain a manageable tool, 
useful to select a balanced portfolio.  
 
2.2.1 Real options Analysis in a Portfolio Context 
“Valuing portfolios of options embedded in investment decisions is one of the most 
important and challenging problems in real options and corporate finance in general. 
Although the problem is vitally important in the value creation process of almost any 
corporation, it has not been satisfactorily addressed” (Trigerogis words in Brosch 
2008). As a matter of fact, most of real options methods are limited to the evaluation of 
a single project. Conversely, according to several authors, it is better to evaluate the 
entire R&D project portfolio of a company instead of its single projects, in order to 
consider the relations and the interdependencies between them. These 
interdependencies, which are ignored if projects are evaluated one by one, usually deal 
with limited resource consumption, risk balancing and company strategies. However, 
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while there is a large amount of literature on project evaluation using ROA, in practice 
the method has been used effectively only to evaluate single projects (Brosch 2008; 
Zapata and Reklaitis 2011).  
 
 R&D portfolio evaluation 
Numerical approaches Rogers et al., 2002; 
Smith and Thompson 2004; Rogers et al., 2005;  
Wang and Min 2006; Brosch 2008; 
van Bekkum et al. 2009; Rafiee and Kianfar 2011;  
Zapata and Reklaitis 2011. 
Closed-form solutions Luherman 1998; Bardhan et al. 2004. 
Table 4 : Classification of selected references about ROA based models to evaluate an R&D 
portfolio 
 
In Table 4, I summarize some literature contributions on ROA approaches in a portfolio 
context in accordance with the particular approach used, i.e. numerical methods, and 
closed-form solutions. To the best of my knowledge this is the first attempt to classify 
literature on real options methods used to evaluate an R&D portfolio. Among the 
others, I consider contributions such that offered by Luherman (1998), which is notable 
for stressing the important intuition of adopting a portfolio perspective, even if he 
didn’t consider limited resources allocation. Particularly the author adopts the B&S 
formula to evaluate each of the six projects in the portfolio and provides a comparison 
with the traditional NPV methodology. The analysis produces a very different 
assessment of the portfolio: instead of accepting only two projects and rejecting four, 
the options framework - that accounts of uncertainty and flexibility- suggests to reject 
just one project, accept immediately another project and wait and see for the other 
fours. Similarly, Smith and Thompson (2004), Wang and Min (2006) and van Bekkum 
et al. (2009), do not address the important problem of allocating scarce resources. On 
the other hand, these works shed light on how correlation between options can be coped 
with in a rigorous valuation framework. Specifically Wang and Min (2006) develop a 
methodology for valuing a portfolio of power generation projects that are market 
correlated. In Smith and Thompson’s (2004) work, the options considered in a given 
portfolio are assumed to be dependent, in that exercise of any one is assumed to 
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produce, in addition to some intrinsic value based on its underlying asset, further 
information concerning the value of other options based on related assets. van Bekkum 
et al. (2009) show that correlation among R&D products with real-options 
characteristics acts differently than it usually does in evaluation contexts that use 
traditional methods such as the NPV, and, in particular, negative correlation only 
slightly reduces portfolio risk. Though correlation between projects is a very significant 
source of interaction, in R&D portfolios it is dominated by resources constraints 
(Zapata and Reklaitis 2011). Other contributions take into account the very important 
aspect of the limited budget and they don’t consider other forms of interdependences 
among projects. Among these, given a set of limited resources, Rogers et al. (2002) 
develop a stochastic optimization model to select the optimal portfolio. In order to 
model both technological and market uncertainty, the authors adopt a quadranomial 
approach (a two-variable binomial tree) and model each project development as a series 
of continuation/abandonment options, deciding at each phase whether to proceed 
further or stop the development. Similarly, in Zapata and Reklaitis’s (2011) work, the 
evaluation of each project considered in the portfolio is represented by a quadranomial 
tree. Starting from Rogers et al.’s (2002) model, Rogers et al.  (2005) propose an 
approach by which to select the best licensing strategy for each product in the R&D 
portfolio.  
All of these contributions (except for Lueharman 1998) adopt numerical approaches in 
evaluating the entire portfolio. The main limitation in using such approaches is their 
implementation. According to Cassimon et al. (2004), it can easily become difficult to 
manage discrete approaches because of the rapidly increasing number of trees with the 
size of the portfolio. In fact, increasing the number of the underlying assets as well as 
the number of time-steps makes the model more realistic, but increases the 
dimensionality of the problem (Brosch 2008). As a result, not surprisingly, most of the 
above-mentioned references have considered the valuation of portfolios constituted by 
two or three projects. When the size of the portfolio increases (for example in the case 
study proposed by Rogers et al. (2002) that considers twenty candidate projects), the 
mathematics of the model becomes too complex including 893 binary variables and 
12,843 continuous variables. In such a case, companies may find it hard to identify an 
optimal project portfolio to solve a problem with a lot of constraints and several dozen 
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thousands of variables. A step towards simplifying this model was made by Rafiee and 
Kianfar (2011), who propose the same stochastic model of Rogers et al. (2002), but 
involving a smaller number of both scenarios and projects considered in the portfolio.  
Moreover, a rigorous valuation framework for portfolios of real options is offered by 
Brosch (2008). The author adopts a discrete approach to model n underlying assets and 
their inter- and intra-projects interactions. As a matter of fact, on the one hand he 
models different real options on the same underlying (intra-projects interactions), so 
that a compound option type approach is adopted. On the other hand, interactions 
created by the use of shared resources and operational constraints are also taken into 
account (inter-projects interactions). In addition, a key future of the model is the 
dynamic global budget equation which has the form of a balanced equation. Funds that 
are not spent can be invested in later periods and funds freed up from disinvestment can 
be plowed back (Brosch 2008, p. 133). To the best of my knowledge, this is the most 
exhaustive real options portfolio optimization model which, from a theoretical point of 
view, handles several important portfolio futures that have not been covered so far in 
literature. However, from a managerial point of view, since its mathematical 
formulation is very complex, the model presents several weaknesses and it is very hard 
to implement. The same author, when illustrates the proposed portfolio approach, 
highlights that he didn’t focus on the efficiency of implementation of the model.  
As far as closed-form solutions proposed to evaluate a projects portfolio are concerned, 
only few models appear in literature. As Lueharman (1998), Bardhan et al. (2004) 
integrate the Black and Sholes formula in a dynamic multi-period portfolio optimization 
model, where different inter-dependencies between projects are considered. For 
example, in their model, hard dependencies between two projects exist when a 
capability for one project is also required by one or more of the other project(s).  
Finally, there are a number of contributions which include fuzzy variables in the real 
options portfolio evaluation. Among these, Wang and Hwang (2007), Hassanzadeh et 
al. (2011), Hassanzadeh et al. (2012) propose closed-fuzzy option models, while   
Arastheh et al. (2014) and Carlsson (2007) propose discrete fuzzy approaches. 
However, the discussion of these last models is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
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2.3 Real Options Games 
ROG (real option games) approach combines real option analysis and game theory, thus 
allowing an economic actor to make decisions, which take into account both exogenous 
uncertainty (nature) and (re)-actions of economic actors that can affect his payoffs. In 
the managerial field, to use Chevalier-Roignant et al. (2011) words, ROG examines the 
tradeoff between managerial flexibility and commitment in dynamic competitive setting 
under uncertainty.  
The main principle underlying game theory is that economic actors involved in strategic 
decisions are affected not only by their own choices but also by the decisions of others.  
The games studied in game theory are well-defined mathematical objects. To be fully 
defined, a game must specify the following elements: the players of the game, the 
information and actions available to each player at each decision point, and 
the payoffs for each possible outcome (Kreps, 1990). The players are also assumed to 
be rational, i.e., each player is aware of the rationality of the other players and acts 
accordingly (Azevedo and Paxson, 2010). A game theorist typically uses these elements, 
to deduce a set of equilibrium strategies for each player such that, when these strategies 
are employed, no player can profit by unilaterally deviating from their strategy. These 
equilibrium strategies determine an equilibrium to the game (Kreps, 1990). According 
to Azevedo and Paxson (2010, p. 3), the two most common  investment games are the  
pre-emption game (where it is assumed that there is a first mover- advantage that gives 
the economic actor an incentive to be the first to invest) and the attrition game (where it 
is assumed that there is a second mover-advantage that gives the economic actor an 
incentive to be the second to invest). Furthermore, the actor’s advantage to invest 
first/second is, usually, assumed to be partial, i.e. the investment of the leader in the 
preemption games or the follower in the attrition games does not completely eliminate 
the revenues of its opponent. Also, in these kinds of games, firms are allowed to invest 
only once either sequentially or simultaneously, or both.  
In the last two decades, the literature combining game theory aspects with real options 
analysis has been very active
7
. In fact, as game theory aims to provide a framework for 
modeling situations in which players, in making investment decisions, take into account 
                                                 
7
 Grenadier (2000a) and Smit and Trigeorgis (2006) provide very good summaries of existing literature 
on real options games.  
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other players’ possible reactions, and real options theory is appropriate for most 
investment decisions, a merger between these two theories appears to be a logic step 
(Smit and Trigeorgis, 2007; Azevedo and Paxson, 2010). The existing literature offers a 
wide range of ROG models which, among the others, present the following 
characteristics: the underlying value of investment is treated as a variable which follows 
a known stochastic process (for instance, the above-mentioned geometric Brownian 
motion); the investment cost is sunk; players are not financially constrained; the 
investment problem is studied in isolation (i.e., the game is played on a single project); 
the number of players which hold the option to invest is traditionally two (duopoly) 
(Azevedo and Paxson, 2010, p.3). 
Particularly, this stream of research starts with Trigeorgis (1991) who studies the 
impact of competition on the optimal timing of project initiation. Smit and Ankum 
(1993) investigate the timing investment decisions in a discrete time-real options model. 
They illustrate the influence of competition on both project value and investment timing. 
Similarly, Lambrecht (1999) and Joaquin and Butler (1999) analyze timing decisions by 
presenting models where competing firms have opportunities to invest in discrete 
investment projects. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), chapter 9, deal with similar research 
questions by introducing a real options continuous-time model for duopoly market. 
Grenadier (2000b) and Bouis et al. (2009) study competitive investments in new 
markets where more than two potential competitors are present, i.e. in oligopoly market. 
Smit and Trigeorgis (2007) highlight the importance to combine real options analysis 
and game theory, by implementing their proposed discrete-time model in electronics 
and telecommunications. In such a way, the authors can help guide managerial 
judgment in deciding whether and when it is more profitable to pre-empt the rival and 
when participation in strategic alliances is the preferred route. Readers can refer to 
Azevedo and Paxson (2010) for an exhaustive overview of ROG models.  
Although several different ROG models have been developed, the pre-emption game is 
one of the most common used in the real options literature. In addition, this kind of 
game is mainly modeled in duopoly market (Bouis et al. 2009; Azevedo and Paxson 
2010). The focus is on studying the trade-off between the value of waiting (as suggested 
by real options literature about single decision maker models) and the incentive to 
preempt the competitor. As a matter of fact, in single decisions maker problems, i.e. 
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when an investor has a monopoly over an investment opportunity, real option theory 
shows that in presence of irreversible investment costs and uncertain revenues, there is 
an option value to wait until more information is available an delay the investment 
opportunity more than the classical net present value method suggests. The reason is 
that once more information becomes available over time, the decision maker can make 
better decisions at a later date (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Trigeorgis 1996). For instance, 
as stated in Smit and Trigeorgis (2007), in 1990 Digital faced a timing decision as to 
when to commercialize its Alpha microprocessor chip and decided to wait because of 
uncertainty over which product standard would prevail (Smit and Trigeorgis, 2007, p. 
87). However, in a duopoly game, when competition is taken into account in the 
analysis, the option to delay the investment becomes less valuable. The presence of 
competition may have an erosion effect on the option value that may justify an earlier 
investment. For example, in consumer electronics, Philips and Sony’s strategy to 
commercialize the Digital Video Disk was affected by the competitive decisions of 
Toshiba and Ti-Warner, and vice-versa (Smit and Trigeorgis, 2007, p. 91). It follows 
that, depending on the decision problem managers may face, we can distinguish 
between two different kinds of real option games, (Smit and Trigeorgis, 2007): 
 
 Games against nature, where managers make investment decisions when 
commercial prospects are uncertain, i.e. in the face of random fluctuations of the 
project value. 
  Strategic games against competition, where managers make investment 
decisions recognizing, in addition to the kind of uncertainty present in the games 
against nature, possible reactions of competitors that would in turn impact the 
value of their investment opportunity.  
 
As shown in the first chapter, this thesis addresses the important issue of the alliance 
timing decisions in a dynamic setting, by introducing a real option game, which 
provides insights on timing alliance in biopharmaceutical industry (please refer to 
chapter 5). In order to become more confidential with the proposed model for alliance 
timing problem, let me illustrate in Figure 5 and Figure 6 an example of both a 
traditional Games against nature (the monopoly case) and a Strategic games against 
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competition (specifically the duopoly case) that deal with the investment timing 
decisions under uncertainty. Specifically, in both cases, a two-stages discrete-time 
model is represented, in which the choice to “invest” or to “defer” is made in two 
possible moments by firm A in the monopoly case and by both firm A and firm B in the 
duopoly case. To make the mathematics as simple as possible, it is common to divide 
the entire project development process in two stages (stage I and stage II in Fig.5 and 
Fig. 6), such as the R&D phase and the commercialization phase. Then, the investment 
(or not) decisions are made at the beginning of the stage I and at the beginning of the 
stage II, i.e. at t=0 and t=1 in both Figures. Note that just a qualitative representation of 
the problems is given, that is the computation of payoffs is not provided.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Two-stages Investments decisions (Monopoly case) 
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Figure 6: Two-stages Investments decisions (Duopoly case) 
 
2.4 Open Innovation and Real Option 
Open innovation is defined as ‘the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge 
to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, 
respectively’ (Chesbrough et al., 2006, p. 1). According to this definition, depending on 
its business model, a firm decides if or not external and internal knowledge is valuable 
to be further developed and commercialized into a new business. For instance, when the 
project is expected not to be profitable enough, the firm will not simply dismiss the 
project (as in the closed innovation framework), but she will try to license or to sell it to 
other firms who can use the innovation productively because they have different 
business models (Vanhavarbeke et al. 2008, p. 253). As a result, unlike the closed 
innovation model, the open innovation paradigm highlights the spectrum of alternatives 
available to firms during the R&D process; indeed, at any phase of the process, firms 
can decide to start, continue, partner with others firms or dismiss the project 
completely. At the same time, there are different kinds of real options which may be 
embedded in a project, namely: the growth option, the option to defer an investment 
project, the option to contract, expand or temporarily shut down an investment, the 
option to abandon an investment project (Perlitz and al. 1999). So, as Vanhavarbeke et 
al. (2008) state, it is surprising that scholars do not pay attention to the existing synergy 
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between ROA and OI. Starting from this important consideration, though there are 
many studies that have focused on various aspects of the open innovation process, in 
this section- consistently with the goal of this dissertation- I discuss some contributions 
that point the attention to the benefits of open innovation that can be partly explained by 
applying the real option approach (Van de Vrande et al., 2006; Vanhavarbeke et al. , 
2008) .  
As companies strive both to maintain their annual revenue-growth rates and to be more 
competitive, the emphasis is on investing in new business opportunities. The creation of 
new businesses inherently involves a high level of uncertainty, especially in the early 
stages of new business development. One way that have firms to handle uncertainty 
associated with new business development is making small investments in multiple 
options on technology (Vanhavarbeke et al., 2008). As it should be clear from the 
section 2.1, real options reasoning is a recognized tool in literature to reduce the 
uncertainty of innovation projects as well as corporate venturing (Miller & Arikan, 
2004). As a matter of fact, making a small, initial investment under high levels of 
uncertainty allows firms to create an option to wait until the uncertainty about the 
opportunity has decreased. When the uncertainty has decreased, the investing firm can 
decide whether to make a further investment or whether to dismiss the project (Adner & 
Levinthal, 2004; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). In these early phases with high levels of 
uncertainty (both technological and market uncertainty), firms can create options 
through learning investments: establishing research alliances with partners is just one 
possibility to explore business opportunities in the first uncertain phases (Vanhavarbeke 
et al. ,2008). By investing in collaborative research firms learn about this opportunity 
and in this way decrease the huge uncertainty related to the initial investment. Once the 
learning investments result in an improved understanding of the technology and 
uncertainty has reached an acceptable level, innovating firms could invest in more 
substantial ways using other external governance modes such as equity alliances or 
joint ventures (Van de Vrande et al., 2006). As a consequence, the real options 
approach offers a framework to better explain the sequential investment rounds in new 
technologies. Accordingly to Vanhavarbeke et al. (2008) there are several advantages in 
adopting the innovation practices in terms of real options compared to the closed 
innovation ones. In particular, their study shows how the real option approach can 
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explain the benefits of one of the most common open innovation practices, i.e. of 
external corporate venturing. In primis, open innovation allows innovating firms to 
access to several externally developed inventions by participating, for instance, in 
venture capital funds. The main advantage of this strategy is that companies make small 
investments and learn about new technologies or projects with uncertain payoffs. Once 
uncertainty is solved or it is at an acceptable level, companies can decide to invest 
more. In addition, investing in external technologies enhances the potential of the real 
option because the company can scan a wide range of interesting ideas and projects. In 
real option terms, open innovation allows companies to build a portfolio of projects, 
instead of just writing options on internal projects alone. Second, innovating firms also 
benefit from delayed entry. Whereas in closed innovation models firms can only start 
with an internally developed project and pull it through the funnel, open innovation 
practices offer firms more flexibility about when to start the innovation process: firms 
could prefer to invest in technologies at a later stage when the level of uncertainty has 
decreased. Third, open innovation offers firms the advantage of an early exit : as a 
matter of fact, firms can always license or sell technologies that are not promising 
enough if they are developed internally (for instance they do not fit with their core 
competencies), but they might be valuable as they come to be developed in partnership 
(Vanhavarbeke et al. , 2008 p. 253, 254). 
These considerations reinforce the need to adopt a real options approach when 
evaluating R&D alliances.  
 
2.5 Research on R&D alliances  
This section presents a review of alliance literature with a particular focus on the 
literature that considers theoretical modeling in the setting of R&D alliance activity 
under uncertainty. The literature on alliances is vast and most of it has examined the 
formation process of the R&D alliances, which includes the important decisions of both 
whom to ally with (Li et al. 2008; Lavie et al. 2012) and the appropriate governance 
structure (Powell 1990; Das and Teng, 2001). The most popular theories that have been 
used to analyze several key aspects involved in the alliance process, such as partner 
selection or governance choice, are the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
(Williamson 1985), and the Resources-based View (RBV) (Zollo, 2002). Recently, 
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Real Options Theory has started to attract significant interest also in the field of 
strategic management (Kogut, 1991). In fact, for at least a decade, work on investment 
under uncertainty - summarized by the seminal book by Dixit and Pyndyck (1994) - has 
significantly shaped the research on sequential investments and created a fruitful 
paradigm for its treatment (Lukas, 2008). As widely discussed in the previous section, 
the initiation of an R&D alliance is just a first step, which generates subsequent options 
in the next stages. These real options rights have been recognized in R&D alliance 
literature. Accordingly, there are a number of empirical studies that emphasize that 
option characteristics are of particular importance for the formation of R&D alliances 
and especially for the choice of the appropriate governance structure (Kogut 1991; Folta 
and Leiblein, 1994; Folta 1998, Santoro and McGill 2005; Van de Vrande et al. 2009).  
By contrast, according to Lukas (2008), there are a comparatively small number of 
papers that consider theoretical modeling in the setting of R&D collaborations adopting 
a real options approach. In other words there has been limited effort to scrutinize the 
properties of options in R&D alliances (e.g., options to acquire, divest and expand) 
through rigorous theoretical modeling (Chi 2000). Thus, in accordance with the focus 
of this thesis, I mainly review the very little literature strand which deals with 
theoretical modeling in the setting of R&D partnerships under uncertainty (Savva, 2006; 
Lukas 2007; Lukas 2008; Chi 2000). By way of anticipation, these works provide 
important insights on the effect of uncertainty and flexibility on the collaborations 
contracts (how partners share the value project in a stochastic environment), on the 
timing aspects of the collaborations as well as on their duration and terminations 
strategies, that previous research has neglected. Specifically, Savva (2006) focused on 
partnerships contracts under uncertainty, but with clauses that admit downstream 
flexibility, whose value is captured by the partner(s) who own the right to exercise, and 
analyzes the effect of this flexibility on the contract. The author distinguishes between 
cooperative options and non-cooperative options: the former are exercised jointly by the 
partners who enter the alliance in the interest of maximizing the total contract value, 
whereas the latter are exercised unilaterally and in the interest of the option holders’ 
payoff. He also provides a framework that captures the effect of optionality on 
partnerships synergies. 
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Lukas (2007) highlights the importance of modeling the dynamics of market entry by 
developing a real options framework that gives insight into the expansion, dissolvement, 
and optimal timing of international joint ventures. In line with real options logic, the 
initial entry strategy serves as a platform allowing the firm to make subsequent 
investments to exploit host-country advantages. He precisely allows for this by taking a 
three-step expansion strategy explicitly into account, so that a compound option is 
modeled. The results suggest that uncertainty, size of equity share and future 
investment/divestment opportunities play an important role when it comes to transit 
from export to the first phase of the foreign direct investment commitment. In a similar 
way, Lukas (2008) adopts an option framework to model a joint venture-induced 
market entry under both economic and technology uncertainty in a continuous time 
setting. He presents critical thresholds for timing and termination strategy in the domain 
of joint ventures and finds that technology uncertainty promotes the formation of joint 
ventures. Consistently with this literature, Chi (2000) develops a model that is used 
specifically to examine the option to acquire or divest a joint venture, both in the case 
where the acquisition/divestiture price is specified ex ante in the initial contract and in 
the case where the price is to be negotiated ex post. The results derived from the model 
show how the value of the option and each partner’s payoff from the venture vary with 
the structure of the option.   
An important consideration on the theoretical modelling in this environment is that, the 
nature of an option (e.g., its values to the “buyer” and “seller”) varies markedly with its 
structure (e.g., the structure of uncertainty and terms of the option contract): therefore it 
is difficult to figure out an option’s implications without modelling its structure 
precisely. For instance, options in joint venture possess some unique structural 
attributes that are not incorporated in any existing option models (Chi, 2000, p. 3).  
Finally, I want to highlight  that this literature deals with the evaluation of the single 
R&D alliance and one can easily imagine further developments in this context.  
 
2.6 Research Goal 
The above sections provided a general overview of prominent research which combines 
real options analysis with portfolio management, competitors interaction as well as with 
alliance literature. It is important to highlight the most of the literature presented in 
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section 2.2.1 and 2.3 deals with investments under uncertainty, i.e. it concerns with the 
evaluation of real options owned exclusive by one firm. Surprisingly, as the previous 
section highlights, there is little theoretical work on alliances under uncertainty (Savva, 
2006; Lukas, 2008), i.e. assuming that projects are developed by two or more firms, 
which is a more realistic assumption in today’s landscape. Several interesting aspects in 
the alliance’s domain have not been sufficiently addressed by real option theory. For 
instance, how should the partners share the value of a project in a stochastic 
environment? How do uncertainty and the associated flexibility affect the value of the 
contract for two or more partners? Specifically, I address these questions by assuming a 
portfolio perspective on the hand and a dynamic perspective in a competitive 
environment on the other hand. In such a way, I find important key factors that 
influence the important choice of when and whether to develop projects in-house, or 
externally.  
In particular, I contextualize this work looking at the collaborations established between 
pharmaceutical firms and young biotechnology firms. Different reasons leaded me to 
this choice. First, the biopharmaceutical industry is absolutely one of the industries with 
the highest rate of formation of alliances; second it has recognized the importance of 
real option approaches (see the next chapter where a description in detail of the 
biopharmaceutical industry is provided). However, as the following chapters will 
highlight, both the portfolio management and the alliance timing decisions are open 
debates. As a matter of fact, questions such as: “Which projects are more promising 
than other ?” or “What is the optimal stage to sign an alliance ?” are more and more 
frequent in this industry and still not well addressed, especially in a situation where the 
level of uncertainty is particularly high (Betz 2011). Therefore the present dissertation 
aims to answer to these important questions and, in addressing these themes, I cannot 
neglect some important considerations coming from the literature review presented in 
the previous sections. First, most of the real options models, used to evaluate an R&D 
portfolio, are based on numerical approaches and are very difficult to implement. 
Conversely, I adopt closed-solutions that greatly make the implementation of the 
portfolio model easier (see the next chapter). Second, following the most recent trend in 
the portfolio management literature that combines different approaches to select an 
optimal projects portfolio, a decision support tool which integrates the real options 
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approach with screening tools and mapping tools, is also proposed (chapter 4). Third, 
section 2.3 shows the importance to combine the real options valuation technique with 
game theory concepts. However no extant research considers this important link by 
focusing on the choice of the alliance timing (rather the focus has been on the 
investment timing decisions). By contrast, the chapter 5 of this thesis sheds light on this 
important issue, taking explicitly into account the important role of competition.   
Finally, although the research context is the biopharmaceutical field, the results and 
insights provided by this thesis apply more generally to R&D environments that have 
the following characteristics: 
 Firms present in the industry resort to R&D partnerships to carry out their 
innovation process (traditionally partnerships between a small innovator and an 
established mayor); 
 Projects under the alliance are staged and are subject to significant uncertainty 
over market, which is resolved progressively as the project advances through the 
development stages (Savva and Sholtes 2014); 
 Industries are characterized by competition, that is, for example, when a small 
firm is signing an alliance with a giant, there are other small firms that aim at 
firming  the same agreement.   
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Chapter 3 
The value of R&D alliances in a pharmaceutical drugs 
portfolio  
  
3.1 Introduction 
New drug development has become considerably challenging in recent years: while 
length and cost of research and development (R&D) have been growing, chances of 
success have become extremely low. As a matter of fact, pharmaceutical companies 
have invested more than $500 billion in research and development into medical 
innovations since 2000, with an estimated $48.5 billion only in 2012 – the largest R&D 
investment of any sector in the US economy (PhRMA, 2013). In contrast, only 43 new 
medicines were approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2012, 
being the highest number in the last 15 years (PhRMA, 2013). The pharmaceutical 
industry is also the sector with the highest ratio of R&D investment to net sales. 
Nevertheless, big pharmaceutical companies cannot avoid relying on R&D activities, 
and keep considering them as a major source of value creation, in spite of their intrinsic 
risks. The emphasis is on increasing both new drugs in the development pipeline and 
the number of commercial launches every year (Rogers et al. , 2005). To achieve these 
goals, pharmaceutical companies more and more consider new paradigm solutions 
including next-generation licensing (Kleyn and Kitney, 2007) and effective pre-
competitive collaborations with other companies (Dhankhar et al., 2012). One 
fundamental element to complete the picture is related to the advent of biotechnology, 
which has significantly impacted the pharmaceutical industry. In fact, since the eighties, 
pharmaceutical companies more and more have partnered with the newcomers, i.e., the 
biotechnology companies, in order to pool their complementary assets along the drug 
R&D and commercialization processes, and succeed in the winner-takes-all patent race. 
While the “raw material” is located in biotech firms, pharmaceutical companies have 
expertise in managing advanced phases in new drug development (i.e., clinical stages, 
approvals, marketing and production) and considerable amounts of financial resources, 
of which biotech firms are lacking (Gupta, 2007). Therefore, the emergence of 
biotechnology has helped change the “closed innovation” business model traditionally 
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adopted by most of the pharmaceutical companies to the “open innovation” (OI) 
business model (Cooke, 2005; Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006; Chiaroni et al., 2008; 
Bianchi et al., 2011; Lo Nigro et al. 2012).  
In this scenario, financially constrained pharmaceutical decision-makers, should select 
projects accurately, being sure to choose the most promising. This important choice is 
also made more complex by the option to sign agreements with biotechnology 
companies. This consideration implies a proper evaluation of every single project, the 
enrolment of an open innovation paradigm in the manager’s agenda, and the adoption of 
a portfolio perspective that is able to incorporate strategic issues into the R&D 
decisions. However, in this environment, strong portfolio management is pivotal in 
helping to focus pharmaceutical company resources effectively on the most attractive 
projects (Betz, 2011). In addition, the pharmaceutical R&D process has a long and 
dynamic life, and further investments depend on the success/failure of previous ones, 
which then also represent an ideal field of application for ROA. As a matter of fact, as it 
will be discussed in section 3.3 of this chapter, in recent years, the real options approach 
has begun to receive attention in biopharmaceutical industry, even if its use has not 
been very widespread
8
 (Hartmann & Hassan, 2006), especially in a portfolio context.  
The aim of this chapter is to set up a manageable real options model (Open OptFolio 
Light (OOL)) that is able to support pharmaceutical R&D decision-makers in the 
portfolio selection process by suggesting which projects should be undertaken, the best 
means by which to develop them (through an open- or a closed-innovation paradigm, 
i.e. licensing-in or not), and the cross-financing policy. Indeed, in order to obtain a 
balanced portfolio, the model takes into account different aspects, including the 
possibility of adopting OI solutions to develop each project, as well as a self-financing 
policy. As illustrated in the next section, the literature fails to deal with these “needs” 
simultaneously, and managers have highlighted this lack (Hartmann and Hassan, 2006): 
this part of the dissertation aims to fill this literature gap.  
In the following section, a literature analysis is conducted to highlight the scientific 
support of the above mentioned research goal. Section 3.3 focuses on the 
                                                 
8
 A survey conducted by Hartmann & Hassan, 2006  into the most important pharmaceutical firms in 
2005, which aimed to investigate the methods used by companies in the evaluation of their R&D projects, 
finds that ROA use is not very widespread, mainly because of: (i) perceived technique complexity; (ii) 
lack of acceptance by the decision makers; and (iii) lack of transparency. 
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biopharmaceutical R&D portfolio evaluation. The OOL model, which is based on 
OptFolio (a model available in the literature (Rogers et al., 2002)), is presented in 
section 3.4; in section 3.5 OOL is compared to other real options models that are 
available in literature to highlight its characteristics, and in section 3.6 OOL is applied 
to a numerical example. In section 3.7, conclusions are drawn, the research findings are 
summarized, and further developments are anticipated. 
 
3.2 Literature Overview  
Previous research acknowledges ROA as a powerful tool to evaluate biopharmaceutical 
R&D projects (Cassimon et al., 2004); nonetheless, the evaluation of a single project 
would not be consistent with a firm strategy that usually assumes a more 
comprehensive point of view. In order to overcome this limitation, the whole portfolio 
of R&D projects should be considered. This is especially important in the context of the 
biopharmaceutical industry, which is characterized by very high failure rates of new 
drug candidates, and by long times to complete the entire R&D process (Rogers et al., 
2002).  
Project portfolio selection is crucial in many organizations, which must make decisions 
on investment, where the appropriate distribution of investment is complex due to 
varying levels of risk, resource requirements, and interactions among the candidate 
projects (Berzinsh et al., 2006). In addition, R&D activities have become increasingly 
costly and risky; hence, measuring their performance and contribution to value is 
critical (Lazzarotti et al., 2011). As discussed in the previous chapter (section 2.2), 
while the portfolio management methods employed in different organizations vary 
greatly, the objectives that managers are trying to achieve are quite similar (Eilat et al., 
2006). According to Cooper et al. (1998), an objective that usually dominates this 
decision process is that of obtaining a balanced portfolio, i.e. diversifying the projects 
in the portfolio in terms of various trade-offs such as high risk versus sure bets, internal 
versus outsourced work, etc. Open Innovation practices provide an invaluable tool by 
which to balance an innovation portfolio and share risk; in the meantime, an actively 
managed portfolio demands judgments calls. The judgments may well be based on 
quantitative values and careful measurements, but the shadow of false positive and false 
negative judgment persists (Bingham & Spradlin, 2011) and can be mitigated by 
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adopting an evaluation method that is able to overcome the underrated problem inherent 
in the net present value methodology (false negative in the case of flexible alternatives) 
such as the ROA method. Therefore, OI reinforces the usefulness of ROA in this 
context. However, organizations, while recognizing the importance of ROA, do not 
apply it because it is perceived as a complex concept. This consideration is especially 
true when the whole R&D projects portfolio has to be evaluated. As widely discussed in 
the first part of this thesis (section 2.2.1), most of the real options models available in 
literature to evaluate an R&D portfolio, are hard to implement mainly because they are 
based on discrete approaches. Such approaches if, on the hand, are more intuitive than 
closed-solutions, on the other hand, are difficult to manage as the size of the portfolio 
increases. Conversely, closed-solutions could appear as black-box tools, but show a 
major easiness of implementation (please refer to the section 3.5) and provide more 
accurate solutions (Chance, 1998).  
The main contribution to the literature of the present chapter is to propose a closed 
ROA model that is easy to implement, in order to support two critical aspects: (i) R&D 
projects selection; and (ii) how to carry out the selected projects (internally or 
externally). Such a tool would represent an operative way to deploy OI. The targeted 
balance is multifaceted: behind open vs. closed means by which to decline innovation, 
the equilibrium between products able to produce cash flows and products that need 
financial sustain is pursued. Therefore, the model also aims to contribute to the 
available models, considering the possibility to create a financially balanced portfolio, 
since it includes a self-financing policy. According to Kamien & Schwartz (1978), the 
self-financing of R&D for a company is urgent for two reasons. First, external financing 
may be difficult to obtain without substantial related tangible collateral that can be 
claimed by the lender if the project fails; an R&D project that fails generally leaves 
behind few tangible assets of value. Second, the firm might be reluctant to reveal 
detailed information about the project that would make it attractive to outside lenders, 
fearing its disclosure to potential rivals.  
The output of the model, named Open OptFolio Light (OOL), is the composition of the 
pharmaceutical portfolio, and, for each selected drug, it is able to suggest whether it 
should be developed in-house or through an alliance with a biotechnology company, 
and if (and to what extent) it will finance other projects in the pipeline when it is 
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commercialized. Moreover the model is able to deal with variables that take into 
account the business strategy (the choice of therapeutic areas in which to invest) as well 
as characteristics of possible partnership (level of synergy, profit sharing policy, etc.), 
and it has been tested through a case study taken from the literature (Rogers et al., 
2002).  
 
3.3 Pharmaceutical R&D Project Evaluation 
Discounted cash-flow-based methods, such as NPV, are generally used to evaluate 
investment projects. However, in the field of R&D pharmaceutical projects, where high 
uncertainty and risks (both economic and technical) are prominent, these methods lose a 
large amount of their effectiveness. In fact, as discussed in details in section 2.1, they 
fail to correctly assess the real value of these projects, which results, among other 
things, from the flexibility possessed by the management and from the several 
opportunities these kinds of investments offer. Thus, the real options approach has 
begun to be used in biopharmaceutical industry: however, while there is a large amount 
of literature on pharmaceutical project evaluation using ROA, in practice the method 
has been used effectively only to evaluate single projects (Copeland & Antikarov, 
2001). 
 
3.3.1 Single pharmaceutical R&D project evaluation 
This section reviews some contributions to the literature that adopts ROA method as a 
tool to evaluate single pharmaceutical projects. Several papers propose different 
solutions for modeling the multi-phase (bio)pharmaceutical process, and I can classify 
these according to the chosen method to evaluate the project, i.e. numerical approaches 
or closed-form solutions. While a first group uses a binomial lattice approach, (Kellog 
& Charnes, 2000; Shockley et al., 2003) or decision tree (Loch & Bode-Greul, 2001), a 
second group solves this problem with closed-form models. Particularly, as Bowman & 
Moskowitz (2001) point out, the first application of ROA in the evaluation of a 
pharmaceutical R&D project was carried out by Merck, one of the most important 
pharmaceutical companies, in the early 1990s. Merck adopts the B&S option-pricing 
model to determine the option value of an investment project. Since this first attempt, 
many scholars have devoted their attention to these closed-form solutions, and they 
54 
 
refer to more accurate models such as the aforementioned option model (Geske, 1979). 
Among these, I can mention the two-fold compound approach (Perlitz et al., 1999) or 
the generalized n-fold version of this (Cassimon et al., 2004; Cassimon et al., 2011a). 
Moreover, in order to more realistically evaluate the pharmaceutical process, several 
authors adopt “adjusted” formulae (specifically jump-diffusion models) based on the 
B&S formula (Brach & Paxson, 2001) or on the Geske model (Pennings & Sereno, 
2011). 
Finally, Sereno (2010) applies both a lattice method and a closed-form solution (a 
three-fold compound option) to evaluate a pharmaceutical patent and, as Sereno points 
out, it is easy to demonstrate that by increasing the number of time steps in the binomial 
model, the solution converges to the closed-continuous time one – for the compound 
option as well. 
 
3.3.2 Pharmaceutical R&D portfolio evaluation 
However, according to several authors, it is better to evaluate the entire R&D project 
portfolio of a company instead of its single projects, in order to consider the relations 
and the interdependencies among them. These interdependencies, which are ignored if 
projects are evaluated one by one, usually deal with limited resource consumption, risk 
balancing and company strategies. A great contribution in this field to scientific 
literature has been made by Rogers et al. (2002), who, as discussed in section 2.2.1, 
developed a stochastic optimization model (OptFolio), based on a quadrinomial tree 
method, which is able to identify the most valuable projects among the entire R&D 
project portfolio of a pharmaceutical company. Starting from this real options 
optimization model, Rogers et al. (2005) proposed an approach by which to select the 
best licensing strategy for each product in the R&D portfolio. Specifically, the OptFolio 
model is based on the binomial tree method. Despite being close to reality, the 
implementation and use of OptFolio turns out to be very complex and difficult to 
manage. As a matter of fact, a pharmaceutical company may find it hard to identify an 
optimal project portfolio to solve a problem with a lot of constraints and several dozen 
thousands of variables, with only 20 candidate drugs. A step towards simplifying this 
model was made by Rafiee and Kianfar (2011), who propose the same stochastic model 
of Rogers et al. (2002), but involving a smaller number of both scenarios and projects 
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considered in the portfolio. As far as closed-solutions models are concerned, they have 
been adopted by Wang & Hwang (2007) who developed a closed fuzzy compound 
option model to estimate the value of each R&D project in a pharmaceutical company 
pipeline. Enea and Lo Nigro (2011a, 2011b) used closed-solutions to develop an 
OptFolio Light (OL) model inspired by OptFolio that addresses OptFolio issues in a 
way that is very easy to implement. However, neither of the above models considers an 
aspect very important in terms of a balanced portfolio: i.e. the decision to license-in or 
to internally develop selected projects. The next section illustrates in details the 
proposed model OOL,  which takes into account this issue.  
3.4 The Open OptFolio Light (OOL) model 
In order to maintain their annual revenues and growth rates, pharmaceutical companies 
aim to increase both new drugs in the development pipeline and the number of 
commercial launches each year. Consistently with these goals, they are augmenting 
their product pipelines by also licensing-in the proprietary compounds by 
biotechnology companies (Rogers et al. , 2005). Licensing-in is a form of inbound OI 
(Dahlander & Gannb, 2010), and typically consists of an initial payment, milestone 
payments based on the successful completion of an R&D stage, and royalty payments 
upon product commercialization. According to Rogers et al.  (2005), the pattern of 
these partnerships is easily assimilated to a real option: so, after an initial up-front 
payment to the biotechnology company, the pharmaceutical company has the right – but 
not the obligation – to make a milestone payment at each stage of development to 
continue the alliance. Furthermore, financial interdependencies existing among the 
projects of a product portfolio have to be underlined. This could mean that selecting a 
drug to be developed may deduct financial resources from the development of other 
drugs, and also that it may provide funds to feed the development of new products. In 
fact, if a drug manages to be commercialized and to achieve satisfactory economic 
results, a company might use part of its incomes to finance other R&D projects. This is, 
as a matter of fact, one of the prominent features of blockbuster drugs.  
These considerations highlight the importance for a pharmaceutical company to select a 
balanced R&D portfolio, in terms of drugs selected at different stages of development 
(both drugs in their early stages and successful ones able to provide profits, as well as to 
finance new drug development), and drugs selected internally (in-house) or by 
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licensing-in (in alliance with a biotechnology company). Therefore, I propose a closed-
form model, Open OptFolio Light (OOL), based on the OL model (Enea and Lo Nigro, 
2011b), which considers R&D alliances to select the optimal R&D portfolio.  
 
 Mathematical formulation of OOL 
             Sets and Parameters 
The proposed model uses the following parameters to describe the problem of portfolio 
optimization projects:  
i=1,2,...,M       products/drugs/molecules (in the following drugs) 
s=1,2,...,S   stage of the process of drug development  
t=1,2,...,T   year of the portfolio planning horizon 
For each of the candidate drugs, as also suggested by the OptFolio model, the 
impending stage at the present time t=0 is classified as s = 1, regardless of where the 
candidate drug is in its development. Subsequent development stages are numbered in 
ascending order until termination at product launch. Let me also define:  
 
0  iV = NPV of future incomes for drug i at t = 0 
i = estimated annual market volatility for drug i 
 r = risk-free interest rate 
,i sT = length in years of stage s of drug development for drug i 
,i sI = investment cost of developmental stage s for drug i 
ϴis= probability of technical success in stage s of development for drug i 
tB = budgetary constraint for year t 
iC = value of drug i if it is developed in house 
'iC = value of drug i if it is developed in alliance with a biotech company 
iF = annual cash flow of drug i made in house 
'iF = annual cash flow of drug i made in alliance 
phr  = rate of return in the pharmaceutical industry 
 n = drugs commercial life 
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&R D
iX = percentage of cash flows of drug i, developed in house,  invested in R&D 
&'R DiX = percentage of cash flows of drug i, developed in alliance,  invested in R&D 
Specifically, 0  iV represents the estimated value of drug i, based on the NPV of all cash 
flows that result if the drug is commercialized, at time t = 0 of the planning horizon. 
This value is an aggregate of the projected sales revenue of the drug minus production, 
distribution, and marketing costs and all other expenses (Rogers et al., 2002). The 
market volatility i  is the standard deviation of 0
 iV , which is usually estimated using 
historical sales data of similar products. The risk-free interest rate, r, corresponds 
generally with an observable market rate, such as US Treasury Bills. Every 
development stage s of each candidate drug i could have a different length 
,i sT as well as 
a different
 
investment cost to be carried out 
,i sI  and probability of technical success ϴis. 
The budgetary constraint tB  is the total amount of financial resources that a company 
can spend for its R&D projects in the year t.  
Model assumptions 
The drug value Di (i.e. Ci or Ci’ depending if it is developed in house or in alliance 
respectively) is calculated by different closed expressions depending on the number of 
phases left. In order to capture this important aspect, let me briefly represent the 
pharmaceutical process. Specifically, as Figure 7 shows, the development of a new drug 
is a step-wise process that starts with a pre-clinical test phase, followed by three clinical 
test phases (phase I, phase II and phase III) and concluding with FDA (Federal and 
Drug Administration) approval phase. Particularly, each phase is an option on the 
following one: if the preclinical phase turns to be successful, the first clinical Phase 
(Phase I) can start. This means that the preclinical phase is an option on the first clinical 
test. In the same way, the first clinical phase is an option on the second one, which is an 
option on the next test and so on, until the FDA phase (Cassimon, 2004). 
 
                            Figure 7: Pharmaceutical R&D decision making process 
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In the context of this framework, as above mentioned, different closed-solutions are 
adopted, depending on the number of phases left.  
Specifically if a drug has successfully completed the last clinical phase (phase III) and  
has only one phase left to pass through (i.e. the FDA approval phase), the simple NPV 
can be adopted because no more option is available.  
The B&S formula is used for a candidate drug that is about to complete its R&D 
process, and has one development phase left (i.e. the Phase III) before the FDA 
approval phase. As a matter of fact, the Phase III is an option for the FDA phase: thus 
the B&S formula , which is a 1-fold option formula, is ideal to model this situation. 
Let me recall the B&S formula introduced in the first chapter:  
 
               
            
 
(19) 
 
Specifically, in this context, as it will be clearer later in the next section, the underlying 
Si and the exercise price Ki of the generic product i, will vary accordingly to the 
modeled scenario, i.e. dependently if the “alliance” scenario or the “in-house” scenario 
is modeled.  
For candidate drugs in earlier phases of their development and that precisely have to 
pass their phase II, the Geske formula is used. Once again, the Phase II is an option on 
the phase III which is an option on the FDA phase, i.e. it is a 2-fold compound option. 
The Geske model, which is a 2-fold options formula, is ideal to model this situation. 
Similarly as the B&S formula, let me recall the Geske formula introduced in the first 
chapter: 
 
                        
                          
              (20) 
 
Once again, the underlying Si and both the exercise prices Ki1 and Ki2 will vary 
according to the modeled scenario. 
Finally, for drugs with more than three phases left, the aforementioned extended Geske 
model, i.e. the n-fold options model developed by Cassimon et al. (2004), would be 
necessary. For example, following the same logic of above, a drug which is in its phase 
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I and, consequently, has other four stages left, would better modeled by a 3-fold options 
model. However, in order to simplify the analysis (for example in a spreadsheet where 
an n-variate cumulative normal distribution is hard to implement) and to keep the 
mathematics as simple as possible, the traditional Geske expression can be used. To do 
so, s = 2 and s = 3 stages, for instance, could be merged if the decision to undertake 
both of them is made at the beginning of the s = 2 stage. This allows the drug to appear 
as it has only three stages left instead of four. The investment/exercise price of this new 
single stage can be calculated as: 
 
              
      (21) 
                   
                  Computing payoffs: The “in-house” scenario 
To better understand the mathematics present in the model, let me present the payoff of 
the pharmaceutical company in the simplest scenario, in which alliance is not 
considered. The net value of the generic drug in the portfolio, is given by (Ci - Ii1), 
where Ci  is the drug value without alliance, calculated at t=0 using NPV/B&S/Geske 
formulae and Ii1 is the initial cost at t=0, necessary to buy the option to invest in further 
stages if successfully completed. Therefore Ii1 is a sunk cost and does not affect the 
option value, but decreases the total project value. Successive investments in different 
stages, Iis,s≠1   affect the real options value Ci: in fact, they represent the exercise prices 
of the call Ci, with underlying value equal to Voi (please refer to table 6). 
 
                  Computing payoffs:  The “alliance” scenario 
To gain insight into how the proposed real options framework takes into account the 
alliance option, as suggested by Rogers et al. (2005), I introduce the concept of 
indifference for the biotech company in developing the drug in alliance with the 
pharmaceutical company or on its own. In this way, I can obtain the licensing 
conditions: i.e. payments offered by the pharmaceutical company and royalties. In fact, 
as above mentioned, the alliance agreement consists of an initial payment, milestone 
payments based on the successful completion of an R&D stage, and royalty upon 
product commercialization. 
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Assuming that a biotech company has the resources to develop the drug i 
independently, she will grant the license to a pharmaceutical company if the alliance 
alternative offers a value that is at least equal to the one if the biotech develops the drug 
on its own.  
 
   1 1 1Biotech Biotechi i i i iC license P I C nolicense I     (22) 
 
The terms  BiotechiC nolicense  and  BiotechiC license , are calculated using again 
the formulae mentioned above (B&S/Geske/NPV). In particular, the underlying asset 
value of  BiotechiC nolicense is Voi  γi
’
 where the initial value of the drug is multiplied 
by the amplification factor '
i (>1), which takes into account the possible added value 
from the biotech firm.  
On the other hand, if the biotech company will license the drug, the underlying asset 
becomes 0 (1 )i i iV     (see Table 5). In such a case, i.e. when the biotech company 
signs the agreement with the pharmaceutical company, the pharmaceutical company 
will transfer an upfront payment 1( )iP , interim payments (Pis,s≠1)  and a percentage of 
the revenues (1 )i to the bio-company, with 0<αi<1. The amplification factor i , 
which is greater than '
i , represents the measure of value added to the project by the bio-
pharmaceutical alliance (the NPV of the alliance future incomes becomes 0i iV  and 
(1 )i is the part held by the biotechnology company whereas αi is the part held by the 
pharmaceutical company). A large pharmaceutical company, which has advanced 
marketing resources, is able to double the value that would generate a small biotech 
company for a drug license (Rogers et al., 2005). According to Nicholson et al. (2005), 
if an experienced pharmaceutical firm works with a biotech company, some of the 
development costs will be lower or expected revenues will be higher. This causes an 
increasing drug value.  
As Ii1, Pi1 is the up-front payment at t=0, necessary to the pharmaceutical company to 
buy the option of signing the alliance with the biotechnology company. If later 
development stages will be successfully completed, the pharmaceutical company will 
contribute with further payments (Pis,s≠1). As a consequence, the exercise price 
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considered in the term  BiotechiC license , will not be the whole investment cost of 
developmental stage s for drug i ( )i sI , but a lower value: stage by stage the biotech 
firm will invest ( )i s isI P  (see Table 5), with Pis ≤ Iis,         
 
 Variable  BiotechiC nolicense   BiotechiC license  
Biotechnology 
company 
Underlying 
asset value 
(Si) 
'
0i iV   0 (1 )i i iV      
  Exercise 
price(s) 
(Kis) 
Iis,s≠1    i s i sI P , s≠1 
Table 5: Input variables used in biotech real options evaluation 
 
In particular, I impose among the payments the same proportionality of the 
corresponding investments. Specifically, I refer to the “hedging investment policy” 
(Rogers et al., 2005), which consists of smaller up-front payments and larger milestone 
payments in later stages of development. Imposing the indifference condition we can 
obtain, for each i, a value of i  and the corresponding payment 1iP  (the other payments 
are functions of 1iP ), that satisfy equation (22): in fact, the problem admits 
1 solutions.  
Once obtained the above payments, the payoff of the pharmaceutical company in the 
alliance scenario, can be easily computed. The net value of the generic drug is given by 
(C’i - Pi1), where C’i is the drug value in alliance, calculated using NPV/B&S/Geske 
formulae and the aforementioned Pi1 is the up-front payment at t=0, necessary to buy 
the option to ally and represents a sunk payment that does not affect the option value, 
but decreases the total project value. Successive payments in different stages, Pis,s≠1,  
affect the real options value  C’i since they represent the exercise prices of the call C’i, 
with underlying value equal to Voi  γ αi.(please refer to table 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 Variable Ci (in-house 
scenario) 
Ci’(alliance 
scenario) 
Pharmaceutical 
company 
Underlying asset 
value 
(Si) 
Voi Voi γi αi 
  Exercise 
price(s) 
(Kis) 
Iis,s≠1 Pis,s≠1 
Table 6: Input variables used in pharmaceutical real options evaluation 
 
Model formulation 
The model includes four dichotomous variables, with the following meanings: 
1  if the drug, developed in house, is selected for the optimal portfolio
 
0 if the drug, developed in house, is NOT selected for the optimal portfolio  
iH

 
  
1  if the drug, developed in alliance, is selected for the optimal portfolio
 
0 if the drug, developed in alliance, is NOT selected for the optimal portfolio  
iL

 
  
1 if part of the cash flow of the drug developed in-house is reinvested
0 if part of the cash flow of the drug developed in-house is NOT reinvested
ih

 
      
 
1 if part of the cash flow of the drug developed in alliance is reinvested
0 if part of the cash flow of the drug developed in alliance is NOT reinvested
il

 
  
Clearly, if a drug is developed in-house by the pharmaceutical company, it cannot be 
licenced-in. Mathematically, this condition can be expressed with the following 
constraint, which also considers the possibility that the same drug is not selected: 
1           i iH L i    (23) 
As mentioned before, further assumptions are needed to achieve a balanced R&D 
portfolio. The first, which concerns the annual revenue distribution of a marketed 
product, assumes that, after its commercialization, a drug provides a company with 
uniform cash flows, iF , for n years. The value of these annual incomes for drug i, 
developed in-house, is: 
0
(1 )
(1 ) 1
n
ph ph
i i n
ph
r r
F V
r


 
 (24) 
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If the drug is developed within the alliance, the value of the cash flows turns out to be:  
0
(1 ' ) '
'
(1 ' ) 1
n
ph ph
i i i i n
ph
r r
F V
r
 

  
 
 (25) 
More precisely, I assume '
phr  lower than phr  
because of the risk sharing coming from 
the agreement. In order to consider the possibility of reinvesting the cash flows of a 
drug, other constraints are needed. The self-financing by the commercialized drugs is 
allowed only if the drug has been selected to be part of the optimal portfolio. In 
mathematical terms, these concepts can be expressed with the following constraints: 
                i ih H i   (26) 
 (27) 
 
However, only a share &R D
iX  or 
' &R D
iX  (depending on the adoption of a closed rather 
than open paradigm, respectively) of annual cash flows is potentially reinvested to fund 
the development of further drugs. Thus, the actual amount of financial resources, 
deriving from the commercialization of drug i and planned to be invested yearly in 
R&D, is: 
&               if drug  is developed in house  R Di i iRF X F i  (28) 
&' ' '         if drug  is developed in alliance R Di i iRF X F i  (29) 
& &0   ' 1R D R Di iX and X   
 
(30) 
The resulting mathematical model is as follows: 
   ,1 ,1
, ,
'
max '   
(1 ' ) (1 )
it i it i
i i i i i i i it t
i i i t i tph ph
RF RF
ROV C P L C I H l h
r r
 
     
 
     
(31) 
s. t.: 
                 
   
                    
   
              
  
   
            
   
      (32) 
constraints of equations 23-30. 
                  i il L i 
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with:
  , , , 0,1i i i iH L h l    
The objective function (eq. 31) can be decomposed into two parts: the first concerns the 
selection of a drug candidate to be included in the optimal portfolio (considering the 
possibility of developing this through an alliance with the biotech firm), and the second 
concerning the possibility of using part of the income of a selected drug to fund 
additional R&D projects. The binary parameter it  allows the contribution of drug i in 
the period t to be considered only if the drug has already been introduced to the market 
in that period.
 
As far as the budget constraint (eq. 32) is concerned, the first part of the 
equation is related to the expenses necessary for the development of drugs, while the 
second part includes the financial contributions brought to R&D by those 
commercialized drugs whose revenues have been partially allocated for this specific 
purpose. Finally, the binary parameter istw  appears (in the OptFolio model too) and 
makes it possible to include in budgetary constraints only those drugs (i) beginning a 
stage of development (s) in the period t (a phase can be longer than one year). 
 
In addition, the mathematical formulation above can be simplified; for example, some 
binary variables can be omitted if, a priori, their value is known (products in the earlier 
phases of development cannot finance other products in the time horizon considered).  
 
3.5 Optfolio and OL: a comparison 
In order to highlight the importance to use closed-solutions, especially from an 
implementation standpoint, let me provide a comparison between OL (the closed  
model I refer to) and Optfolio model, that has been used in literature to evaluate a 
pharmaceutical portfolio too, but, conversely, uses numerical approaches.  
The aim of OptFolio (Rogers et al., 2002) and OL is to determine the optimal drug 
developmental portfolio that maximizes the real options value (ROV), which is the 
overall value of the portfolio given a set of candidate drugs in various stages of 
development. To estimate the value of the single project/drug, OptFolio uses a 
quadranomial approach (a two-variable binomial tree) and models each project 
development as a series of continuation/abandonment options, deciding at each phase 
whether to proceed further or stop the development (Rogers et al., 2002). However, 
according to Copeland & Antikarov (2001) and Cassimon et al. (2004), decision tree 
methods can easily become difficult to manage because of the rapidly increasing 
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number of trees with the size of the portfolio. As a matter of fact, the resulting OptFolio 
formulation, as pointed out by the same authors, involves a large number of binary 
variables and causes the objective function to no longer be a linear function. Thus, in 
order to achieve a more tractable approach in a linear form, the authors must solve a 
sub-problem with no budgetary restrictions. This linearization procedure reduces the 
number variables, but complicates the global problem resolution. Several constraints 
are present in the model, such as budgetary constraints or others that are used to enforce 
the precedence between the different development phases of a drug and to prevent a 
drug which has been abandoned in an earlier stage from being selected. Using this 
approach, the mathematical model for the case study considered (the same presented in 
section 3.6) includes 893 binary variables and 12843 continuous variables.  
To reduce OptFolio’s complexity, OL (Enea and Lo Nigro, 2011a; 2011b), introduces 
some alterations, while the goal is the same. The first is the way in which the R&D 
process is modeled: OL opts for closed-form formulae instead of the binomial method, 
making the computational burden lighter. Particularly, the B&S formula is used for 
candidate drugs which are about to complete their R&D processes and have only two 
development phases left, while the Geske formula is used for candidate drugs in earlier 
phases of their development. Lastly, if a drug has only one phase left to pass through, 
which is generally the approval phase, the NPV can be adopted. As a consequence, an 
important difference from the OptFolio model is that the real options drug values are 
input parameters in the proposed mathematical model, while in OptFolio they are an 
output of the mathematical programming (they are considered in the objective 
function). This is an important issue because it greatly reduces the implementation 
complexity. Moreover, OL foresees, inside the closed solution, the possibility to further 
or stop investments (Perlitz et al., 1999) during the pharmaceutical R&D if the outcome 
of any phase is or not satisfactory (indeed, in this case, the corresponding single real 
options, as shown earlier in chapter 2 assume values equal to 0). On the other hand, a 
drug can be dismissed because of budgetary constraints. These two assumptions allow 
OL to use a binary variable for each drug, with only one subscript to model whether a 
drug is selected to be part of the optimal portfolio. In this mode, the same case study 
proposed by Rogers et al. (2002), can be solved with only 40 binary variables and 20 
continuous variables. 
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Actually, binomial approaches show more clearly how the value of the real asset can 
evolve over time. However, as widely discussed earlier in this dissertation, they can be 
more complicated in terms of implementation, especially in a portfolio context. Also, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, another limitation consists in the “ arbitrary granularity”, i.e. the 
arbitrary in choosing the number of sub-trees.  
On the other hand, a possible shortcoming of OL, could be the assumption of a 
diffusion process (the Geometric Brownian Motion) for the underlying. This implies a 
continuous arrival of information that changes the underlying value (Pennings & Lint, 
1997) while, in a research environment information tends to arise at discrete points of 
time, causing that that the managers, in real markets, do not continuously adjust the 
underlying value, but only when information arrives (Pennings & Lint, 1997). In 
addition, for drugs that are in early phases of their development, OL is based on Perlitz 
et al.’s (1999) approach, which models the complex R&D process in two phases (eq. 
21). This simplification is addressed to keep the mathematics as simple as possible, 
because in this way the two-period compound option model of Geske (1979) can be 
used. Using a generalization of Geske’s compound options Cassimon et al. (2004) 
derive a closed-form solution for the n-fold compound option model. However, this 
model, while being a better fit for the pharmaceutical process than Perlitz et al.’s (1999) 
model, is more complicated from a mathematical point of view. In addition, Cassimon 
et al. (2011a) present a valuation of a project (Vitosha project) using both the two-fold 
compound option approach and the n-fold compound option approach: the results do 
not seem to be very different. 
Table 7 summarizes the similarities, key assumptions, weaknesses and strengths of 
OptFolio and OL. 
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 OptFolio OptFolio Light (OL) 
Similarities 
 Goal 
 
 
 Financial option 
used 
 
 Portfolio 
optimiziation tool 
 
Pharmaceutical R&D 
portfolio optimization 
 
Call option 
 
 
Mathematical 
programming 
formulation 
 
Pharmaceutical R&D 
portfolio optimization 
 
Call option  
 
 
Mathematical programming 
formulation 
 
 
 
 Key assumptions 
 Real option model 
 
 Means of 
contemplation 
 
Quadranomial approach 
 
 
Discrete  
 
Closed solutions 
(B&S/Geske); NPV 
 
Continuous 
Weaknesses 
 
Huge number of 
variables and constraints 
Arbitrary granularity 
(number of sub-trees) 
Not applicable in the case of 
American put  
Continuous change in the 
underlying value due to 
Brownian motion 
Strengths Transparency of the 
binomial tree approach 
Easy implementation 
Flexibility (possibility to 
take into account open 
innovation and self-
financing) 
Table 7:  A comparison between OptFolio and OL 
 
3.5.1 OOL: a comprehensive comparison 
To better highlight the unique futures that make OOL very attractive, let me provide a 
briefly comparison with other models that have been adopted in literature for the 
pharmaceutical portfolio management. To the best of my knowledge, in addition to 
Optoflio model (Rogers et al., 2002) and OL model (Enea and Lo Nigro 2011a; 2011b), 
other models (Rogers et al., 2005; Wang & Hwang, 2007; Rafiee and Kianfar (2011)) 
are available to select the optimal pharmaceutical portfolio. Particularly, Rogers et al. 
(2005) and  Rafiee and Kianfar (2011) use the same model developed by (Rogers et al., 
2002), that has been thoroughly described in the previous section. As far as Wang and 
Hwang’s (2007) model is concerned, it adopts the same case study (Rogers et al. 2002) 
I use to test OOL (please refer to the following section). Therefore, it is even more 
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interesting to show a comparison between this model and OOL to understand how the 
latter differs from it. Specifically, Wang and Hwang (2007) adopt a fuzzy real options 
valuation method that is based on the method proposed by Carlsson & Fullér (2003). 
They use the Geske compound options valuation model for all 20 drugs considered in 
the portfolio, but I believe that the method (Geske, B&S, or the simple NPV) should 
depend on the remaining phases. Moreover, the authors formulate the R&D portfolio 
selection problem as a fuzzy zero-one integer programming model with the aim of 
maximizing an objective function, subject to budgetary constraints or constraints on the 
availability of human resources and other mathematical constraints. Specifically, the 
objective function is the total ROV (fuzzy real option value) of selected projects, minus 
all development costs in the planning horizon. However, according to Hassanzadeh et 
al. (2011), deducting the total development costs of selected projects from their ROVs 
in the objective function implies that the total benefit of the portfolio is doubly affected 
(because they are also considered as exercise prices in the real options evaluation) by 
development costs (except for the initial cost).  
Moreover, neither of the above models (Rogers et al., 2005; Wang & Hwang, 2007; 
Rafiee and Kianfar, 2011) considers two aspects that are very important in terms of a 
balanced portfolio: i) the self-financing option and ii) the decision to license-in or to 
internally develop selected projects. Finally, the model has been tested using a 
spreadsheet (as described in the following section), so it can be implemented and used 
in a simple way:  this characteristic could bring managers to adopt a ROA-based tool.  
 
3.6 An OOL Numerical Example 
The low computational burden of OOL allows its implementation in a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet. Any pharmaceutical company interested in evaluating and selecting its 
R&D projects could create its own optimal products portfolio simply by entering the 
drug information and clicking a button. Specifically, the model requires inputs 
regarding budget limitations as well as candidate drugs, such as their expected current 
values, volatilities, technical success rate and investment costs for each stage and type, 
which indicates what the impending development stage of a drug is at the time of 
portfolio selection. Thus, the spreadsheet identifies whether the B&S, Geske or NPV 
approach is needed for each drug, and eventually calculates the options parameters, 
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which are useful for estimating the real options values iC  and 
'
iC . Ultimately, it is 
sufficient to click on a macro button, which launches the Excel solver to find the 
balanced optimal portfolio composition. Of course, if the drug is developed jointly 
through an alliance with a biotech company, among the input parameters the payments 
that the pharmaceutical company will pour into the biotech company during the 
agreement will substitute the investments. To calculate payments and royalties by the 
above indifference condition (eq. 22), it is therefore necessary to introduce additional 
input parameters such as the values of i  and 
'
i , as shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: Optimal portfolio selection process using OOL spreadsheet 
 
As an illustrative example of the model OOL, I use the case study presented by Rogers 
et al. (2002), which concerns the portfolio selection of a pharmaceutical company with 
20 drug candidates (M) for an R&D portfolio. Each of them is classified into six 
categories, depending on which stage of development it is at (Table 8).  
 
 
 
 
 
Inputs 
Drug parameters: 
• Ii,s 
• ϴis 
• V0,i 
• σi 
• Type 
• γi ; γ'i 
• Pharmaceutical 
industry 
parameters 
• Budget 
limitations 
• Risk-free int.rate 
Options biotech 
parameters 
• Evalutation 
method 
selection 
(Geske, B&S, 
NPV and 
related 
parameters) 
• Cbio-license 
•  C bio-no 
license 
• Indifference 
condition 
(Pis,αi)  
Output 
• Optimal 
portfolio 
composition  
• Drugs to 
develop in 
licencing or 
in-house 
• Supporting 
drugs 
• Optimal 
reinvestment 
share 
• Max ROV 
Options 
pharma 
parameters 
• Evalutation 
method 
selection 
(Geske, 
B&S, NPV 
and related 
parameters) 
• Ci 
•  C'i   
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Type Beginning phase Candidate 
drugs (M) 
Evaluation 
method 
Development 
stages left 
1 Phase I 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Geske  4 
2 Phase II 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 Geske 3 
3 Phase III 12, 13, 14 B&S 2 
4 2
nd
 year Phase III 15, 16 B&S 2 
5 1
st
 FDA 
Approval 
17, 18 NPV 1 
6 2
nd
 FDA 
Approval 
19, 20 NPV 1 
Table 8:  Candidate Drugs 
 
In particular, drugs of type 1, 2 and 3 are all placed in the clinical phase, which is 
divided into three sub-phases (phase I, phase II, phase III). Moreover, drugs of type 5 
and 6 have only the commercialization phase (or phase IV) left. The length of phases I 
and II have been assumed to be equal to one year each, while the length of phase III and 
FDA approval is equal to two years each, resulting in an overall length of six years for 
the R&D process. Budget limitations have been considered as M$ 400 for the first year 
and M$ 800 for the remainder, with a planning horizon of five years (Rogers et al., 
2002). In order to obtain from the 0iV  the annual cash flow
'/i iF F  which represents the 
available self-financing from the commercialized drugs developed, a value of 
phr   equal 
to 12% was also assumed, as suggested by DiMasi et al. (2003), along with a lower 
value for 'phr   (due to the risk sharing) equal to 11%.  .   
Finally, the risk-free interest rate, r, has been set at 5%. This corresponds to an average 
observable market rate (e.g. US Treasury Bills as used by Rogers et al., 2002), which 
has been adopted to compare part of the numerical example results. In addition, the life 
of a drug after its commercialization, n, has been considered as equal to 10 years, since 
after this lapse of time a drug normally loses its patent protection, causing its annual 
incomes to fall dramatically. 
Some of the input parameters (Table 9) of the model, such as the present value of future 
cash flows of drugs, the probability of technical success, as well as investments for each 
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drug, and volatility, have been estimated based on historical and industry data (Rogers 
et al., 2002), and the biotech investments are supposed as equal to the pharmaceutical 
ones. 
 
M Type V0i 
σi 
(%) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) 
ϴi1 
ϴi2 
ϴi3 
ϴi4 
1 1 50 80% 2 10 20 30 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.95 
2 1 100 70% 3 10 40 45 0.65 0.55 0.75 0.9 
3 1 200 50% 10 15 60 100 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 
4 1 200 60% 5 15 50 170 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 
5 1 600 50% 20 40 45 200 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 
6 1 100 20% 15 15 25 45 0.85 0.9 0.9 0.95 
7 2 80 50% 10 25 30 - 0.6 0.8 0.95  
8 2 100 70% 20 35 50 - 0.6 0.8 0.95  
9 2 180 55% 20 55 80 - 0.75 0.7 0.85  
10 2 380 35% 30 55 120 - 0.6 0.8 0.95  
11 2 80 45% 10 25 30 - 0.6 0.8 0.95  
12 3 100 80% 30 60 - - 0.8 0.9   
13 3 400 30% 75 180 - - 0.8 0.9   
14 3 700 40% 90 280 - - 0.6 0.85   
15 4 500 35% 50 100 - - 0.8 0.95   
16 4 300 100% 80 150 - - 0.7 0.9   
17 5 350 60% 180 - - - 0.75    
18 5 550 30% 220 - - - 0.9    
19 6 800 60% 250 - - - 0.7    
20 6 1150 20% 350 - - - 0.9    
Table 9: Inputs parameters 
Among the input parameters, some reflect the pharmaceutical strategy and the 
agreement characteristics (
1,4 ,isP  ,i ,i
' ,i  
the therapeutic area); these are summarized 
in Table 10 (Ncore refers to a non-core therapeutic area). Moreover, for the sake of 
clarity, Table 10 also shows the drug values ( iC and
'
iC ). Finally, for drugs 17-20, 
1iI 2iI 3iI 4iI
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which are in the FDA phase, possible alliance with a biotech company is not 
considered. The therapeutic area (core or non-core) influences the choice of factor ' ,i
which considers the possible added value from the biotech company to the value of the 
drug produced by the pharmaceutical company. As can be observed from Table 10, 
higher values are assumed for the drugs allocated in the early stages of the process, in 
which the biotech enterprise has more expertise than the pharmaceutical company. 
More precisely, as suggested by empirical analysis on the adoption of open innovation 
in the bio-pharmaceutical industry (Bianchi et al., 2011), a larger value of '
i  is 
assumed for a drug placed in a non-core area, whereby the biotech firm has more 
specialized competencies than the pharmaceutical industry, thus increasing the value of 
the project. This explains the high value for i , which is the value added from 
collaboration within the project, which, for some drugs, equates to double the amount 
achieved without collaboration. 
 
M    Ther. 
area 
       
 (M$)          
 
(M$) 
 
(M$) 
 
(M$) 
1 0.54 1.5 2 Ncore 16.97 25.05 1.52 7.61 15.23 22.84 
2 0.54 1.5 2 Ncore 37.55 52.30 2.43 8.10 32.43 36.48 
3 0.48 1.3 1.8 Core 69.37 99.23 5.04 7.56 30.24 50.41 
4 0.57 1.3 1.8 Core 62.033 92.75 3.61 10.83 36.12 122.82 
5 0.50 1 1.4 Core 371.1 252.67 14.78 29.57 33.26 147.86 
6 0.39 1.5 2 Ncore 26.76 54.80 4.811 4.81 8.01 14.434 
7 0.50 1.4 1.9 Ncore 33.85 45.53 6.151 15.37 18.45 - 
8 0.53 1.4 1.9 Ncore 40.56 58.63 12.23 21.41 30.59 - 
9 0.40 1 1.3 Core 72.72 60.11 11.86 32.62 47.44 - 
10 0.46 1.2 1.7 Core 225.1 207.07 17.27 31.66 69.08 - 
11 0.50 1.4 1.9 Ncore 32.91 45.72 6.13 15.34 18.4 - 
12 0.66 1.3 1.7 Ncore 59.96 71.30 29.75 59.51 - - 
13 0.68 1 1.2 Core 228.07 159.00 74.79 179.5 - - 
14 0.53 1.2 1.5 Core 440.47 309.88 89.84 279.5 - - 
i
'
i
 i iC 'iC 1iP 2iP 3iP 4iP
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15 0.34 1.1 1.2 Core 396.85 99.96 49.75 99.51 - - 
16 0.62 1.2 1.4 Ncore 182.88 149.55 79.73 149.5 - - 
17 - - - Ncore 350 - - - - - 
18 - - - Ncore 550 - - - - - 
19 - - - Core 800 - - - - - 
20 - - - Core 1150 - - - - - 
Table 10: Strategic input parameters and real option values of drugs 
 
Bounded by a specific budget for the R&D process, the pharmaceutical company has to 
decide which drugs should be allocated development finance in later years. The same 
budget limitations and values of other common input parameters used in the 
aforementioned case study (Rogers et al., 2002) have been considered. 
 
3.6.1 Analysis of results 
In order to compare the proposed model to the OptFolio model (Rogers et al., 2002), 
which represents the benchmark, I start the analysis simplifying OOL by neglecting 
both the license possibility and the self-financing possibility: in this way, OOL gives 
the same output typologies as the benchmark model. Table 11 shows a comparison of 
the optimal portfolio selected by the OptFolio model and that selected by the OOL 
model, referring to the same case study (Rogers et al. 2002) as that mentioned above.  
 
 Optimal portfolio (drugs selected) 
OptFolio model 15, 20 
OOL  1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 14, 15, 16, 19 (ROV= M$ 2003.03) 
Table 11:  OptFolio vs OOL without the licensing option and the self-financing possibility 
 
It is clear from the above that the proposed OOL model suggests selecting as many as 
nine drugs, unlike the original OptFolio which selected only the two that were closest to 
commercialization. In fact, it replaces drug 20 with eight products that less profitable at 
the decision time, but which have greater growth opportunities (drug 19 excepted). 
Table 12 shows the optimal portfolio selected, ceteris paribus, in the case of license 
possibility and the self-financing possibility are considered. 
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Drugs selected In alliance  In-house   Supporting 
drugs 
ROV (M$) 
11 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 
10 
5, 14, 15, 16,19 0 M$ 2213.74 
Table 12: OOL: The optimal portfolio composition and the overall ROV (OOL model) 
 
In general, drugs that have reached the last stage of the development process have a 
higher value, as their market launch is more likely. However, investment and marketing 
costs associated with their launch are significant, and limit the number of products that 
pharmaceutical companies can bring to market. The size of the optimal portfolio 
therefore balances the desire to launch drugs that are most valuable and that are in the 
FDA approval phase, with investments into drugs that are potentially valuable in the 
early stages of the development process. The model results seem to satisfy this desire: 
11 drugs are selected, with four allocated in the latter stages (FDA) of the process and 
seven placed in the early stages (clinical phases). Moreover, the most valuable drugs, 
which are allocated within the core therapeutic area (drug 16 excepted), are selected in-
house, while alliances are allocated drugs which are in different stages of the 
development process and are in core (3,4,10) and non-core therapeutic areas (2, 6, 7), in 
order to exploit the complementary skills of the biotech company (Bianchi et al., 2011).  
Comparing Table 11 with Table 12, we can observe that OI makes an important 
contribution to the value of the chosen portfolio: in fact, the most valuable drugs (5, 14, 
15, 16, 19) continue to be chosen in-house, in order to maintain their total ownership (
i =100%), and six potentially valuable drugs are selected in alliance, causing an 
overall increase of ROV. This result is very important in terms of risk held by the 
pharmaceutical industry: drugs that are in the early stages of the process (and are thus 
characterized by higher uncertainty) and will not necessarily come to market, are 
chosen in alliance; so the pharmaceutical company can share the risk with the biotech 
company.  
Table 13 shows the results of optimal portfolio selected when, ceteris paribus, budget 
constraints are more stringent (M$ 400 for the first year and M$ 100 for the remaining 
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ones). Once again, to highlight the importance of collaborations, a comparison between 
OOL with and without the licensing option is provided.   
This numerical example highlights even more benefits from the adoption of open 
innovations. In fact, the most valuable drugs (5, 15, 20) continue to be chosen in-house, 
and are all placed in core therapeutic areas, while drug 10 is chosen in alliance (even if 
C’10< C10, because the alliance allows some budget to be freed up and thus allocated to 
other products), and two new products (2, 6) are selected in alliance and placed in non-
core therapeutic areas, causing an overall increase of ROV. So, open innovation 
contributes in a twofold way: in primis it makes the optimal portfolio more balanced 
(drugs which are in different stages of the process are selected) and more diversified 
(drugs are in both core and non-core areas), and on the other side, drugs that are less 
likely to be launched on the market are chosen in alliance, thereby reducing the risk for 
the pharmaceutical company. For these products, also, the pharmaceutical company 
makes lower development investments since they are shared with the biotech company. 
 
 # of 
drugs 
selecte
d 
In 
alliance 
In-house Supporting 
drugs 
R&D 
share 
ROV 
(M$) 
OOL  
with 
licensing 
7 2, 6, 10 5, 15, 20 15, 20 15=89.29% 
20=1.9% 
1730.12 
OOL 
without 
licensing 
4 - 5, 10, 15, 
20 
15, 20 15=37.29% 
20=3.44% 
1650.87 
Table 13:  The optimal portfolio composition and the overall ROV with a more stringent budget 
 
In particular, as suggested by Rogers et al. (2002), drugs 15 and 20 are selected in both 
scenarios because they have a very large 0iV  and a high chance of being successfully 
launched on the market, compared to the other potential drugs; these two products in 
Rogers et al.’s (2002) study show a robustness compared to the budgetary constraints 
(they are always chosen when the budget varies).  
Finally, an important contribution is provided by the possibility of self-financing of the 
drugs selected. It is indeed worth noting that if this problem had been solved with the 
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same budget constraints, but without any chances of self-financing, it would have led to 
a lower overall ROV, which is equal to M$ 1.515,49 (see Table 14): 
 
 # drugs selected In alliance In-house ROV (M$) 
OOL without self-
financing  
7 2, 6, 7, 10, 
11 
15, 20 1515.49 
Table 14: The optimal portfolio composition and the overall ROV without self-financing 
 
The ROV decreases and less profitable drugs are selected – i.e. 7 and 11, rather than 5. 
In fact, just the reinvested market revenues of drugs 15 and 20 would allow for the 
development of the profitable drug 5, leading to a higher portfolio ROV. 
 
3.7 Discussions and Conclusions 
This chapter addresses an issue that is related to three literature streams: open 
innovation, real option analysis and R&D portfolio selection. R&D portfolio selection, 
especially in some industries, cannot avoid taking into consideration the OI alternative, 
and in the meanwhile dealing with the intrinsic uncertain and flexible nature of the 
process. As a result, the ROA method becomes a must in this field. The managers 
perceive ROA adoption as a complex task, so they prefer to use a simple and easily 
manipulated means by which to evaluate investments (NPV most of all). The main 
contribution to the literature is to propose a closed-form model that is easy to 
implement (but not to manipulate) in order to select which R&D projects to finance and 
how to carry them out – that is, developing them in-house or with an alliance that 
represents an operative way to deploy OI. The proposed model, moreover, considers the 
self-financing option: every portfolio should be composed of elements able to produce 
cash flows and others that need financial support; usually, these will finance new entries 
into the portfolio (according to the life cycle of the element). The biopharmaceutical 
industry is characterized by a long, uncertain, expensive and strategic R&D function, 
which thus represents an ideal benchmark for the proposed model, even though it can 
be customized according to the industry considered. In the developed 
biopharmaceutical numerical example, each potential drug that reaches the market has 
an implicit option consisting of financing drugs in the pipeline, and this option cannot 
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be taken into consideration without a portfolio perspective. Finally, the considered  
portfolio has been selected assuming a strategic perspective: actually, the R&D 
decisions have a significant impact on the firm’s future performances: so the firm’s 
weaknesses and strengths should impact on these decisions. The proposed model takes 
this aspect into account through the core/non-core nature of the drugs. The results 
obtained for the developed numerical case suggest the selection of a multi-balanced 
portfolio: this is composed of drugs of different types (that are at different stages of the 
pipeline), which are developed both in-house and in alliance; thus, the model gives the 
best mix of closed-open innovation patterns in terms of risk control, and some of the 
selected drugs are able to self-finance the portfolio. In addition, the model can be easily 
extended to consider other kinds of open innovation solutions. 
Further developments aim to test the model in other R&D-based industries; moreover, a 
sensitivity analysis allows the obtained results to be generalized in order to obtain 
further insight into the optimal selection of the R&D portfolio from an inter-industry 
perspective. Finally, building on the findings of Vassolo et al. (2004), further 
developments aim to investigate the interactions between projects. 
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Chapter 4 
A DSS to select an optimal biopharmaceutical R&D portfolio 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The research findings of the previous chapter provide support for the managerial 
implications of considering R&D collaboration as a way to carry out the development 
of a project, considered as a part of a projects portfolio. As a matter of fact, the 
proposed real options model provides insight on the fact that R&D alliances make an 
important contribution to the value of the chosen portfolio, since – as shown in chapter 
3 - they contribute to make a more balanced portfolio. This consideration is especially 
true for the biopharmaceutical industry, which has been making a rich use of alliance 
activity. In fact, pharmaceutical companies are increasing their product pipelines by 
both developing drugs on their own and collaborating with biotechnology companies 
(Rogers et al.  2005). As a consequence, since the R&D process can last more than 10 
years, with the pharmaceutical pipeline consisting of several drugs in different phases 
of development, financially constrained pharmaceutical companies must to be sure to 
select the most promising ones along their best development path (i.e. developing the 
selected drug on their own or collaborating with a biotechnology company). Yet, 
surprisingly, there has been very little attention given to whether and under which 
conditions R&D alliances would perform better than the traditional innovation 
practices conducted in house, especially when the whole portfolio of R&D projects is 
considered; as a consequence an integrated framework that helps managers to decide 
when to deploy open innovation practices is missing (Huizingh, 2011). In this chapter, 
starting from the model illustrated in the previous chapter, I propose a Decision 
Support System (DSS) in order to answer to the following research question: 
 
i) What are the portfolio parameters that induce firms (in particular 
pharmaceutical firms) to welcome or disregard the opportunity to collaborate 
with other companies (such as biotechnology companies)? 
 
79 
 
Specifically,  the proposed tool provides pharmaceutical managers with an optimal set 
of drugs to be developed (suggesting to resort or not to open innovation for each of 
them) and supports this decision with a what if analysis, useful to understand what 
would happen to the best selected portfolio if some candidate drugs parameters change. 
Then, the analysis of the results coming from the what if analysis allows to draw up 
“what-if” rules helpful in getting managerial insights about the convenience to develop 
the drug on their own or cooperating with a biotechnology firm.  
In addition, as already discussed in chapter 3, pharmaceutical R&D has a long and 
dynamic life and further investments depend on the success/failure of previous ones; 
then, its evaluation represents an ideal field of application for real options analysis. 
Literature discussed in the previous chapter offers interesting examples of 
mathematical models, based on ROA, that are able to support managers in the selection 
of the best R&D pharmaceutical portfolio also considering, as illustrated in the same 
chapter, OI and self-financing. However, these methods do not support managers in a 
what if analysis. As a matter of fact, in order to evaluate each product, several 
parameters are involved such as the underlying value (i.e. the current value of future 
incomes from drug’s commercialization) and the estimated annual market volatility of 
the product as well as the potential value added by a biopharmaceutical alliance. In 
fact, these key-variables represent the major value-drivers of the real option that 
evaluates the single project (Cassimon et al., 2004); however, the contribution of this 
chapter is to highlight their impact not only on the single related real option, but 
especially on a considered portfolio of R&D options. To this aim, a three-step DSS is 
proposed: starting from the ROA-based optimization model illustrated in the previous 
chapter, (1) I solve the model several times in order to test the optimal portfolio 
sensitivity to given input parameters; (2) I provide a Pareto Analysis of products to 
concentrate the analysis on a narrow number of projects; and (3) I elicit what if rules, 
and map results in an effective way.  
By way of anticipation, the proposed DSS suggests that whether the drug development 
process is conducted in-house or in alliance depends mainly on the value of future 
incomes from the drug’s commercialization, as well as on the potential value added to 
the drug by a biopharmaceutical alliance.  
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The contribution aims also at having a strategic implication, since R&D portfolio 
selection represents a strategic activity in any pharmaceutical firm. Strategy sets the 
framework within which future decisions will be made, but at the same time it leaves 
room for learning from ongoing developments, as well as for the discretion to act based 
on what is learned (Luehrman, 1998). Luehrman sees strategy as a portfolio of real 
options, and his vision fits perfectly with the decision process I want to handle with. 
The best decision would be to bet to the safest options, i.e. the ones that are successful 
whatever the context will vary. Each option is like an avenue that a manager would 
walk through and the avenue attractiveness depends on the knowledge about the future. 
Promising avenues could deteriorate as managers continue their strategic walking, 
because knowledge evolves and forecasts, based on it, could therefore turn out to be 
incorrect. Some avenues maintain their attractiveness no matter how the knowledge 
evolves: managers would want to walk along these ones. Obviously, managers are 
financially constrained and then cannot buy all the options, but at the same time, they 
could avail the possibility to sign partnerships that can help in building up some 
avenues making them more rewarding: the proposed DSS takes into account these 
strategic issues.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section reviews the 
literature about portfolio selection methods and pharmaceutical portfolio models based 
on real options and in this framework strengthens the contribution of the research; 
section 4.3 introduces the research methodology along with the numerical example I 
will refer to; section 4.4 illustrates the obtained results for each step of the DSS; and, 
finally, section 4.5 focuses on the paper’s findings and further developments.  
 
4.2 Portfolio-selection literature overview  
The present chapter aims at developing a simple tool to support the complex decision-
making process of R&D portfolio selection in the pharmaceutical industry. In this 
respect, it combines two streams of research: portfolio theory, as well as ROA, to 
select an optimal portfolio in the biopharmaceutical industry. First of all, let me 
highlight the recent trend of increasingly using decision-support tools in the R&D in 
general and in pharmaceutical setting in particular.  
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As already discussed in chapter 2, different methods have been used to select an 
optimal portfolio. Though different classifications have been proposed in literature, 
one has particularly influenced this part of the dissertation (please refer to section 4.4), 
i.e. the classification proposed by Cooper et al.’s (1998). According to these authors, 
the R&D projects portfolio-selection models can be divided into three main categories: 
i.e. mathematical programming; ii. classical tools that include scoring and sorting 
models and checklists; and iii. mapping tools that use graphical and charting 
techniques to visualize a balanced portfolio. Two-axes diagrams are typically used to 
display the trade-off between two criteria: e.g. risk versus reward or probability of 
success versus value (Dickinson et al., 2001). However, any logical combination of the 
indicated techniques can be used to build up an “optimal” R&D portfolio and the most 
recent trend has been to combine the different approaches into an integrated and 
manager-friendly DSS that can then be used directly by decision makers to analyse 
what if scenarios for different parameter sets and portfolio compositions (Chu et al., 
1996; Henriksen and Traynor, 1999; Ghasemzadeh and Archer, 2000).  
Moreover, given the high costs and risks associated with drug development, and the 
huge potential future cash flows, different frameworks have been developed to assist 
decision-making in biopharmaceutical industry. Among these, Blau et al. (2004) 
proposed a DSS to manage a pharmaceutical portfolio of interdependent new candidate 
products. Specifically, they combine discrete simulations with bubble-chart diagrams 
and genetic algorithms to obtain a robust portfolio by maximizing expected financial 
returns at an acceptable level of risk for a given level of corporate resources. Closer to 
the spirit of this chapter, Rajapakse et al. (2005) generated a prototype for a computer-
aided tool to find out, among different input parameters, which ones had the biggest 
effect on the net present value (NPV) of a pharmaceutical portfolio. However, neither 
of these works considers ROA to evaluate properly the highly uncertain as well as 
flexible pharmaceutical R&D process. Actually, as already discussed in the previous 
chapter, in recent years, mathematical ROA based models have been also developed to 
evaluate pharmaceutical portfolio
9
 (Rogers et al. 2002; Rogers et al.  2005; Wang and 
Hwang 2007; Rafiee and Kianfar 2011). Among these, a few models consider open 
                                                 
9
 Readers can refer to chapter 3 an exhaustive overview of pharmaceutical portfolio models based on real 
options analysis. 
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innovation solutions. In particular, Rogers et al. . (2005) propose a numerical approach 
by which to select the best licensing strategy for each product in the R&D portfolio. A 
closed-form model has been also developed in the previous chapter to select a balanced 
optimal R&D pharmaceutical portfolio, as well as the best way to develop each of the 
chosen products following a closed or an OI path, i.e. developing the product in-house, 
or through an alliance with a biotechnology firm. However, there is a lack of research 
explicitly integrating this stream of literature and the literature that considers decision-
making activities that have been recently used in biopharmaceutical industry. As a 
matter of fact, neither of the above models can support managers in estimating the 
effect of input-parameters variation on the optimal solution. Thus, it lacks a DSS that, 
using ROA to select the optimal portfolio, can support managers in achieving the 
following: a deeper knowledge about the selection process; the individuation of the 
most important products, whatever the parameters scenario; and knowledge about how 
the selected optimal portfolio (and the paths to develop it) changes as the assumed 
context varies. This is an important issue, mainly when the OI paradigm is considered. 
Many studies have focused on various aspects of the OI process, offering useful 
insights and proposing various frameworks to support managerial decision-making 
(Huizingh, 2011). Nevertheless, Gassmann et al. (2010) recently noted that the internal 
process by which companies manage open innovation is still more trial-and-error than 
a professionally managed process. In fact, as above-mentioned, an integrated 
framework that helps managers to decide when and how to deploy open innovation 
practices is missing (Huizingh, 2011). Moreover, a DSS could help managers become 
less fearful of the errors associated with choosing the wrong portfolio: more confident 
managers are more inclined to consider a larger spectrum of alternatives, even if they 
are not well-known due to uncertainty. One of the most important barriers to OI 
implementation is represented by the lack of confidence in this kind of collaborations, 
so the exploration of the range of outcomes (varying input parameters) can encourage 
its adoption.  
In order to fill the aforementioned gap, I propose a ROA-based decision-support tool 
for pharmaceutical R&D managers who are tasked with selecting, from a set of 
candidate drugs, those most suitable for development. Specifically, in order to build the 
DSS, I refer to the aforementioned closed-solutions based model proposed in chapter 3. 
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In fact, despite being particularly close to reality, implementation and use of numerical 
approaches turn out to be very complex, due to the significantly rapid increase in the 
number of selection and sequencing decisions related to the size of the portfolio 
(Copeland and Antikarov, 2001; Brosch 2008). Conversely, Chapter 3 highlights the 
benefits (in terms of implementation) in using closed-solutions in a portfolio context. 
 
4.3 A  numerical example 
In order to better understand the tool, let me briefly recall the numerical example used 
in the previous chapter, which I refer to. The numerical considers 20 candidate 
products. Table 15 shows, for each product (P), the data of interest for the DSS and 
used to test it: the type, the impending phase and the involved input parameters. The 
type indicates the impending phase; V0i (i.e. the call option underlying that evaluates 
the product) is represented, as above mentioned, by the NPV of the cash flows coming 
from the product’s commercialization; σi is the estimated annual standard deviation of 
product i return based on the cash flows distribution;  i’ the value added to the drug by 
the biotechnology company and i, the value added to the drug by the 
biopharmaceutical alliance. Realistic values, based on historical studies of the 
pharmaceutical industry, are chosen for the data used in this example (Rogers et al. 
2002) as summarized in Table 15. In practice, these parameters would be based on 
historical data and market research (PhRma 2013; EFPIA 2014). As in Rogers et al. 
(2002), the set of 20 candidate drugs represents a variety of product characteristics. 
Volatility estimates range from 20% for low-risk drugs to 100% for high-risk drugs, 
with a typical market volatility of 50%/year.  
 
P Type Impending phase Eval. 
tool 
V0i 
(M$) 
σi i’ i 
1 1 
Phase I 
Geske 50 80% 1,3 1,8 
2 1 Geske 100 70% 1,3 1,8 
3 1 Geske 200 50% 1,5 2 
4 1 Geske 200 60% 1,5 2 
5 1 Geske 600 50% 1,5 2 
6 1 Geske 100 20% 1 1,4 
7 2 
Phase II 
Geske 80 50% 1 1,3 
8 2 Geske 100 70% 1,2 1,7 
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9 2 Geske 180 55% 1,4 1,9 
10 2 Geske 380 35% 1,4 1,9 
11 2 Geske 80 45% 1,1 1,5 
12 3 
1
st 
year Phase III 
B&S 100 80% 1 1,2 
13 3 B&S 400 30% 1,3 1,7 
14 3 B&S 700 40% 1,3 1,6 
15 4 2
nd
 year  
Phase III 
B&S 500 35% 1,2 1,4 
16 4 B&S 300 100% 1,1 1,2 
17 5 1
st
 year FDA 
Approval 
NPV 350  1 1,1 
18 5 NPV 550  1 1,2 
19 6 2
nd
 year FDA  
Approval 
NPV 800  1 1,1 
20 6 NPV 1150  1 1,2 
Table 15: Input parameters for the baseline solution 
 
In particular, for the numerical example at hand, managers could be interested in 
understanding how robust the obtained solution is for the considered input data (the 
last four columns of Table 15). The relationship between each of these parameters and 
the selected portfolio cannot be made explicitly because I am faced with a constrained 
optimization problem. It is therefore not possible to specify ex ante whether a change 
in a certain parameter will increase or decrease portfolio value (Brosch, 2008). Thus, 
as Ghasemzadeh and Archer (2000) suggest, the model should be re-solved several 
times in order to test its sensitivity to particular parameters. This is the main goal of the 
proposed DSS, which is illustrated in details in the following section.  
 
4.4 The proposed DSS 
Particularly, a spreadsheet-based DSS has been built: by changing cell values and 
having all cell values re-evaluated, a user performs what if analysis and can observe the 
effects of these changes (Power and Sharda, 2007). Moreover, according to Novak and 
Ragsdale (2003), there are different advantages with using Microsoft Excel. As a 
matter of fact, it is the most widely distributed spreadsheet software package in the 
world, and it is very user-friendly when it comes to solving various optimization 
problems (Novak and Ragsdale, 2003).  
Specifically, the proposed decision-support tool has been built in three steps. As Figure 
9 shows, after running several times the afore-illustrated OOL (see chapter 3) in order 
to test the portfolio sensitivity to given input parameters (STEP 1), a Pareto Analysis 
has been implemented to concentrate further analysis on a narrower number of projects 
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(STEP 2). Then, by matching and analyzing the results of STEP 1 and STEP 2, I’m 
able to formulate what if rules and map results in an effective way (STEP 3). In 
particular the general structure of the DSS covers with the three portfolio selection 
model classes suggested by Cooper et al. (1998):  
 
STEP 1: Mathematical programming; 
STEP 2: Screening and sorting; 
STEP 3: “What if” rules and mapping. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Graphical representation of the proposed DSS 
 
STEP 1: Mathematical programming 
In order to become more familiar with the model optimization logic, I use Design of 
Experiments (DOE) to build experiments to test how, varying the input parameters, the 
optimal portfolio composition changes. The range by which to vary the input 
parameters is set according to their expected values. 
Without loss of generality, the input parameters have been varied by the range 
proposed in the numerical example: for each drug’s type (type1-type6) I individuated 
the minimum and maximum value of the input parameters considered (V0i, i’-i, σi) 
obtaining, consequently, 112 experiments (Table 16). For products 17-20 (those in the 
86 
 
last phase of development), the NPV evaluation method was used, so that σiwas not 
relevant.  
I ran the ROA optimization model proposed in chapter 3 for all the experiments listed 
in Table 16. In the following, I will indicate with the term baseline the optimal solution 
obtained with parameters set out in Table 15, consisting of a portfolio of 10 products: 
six to be developed by licensing them (P3, P5, P6, P9, P10 and P11), and four to be 
developed in-house (P14, P15, P16 and P19). Each input has been varied in turn, while 
keeping the others constant. I analysed the results in order to obtain useful insights for 
managerial decisions; important considerations were formulated by comparing the 
baseline with the optimal solution of each of the 112 experiments.  
 
STEP 2 Screening and sorting 
As there is a high number of products and parameters involved in the problem, it could 
be useful to individuate the most important products, i.e. the products that are more 
frequently chosen, or that offer an important financial contribution to overall portfolio 
values of the selected portfolio (i.e. the real options value (ROV) in equation 31). 
Experiments’ results highlight some products as belonging to many best portfolios, 
while others do not: therefore, I find out the “contribution” of each product to the all 
ROV obtained solutions, and then I sort the products out based on this value (i.e. its 
own contribution). In this way, I can implement a Pareto Analysis (see Figure 10) and 
individuate the products that mostly contribute to the best solutions; it is possible to 
notice that P19-P15-P5-P14 (class A) account for 66 per cent of the overall ROV, P10-
P20-P16-P9-P3 (class B) account for 29 per cent, and the remaining ones (class C) 
account for just 5 per cent. We can observe that the baseline solution contains all the 
four class A products, all the class B products but P20, and two products (P6 and P11) 
from class C. For the decision it suggests to put attention on P6 and P11’s selection and 
evaluate the opportunity to substitute them with P20.  
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Table 16: (Step1) Design of experiments. For each type (type1-type6) the min and max value of 
the parameters V0, σi and  γ-γ’, are considered in order to obtain the inputs for the experiments. 
 
The Pareto Analysis on the product’s contribution to the ROV of optimal portfolios 
allows to focus our attention on the products that have an important weight on the 
overall obtained optimal portfolios. This screening task is useful and helps us to 
concentrate and then compress the effort of time consuming and expensive analyses – 
that otherwise, being unaffordable, would be eluded and substituted with a waiting 
strategy (Rotheli, 1990) - on products belonging to class A and to class B. 
 
 Var. levels V0 σi i-i’ 
P1 
MIN E1 E2 E3 
MAX E4 E5 E6 
P2 
MIN E7 E8 E9 
MAX E10 E11 E12 
P3 
MIN E13 E14 E15 
MAX E16 E17 E18 
P4 
MIN E19 E20 E21 
MAX E22 E23 E24 
P5 
MIN E25 E26 E27 
MAX E28 E29 E30 
P6 
MIN E31 E32 E33 
MAX E34 E35 E36 
P7 
MIN E37 E38 E39 
MAX E40 E41 E42 
P8 
MIN E43 E44 E45 
MAX E46 E47 E48 
P9 
MIN E49 E50 E51 
MAX E52 E53 E54 
P10 
MIN E55 E56 E57 
MAX E58 E59 E60 
P11 
MIN E61 E62 E63 
MAX E64 E65 E66 
P12 
MIN E67 E68 E69 
MAX E70 E71 E72 
P13 
MIN E73 E74 E75 
MAX E76 E77 E78 
P14 
MIN E79 E80 E81 
MAX E82 E83 E84 
P15 
MIN E85 E86 E87 
MAX E88 E89 E90 
P16 
MIN E91 E92 E93 
MAX E94 E95 E96 
P17 
MIN E97  E98 
MAX E99  E100 
P18 
MIN E101  E102 
MAX E103  E104 
P19 
MIN E105  E106 
MAX E107  E108 
P20 
MIN E109  E110 
MAX E111  E112 
 
88 
 
 
Figure 10:  (Step 2) Pareto Analysis of the product portfolio value contribution. 
 
STEP 3: “What if” rules and mapping 
The proposed what if analysis assumes a portfolio perspective and, to the best of my 
knowledge, literature has not tackled with it so far.  
It is interesting to understand the impact of each parameter on the optimal portfolio: in 
particular, it is possible to distinguish between direct effect and secondary effect. I 
refer to direct effect to indicate the impact the product i parameter has on the product i 
itself, and I refer to secondary effect to indicate its impact on the nineteen remaining 
drugs: for example, in E4 (Table 16), the parameter changed is P1’s V01 that is equal to 
the maximum of the V0i for type 1’s products (V0i=600), and it can influence either 
product P1’s choice (direct effect), or P2-P19’s choice (secondary effect). The obtained 
optimal solution for E4 suggests that P1-P15-P16 and P19 should be developed in-
house, and that P2-P5-P9-P10-P11 and P13 should be licensed-in. Comparing this 
solution to the baseline, I can observe that a higher V01 has a direct effect on P1 (P1 in 
the E4 solution is developed in house while it is not present in the baseline), and a 
secondary effect on other products (product 3, 6 and 14 no longer belong to the 
solution, while products 2 and 13 are chosen): it is a kind of substitution effect 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2008). The secondary effects are very hard to understand, but 
to this purpose, the Pareto Analysis (proposed above), combined with the what if rules 
(proposed below), could be helpful.  
A direct-effects analysis on the products of the baseline, that belong to class A and 
class B of the Pareto Analysis, allows to gain some insights. In particular, I can 
observe that: 
Pareto Analysis  
0 
66% 
95% 100% 
0 
0,2 
0,4 
0,6 
0,8 
1 
0 P19-P15-P5-P14 P10-P20-P16-P9-P3 P6-P11P13-P2-P4-P1-P7-P8 
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 For P15 (E85 and E88),  the model recommends in-house development for the 
maximum value of V015, and the model recommends that the product is licensed 
in that for the minimum value;  
 For P3 for the lowest value of V03 (E13), the model recommends exclusion 
from the optimal portfolio, otherwise (E16, when V03 assumes its maximum 
value) that it should be licensed-in; 
 For P5, P10, P16 and P19, no direct effect can be observed, thus they will be 
included in the portfolio selected, even if secondary effects can be observed; 
 For P17, P18, P19 and P20, if selected, they are always developed in-house. 
 
The analysis of direct and secondary effects allows to formulate what if rules:  
 
Rule 1 The higher the value of the drug i, V0i, the greater the opportunity to 
select and develop it in-house.  
 
This is an expected result that agrees with the influence of the underlying (V0i) on the 
call value, as foreseen by  that measures the rate of change of option value with 
respect to changes in the underlying asset's price (Gaarder, 2007)the higher the value 
of V0i of a product, the higher its real options value, which means that for the 
pharmaceutical firm, it is more convenient to develop the drug in-house and this stands 
also in a portfolio perspective.  
In fact, when we consider the influence of the underlying (V0i) on the option value of a 
drug developed in alliance, the benefit (the direct influence of V0i on the option) is 
“mitigated” by the payments and royalties that the pharmaceutical company will give 
to the biotechnology company during the alliance. Particularly, the higher the V0i, the 
higher the payments and royalties, which reduce the total value of the option. 
However, from a portfolio perspective (with budget constraints), the alliance 
alternative could be more convenient than the in-house alternative (see P3), simply 
because could require lower net investments leaving room for other investments to 
develop other products. It seems that, in the case of a product that displays the 
characteristics best-suited to being developed in alliance, as V0i grows, an ordered 
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preference arises among “do not develop”, “licence in” and “develop in-house” (with 
in-house being the most convenient for higher values of V0i).  
As far as i’-i is concerned, for the products that, in the baseline, are developed in 
alliance (licensable drugs), a lower value of i’-i causes the exclusion of the product 
from the optimal portfolio (for P3, P9 and P11), or the suggestion that it should be 
developed in-house (P5 and P10).  
This is another expected result, because licensing-in is a convenient solution if the 
alliance adds consistent value to the product. Moreover, the analysis suggests that it 
would be valuable to keep products P5 and P10 in the portfolio, and to develop them 
in-house if licensing is not a convenient alternative (low value for i’-i); furthermore, 
the other products (P3, P9 and P11) do not remain in the optimal portfolio if the 
licensing solution is no longer convenient. 
These considerations allow to formulate the following what if rule:  
Rule 2 The higher the value of i’-ithe higher the convenience of selecting 
licensable drugs and of licensing them in. 
The influence of σi is limited to two cases: we can conclude that, for the considered 
example, the baseline is robust if σi varies. 
The results can also give interesting suggestions on the portfolio mix. Figure 11 shows 
a four-quadrant bubble chart; the four quadrants are obtained combining two variables 
(product type and development path) with two levels each: Quadrant 1 (Q1) refers to 
products of type 1 or 2 developed in alliance; Quadrant 2 (Q2) refers to products of 
type 3, 4, 5 or 6 developed in alliance; Quadrant 3 (Q3) refers to products of type 3, 4, 
5 or 6 developed in-house; and Quadrant 4 (Q4) refers to products of type 1 or 2 
developed in-house.  
For the sake of clarity, let me refer to Q4 in Figure 11 and indicate with HOSsi, the set 
of optimal solutions in which product i is developed in house and with card(HOSsi) 
HOSsi cardinality, how many times product i is selected and developed in house. Each 
bubble in Q4 refers to a product i of type 1 or type 2, and to its HOSsi. The bubble is 
centred according to the average contribution of the product i to its HOSsi (x axis) and 
to its card(HOSsi) (y axis), and its area is proportional to the overall contribution of 
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product i to the sum of PV of the considered solutions set (HOSsi) namely the product 
of its coordinates x and y. Similar arguments hold for the other quadrants. 
As shown in Figure 11, comparing Q1 with Q2, we can argue that type 1 and type 2 
products – for which the impending phase is one of the first phases considered in the 
numerical example – are developed by licensing them in, while type 3, 4, 5 and 6 
products are developed in-house (Q3 vs. Q4). This result is very important in terms of 
the risk held by the pharmaceutical firm: drugs that are in the early stages of the R&D 
process, and that will not necessarily reach the final market, are chosen and developed 
in alliance so the pharmaceutical company shares the risk with the biotechnology 
company (Bianchi et al., 2011). 
Some exceptions (Q2 and Q4) are represented by the following: P13 (in Q2), which is 
of type 3 (i.e. it is in Phase III), and, if  selected, is developed in alliance (instead of in-
house as expected) due to secondary effects; P5 (in Q4), though of type 1 (i.e. it is in 
Phase I),  is developed in-house when i’-i achieve the lowest values (direct effect) or 
because of secondary effects; P1, P10 (in Q4) and P15 (in Q2) which, for just one 
experiment, are selected and developed in the opposite way to that expected: P1 and 
P10, which are developed in-house when V01 assumes the highest value and when 10’-
10 achieve the lowest value respectively (thus the alliance is not a promising 
alternative), and P15, which is developed in alliance when its V0i is equal to the 
minimum value (direct effect). Moreover, Figure 11 gives an alternative graphical 
representation of the Pareto Analysis, according to the mapping methods. 
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Alliance 
 
No 
alliance 
 Products 12-20 (Type 3,4,5,6) Products 1-11 (Type 1 and 2) 
Figure 11 (Step 3): Selected products bubble charts . 
The DSS results give some useful insights to managers: in particular, it allows looking 
at the baseline with greater awareness. The optimal solution, for the case at hand, 
seems a robust one: if we observe Figure 11, we can notice as products in the baseline 
are the most selected (they are in the high frequency area of Q1 and Q3). However, 
decision maker should pay attention to product P20 (belonging to class A and selected 
only 20 times out of 112) and P13 (selected 8 times, even if in class C). Moreover, 
three of the selected products, namely P15, P10 and P5 could be developed in an 
alternative way instead of the suggested one in the baseline. The DSS makes the 
decision maker more conscious of her/his decision and this allows to overcome barriers 
in the adoption of ROA based tools.  
In addition, the proposed DSS can be used at each decision point when fresh 
information is available: this is the so-called “rolling view” proposed by Collan and 
Kyläheiko (2013). 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter aims at supporting managers involved in the selection of the best R&D 
portfolio in the pharmaceutical industry. This is a constrained problem: limited 
resources cannot allow the development of all the potential product candidates, and it 
forces the adoption of a portfolio perspective. Moreover, pharmaceutical R&D process 
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has characteristics that require advanced evaluation methods, such as ROA. Literature 
suggests the use of mathematical models to tackle the selection process in the depicted 
scenario (real option-based R&D evaluation of interdependent projects).  
The proposed DSS consists of three steps and is able to: design an experimental plan to 
test the influence of uncertain parameters of the input data set on the optimal solutions; 
analyse the results obtained for the experiments individuated in the previous step in 
order to obtain what if rules; and map the results in an effective way. Furthermore, the 
suggested what if rules confirm theoretical knowledge about ROA and OI also in a 
portfolio perspective: the first rule confirms the importance of the underlying value of 
each candidate product, both in selecting the product itself and in a portfolio context, 
while the second rule confirms the importance of complementary resources in OI. In 
particular, the first rule gives an original contribution to the literature about a 
controversial issue. Indeed, it states that, even if a product is in its earlier stages of 
development, and is therefore very risky, it could be better to develop it in-house 
(rather than sharing the risk with a biotechnology firm) as the reported example for 
type 1 products shows. This result shows that it could be helpful to analyse the optimal 
portfolio, considering both risk and return as criteria; indeed, it suggests the existence 
of a break-even point for the value of the product (which is a proxy of its return), past 
which it could be better for the pharmaceutical firm to bear a higher risk (developing it 
in-house and not sharing the risk with a biotechnology firm). 
Research findings show interesting managerial and academic implications: the main 
driver in product robustness (resilience in the optimal portfolio) and in determining the 
way the product should be developed (in-house or in alliance) is the underlying value, 
i.e. the NPV of cash flows that results from the commercialization of the drug (that 
represents the underlying of the related call option); also the added value from the 
potential partnership, expressed by i’-i, plays an important role in product selection. 
The secondary effects need a deeper investigation, which could benefit from a 
consideration of the correlation between two products: it is possible to  argue that the 
correlation between product i and product j can affect the impact of product i 
parameter changes over product j decision (products also have a generic 
interdependency one another because of budget constraints that we took into account). 
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By integrating real-options analysis with portfolio optimization, this chapter offers also 
an important contribution from a methodological perspective. At the same time, the 
proposed methodology offers general guidelines for building a DSS that can be applied 
to mathematical programming with a goal similar to the one we dealt with. 
Further developments aim at investigating the diversification side of the problem, and 
then at obtaining a risk-return efficient frontier: in order to accomplish this task, 
correlation between each couple of products should be known. This is an interesting 
task because, as discussed in Chapter 2, in van Bekkum et al. (2009), correlation 
among R&D products with real-options characteristics acts differently than it usually 
does in evaluation contexts that use NPV, and, in particular, negative correlation only 
slightly reduces portfolio risk.  
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Chapter 5 
The role of competition in an alliance timing game 
 
5.1 Introduction 
While Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 shed light on important aspects on R&D alliances in a 
portfolio context, this chapter focuses on the time aspects of R&D collaborations, in 
presence of competition. As shown in Chapter 1, since project development is a 
dynamic process (Pinto and Prescott, 1988) during which partnerships are initiated, 
developed or terminated at different points of time, one important aspect of R&D 
collaborations is the optimal timing to sign R&D collaborations. Specifically, I consider 
potential collaborations between biotech and pharmaceutical firms, by taking the 
perspective of biotech firms facing the decision of whether and when to collaborate 
with a pharmaceutical firm. Alliance timing has, in fact, become a critical decision 
process. As a matter of fact, several empirical studies highlight its important role in 
R&D performances (Niosi, 2003; Du et al., 2013). More importantly, whether and when 
a biotech firm should ally with big pharma is currently one of the key issues debated in 
the industry world. Some industry insiders suggest that biotech firms should set aside 
their dreams of becoming the next Amgen or similar firms, which have become big 
successful companies. Rather, they need to partner with pharmaceutical companies very 
early in the development process to succeed (Napodano, 2009). It is argued that 
numerous biotech startups, which had the opportunity to do it but waited in hopes of 
obtaining bigger payoffs later, did not succeed, remaining at a micro-cap status. On the 
other hand, other experts highlight that many biotech firms have realized they do not 
need the support of big pharma to bankroll their clinical trials and marketing efforts, 
given the more easily available financing. Actually, such firms, e.g., Gilead, are 
monetizing the success of their product in the final market and evolving from being 
targets of big pharma to be acquirers (Toonkel, 2013). An industry survey conducted by 
giant consulting company Deloitte also suggests that, in recent years, the focus of small 
biotech firms has shifted from simply looking for capital to fund pre-commercialization 
development to building clinical development and product marketing capabilities. As a 
result, biotech tends to postpone the alliance timing to the later stages of development 
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and commercialization (Deloitte, 2005). These interestingly contrasting arguments 
reflect the existing tradeoff, which has been pointed out in the innovation management 
literature. In fact, taking the viewpoint of a biotech firm, an early arrangement entails a 
lower level of risk because of the higher quality and more successful R&D activities the 
biotech firm can conduct thanks to the considerable amount of financial resources 
coming from the pharmaceutical firm (Gassmann and Reepmeyer, 2005). At the same 
time, however, an early arrangement has the negative effect of giving even higher 
bargaining power to the pharmaceutical company in determining the payment amount, 
which might financially penalize the biotech firm. On the contrary, in spite of higher 
risks of failure in early stages, a later agreement might help the biotech firm to better 
monetize from the innovation through higher payment conditions and higher royalties 
in the final market (Nicholson et al., 2005; Rogers et al.  2005).  In general, the 
dominance of one of these contrasting forces over the other one determines whether a 
biotech should collaborate in early stages or postpone such a decision as late as 
possible. The existence of such conflicting forces also helps explain why we observe 
substantial differences in the timing of real alliances. As a matter of fact, among the top 
biotech licensing deals in 2012, we can observe a very large heterogeneity in alliance 
timing (Carroll, 2012). For instance, the agreements between FivePrime Therapeutics 
and GlaxoSmithKline and between Genmab and Novartis relate to the discovery stage 
in the new drug development process. On the other hand, the agreement between 
Enanta and Novartis relates to preclinical phase, whereas the agreement between 
Galapagos NV and Abbott Laboratories focuses on phase II. Some other agreements, 
such as that between Thrombogenics and Merck KGaA, concern the stage of 
application for approval. 
While previous studies offer important intuitions about alliance timing in absence of 
competition among biotech firms, no works are available when biotech firms compete 
in the same market. However, Biotechnology industry is characterized by the presence 
of many competitors (FierceBiotech, 2007). Particularly, Deloitte survey reports that a 
solid majority of both large and small companies in this industry believes that the 
alliance market will become even more competitive (Deloitte, 2005). In fact, naturally, 
some competitors end up working in the same therapeutic area. As an example, recent 
industry voices anticipate the emergence of a “horse race” in the migraine treatments 
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among a number of biotech firms (Schatzman, 2013). Therefore, it is more realistic to 
incorporate the possible reaction of competitors in the decision-making process. In this 
chapter, I introduce competition among biotech firms, which has not considered in 
previous works on alliance timing in the biopharmaceutical industry. Specifically, I 
consider two competing biotech firms that can decide whether and when to partner with 
a pharmaceutical company. In this setting, the alliance is mutually exclusive in the 
sense that the pharmaceutical company will only contract with one biotech firm. This is 
consistent with the observation that usually pharmaceutical companies identify and 
make a selection only among the most promising biotech target. Also, consistent with 
certain trends discussed above, it is assumed that both biotech firms can reach the 
market individually, which implies that they are not exactly researching on the same 
molecule. Therefore, if one biotech firm signs an alliance with the pharmaceutical 
company, the other can only continue the R&D process individually with some 
spillover benefits from the competitor’s alliance, but with her own financial resources. 
This scenario is quite reasonable in reality and offers an opportunity to investigate 
alliance timing decisions from a wider perspective (Rogers et al. , 2005). In fact, in such 
a case, competition might change the previous considerations about the timing and the 
profitability of signing the alliance. Intuitively, one could think that the introduction of 
competition will raise the incentive of each biotech firm to anticipate the timing of 
collaboration with the pharmaceutical company in order to prevent the opponent from 
being faster in establishing the alliance. Therefore, the incentive to anticipate might be 
due to the traditional economics of pre-emption. To some extent, this might be the case 
of the recent alliance of Forma Therapeutics with Celgene. In fact, the small biotech 
firm has reached the deal right after several other biotech firms, such as Cleave 
Biosciences and Proteostasis Therapeutics, entered the field of protein homeostasis 
(McBride, 2013). However, an opposite effect might arise as well. In fact, there might 
be a strong competitive pressure to reach later stages or, even, the final market with 
products whose revenue are not shared with the pharmaceutical company in order to 
appropriate higher profits and win the competition against the rival. This effect seems 
to be consistent with several examples of successful biotech firms more and more 
willing to postpone potential deals in such a competitive arena (Toonkel, 2013). These 
contrasting viewpoints from the industry world reveal the importance of the alliance 
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timing issue in a competitive environment. It appears, in fact, still unclear whether a 
biotech firm should anticipate, postpone or disregard the opportunity of collaborating 
with a pharmaceutical company. In this chapter I  provide an answer to this question 
adopting a real options games (ROG) approach, in order to account for both exogenous 
uncertainty, that characterizes the R&D biopharmaceutical process, and (re)actions of 
possible competitors. 
By way of anticipation, the research findings suggest that whether, when and who will 
ally with the pharmaceutical company depend on the contract terms offered by the 
pharmaceutical company, the market value increase due to the presence of the 
pharmaceutical industry, as well as the competitive advantage one biotech firm gains 
against the competitor due to the alliance. Identifying and understanding the conditions 
under which specific results arise can be particularly useful to both biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies involved in open-innovation based R&D project decisions in 
a competitive environment. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, previous 
closely related contributions are discussed in order to highlight the scientific support of 
this research. In section 5.3, the ROG model and relative solutions are introduced. In 
section 5.4, I discuss results and relative managerial implications. Finally, in section 
5.5, conclusions are drowned and further developments are anticipated. 
 
5.2 Literature Overview 
This chapter investigates alliance timing in the biopharmaceutical R&D process in 
presence of competition. Specifically, from the perspective of biotech firms, I try to 
understand the conditions under which competing biotech firms should anticipate, 
postpone or disregard the opportunity of collaboration with a pharmaceutical company. 
In this respect, this part of the dissertation combines two streams of research: real 
option games and alliance timing in the biopharmaceutical industry. On one hand, I 
utilize ROGs because firms’ decisions do not depend only on the nature of competition, 
but also on the nature of uncertainty. In this respect, ROGs, as widely discussed in 
Chapter 2 (section 2.3), take into account both exogenous uncertainty (nature) and 
(re)actions of possible competitors. In particular, once again, I adopt closed-form 
solutions (specifically the Black and Scholes formula) because of the easiness of 
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implementation and also because allow to preserve analytical tractability which is very 
useful in this kind of analysis. In particular I assume that biotech firms can, in turn, 
decide whether to ally with the pharmaceutical company at the beginning of each 
development phase, and thus I model the process with a European call.  
While there is an amount of literature on Rogs (as presented in chapter 2), in this 
chapter I refer to specific references in this field, that are more closely related to the 
proposed model, since they apply ROG to R&D investment decisions in presence of 
spillovers. Specifically, Martzoukos and Zacharias (2013) demonstrate how two 
competing firms can act strategically and take advantage of the positive spillovers, or 
take pre-emptive action against the negative spillovers. They find that, under learning-
by-doing hypothesis, strategy shifts are easier to observe in market environments of 
high growth and high volatility. Mason and Weeds (2005), conversely, find that in 
duopoly, in the presence of positive externalities, greater uncertainty can actually hasten 
rather than delay investment. This is because uncertainty can raise the leader’s value 
more than the follower’s. Pre-emptive reasoning entails that the leader must act sooner. 
However these works deal with investment timing, while the model proposed in this 
chapter deals with alliance timing under a competition setting.  
On the other hand, I am also naturally closely related to the alliance timing literature. 
Actually, some papers highlight the optimal time to ally in R&D biopharmaceutical 
environment. However they do not consider competition. Among the others, Kalamas et 
al. (2002), observe how pharmaceutical firms might want to postpone the agreement to 
reduce the risk of licensing a drug that ultimately fails to win approval from the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). So they offer much better contract in the later 
stages of the drug development. Naturally, under these contract terms, biotech 
companies prefer late-stage deals. Assuming a fair pricing of the agreement, the authors 
find that it would be better to ally early in the preclinical phases from a holistic 
perspective, i.e., taking into account both pharmaceutical and biotech perspectives, in 
absence of competition.  
Nicholson et al. (2005) demonstrate that a biotech company profits more by signing a 
partnership with a pharmaceutical company in the later stages of R&D in order to 
acquire a greater bargaining power and obtain more favorable conditions in terms of 
payments and royalties. In addition, Rogers et al.  (2005) tackle with similar research 
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questions from the perspective of the pharmaceutical company, adopting a real options 
approach. Their results suggest that the timing and financial side of the license depend 
on the volatility of cash flows coming from the drug commercialization and the value 
that the partnership is able to add to the developed drug. Specifically, their results 
indicate that early stage alliances become more valuable when market uncertainty and 
the value added to the drug by the pharmaceutical companies increase. However, they 
focus on the optimal alliance design without considering competition. 
 
5.3 The ROG model  
For the sake of simplicity, I model the game as consisting of two main stages of the 
pharmaceutical process: the first stage is the R&D stage, whereas the second stage is 
the commercialization one. There are two identical biotech firms, namely BIO1 and 
BIO2, in the market having the opportunity, in each of the two stages of the game, to 
establish a partnership with a pharmaceutical company. In line with most of the 
situations in reality, I assume that the pharmaceutical company has the bargaining 
power to make a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer and maintain such an assumption 
throughout the chapter. Another important assumption is that the pharmaceutical 
company selects biotech firms sequentially. That is, a Stackelberg game is modeled, 
where BIO1 is the first mover and BIO2 is the follower. Also, the alliance is mutually 
exclusive in the sense that the pharmaceutical company will only contract with one 
biotech firm. Therefore, if one biotech firm signs an alliance with the pharmaceutical 
company, the other can only continue the R&D process and reach the market on its 
own, which implies that they are not exactly researching on the same molecule. Under 
this setting, BIO1 certainly enjoys a first-mover advantage. However, the focus is in 
understanding whether and which of the two biotech firms will ally with the 
pharmaceutical company and the relative timing of such alliance, i.e., first or second 
stage.  
The sequence of the game is as follows. At the beginning of stage 1, BIO1 is selected 
by the pharmaceutical company. The pharmaceutical firm offers an alliance contract to 
BIO1 as consisting of an ex-ante payment P1 poured at the beginning of stage 1 to the 
biotech firm and the percentage of royalties she will retain equal to a1. If BIO1 rejects 
the offer, the same contract is offered to BIO2 due to the perfect symmetric 
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environment. If, on the contrary, no agreement has been reached in the first stage, the 
decision game is repeated. The pharmaceutical firm offers a different alliance contract 
to BIO1 as consisting of an ex-ante payment P2 poured at the beginning of stage 2 to 
the biotech firm and a percentage of royalties she will retain equal to a2. If BIO1 rejects 
the offer, the same contract is offered to BIO2, due to the perfect symmetric 
environment. Therefore I assume that the pharmaceutical company is not financial 
constrained and she is able to offer two different contracts in two different moments. 
At the end of the second stage, future cash flows are estimated for both biotech firms 
under all the possible situations that can arise in this setting. In case of alliance in any 
of the two stages, the size of the potential drug market increases relatively to the case of 
no alliance by an amplification factor δ >1, which reflects the value added to the drug 
by the synergies derived from the alliance (Rogers et al. , 2005). Figure 12 depicts the 
extensive form of the game where the payoffs are computed using ROA, as described 
later in this section. 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  Extensive form of the game in presence of competition. 
The game can be solved via backward induction procedure. Therefore, I start from the 
final sub-game where BIO2 has to decide if ally or not with the pharmaceutical 
company and go back to the first stage involving BIO1’s decision, examining all the 
possible branches of the tree illustrated in Figure 12. Solving the game entirely yields 
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five possible scenarios of equilibrium for the game as shown in Table 17 (e.g., E1 refers 
to the equilibrium where BIO1 signs an alliance at stage 1, and so forth). 
 
 
Table 17:  Scenarios of equilibrium (duopoly case) 
 
Before computing the payoffs, let denote i =1, 2 the specific biotech involved in the 
game, and j = 1, 2,…, 5 a generic scenario of equilibrium as identified above. Also 
define: 
 It = investment cost for stage t; 
 σ = volatility of V0; 
 r = risk-free interest rate; 
 T= length of the first stage; 
 V0 = value of the project (net cash flows arising after commercialization) at the 
beginning of the first stage; 
 VT = value of the project (net cash flows arising after commercialization) at the 
beginning of the second stage. 
 
In case no biotech firm signs the alliance with the pharmaceutical company, they are 
able to reach the final market individually and they share the total market equally due to 
symmetry. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, in case of alliance in any of the two 
stage, the size of the potential market value of the drug increases relatively to the case 
of no alliance by an amplification factor δ >1. Furthermore, the alliance generates 
spillover effects
10
. That is, not only the biotech signing the alliance with the 
                                                 
10
 R&D spillover effects are significant among different sectors, as discussed in Bernstein and Mohnen 
(1998). The importance of inter-competitive pharmaceutical companies has been documented in literature 
(Handerson and Cockborn, 1996). 
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pharmaceutical company, but also the “lonely” competitor will receive a benefit from 
rival’s collaboration. However, due to presence of competition, the total pie will be split 
differently between the two biotech firms if one signs the alliance. Specifically a higher 
portion, say β >1/2, of the market will be captured by the company signing the alliance, 
whereas the competitor will appropriate the remaining portion.  
 
Computing firms’ payoffs 
In order to understand how the model works, let me consider an environment where 
only one biotech (BIO) operates in the market, which I refer to as the monopoly case, 
and describe in details this setting. In addition, considering the monopoly case allows 
me to highlight the role of competition in the alliance timing decisions. The game 
structure is similar to the duopoly case. Figure 13 depicts the extensive form of the 
game in absence of competition. It is straightforward to see that we can obtain three 
possible scenarios (j) of equilibrium for the game. These are (see table 18): BIO’s 
alliance at stage 1 (equilibrium Q1), BIO’s alliance at stage 2 (Q2), and no BIO’s 
alliance (Q3).  
 
 
Figure 13:  Extensive form of the game in absence of competition. 
 
 
Qj=1,2,3 Q1 Q2 Q3 
BIO Alliance at first 
stage 
Alliance at second 
stage 
No alliance 
Table 18: Scenarios of equilibrium (monopoly case) 
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As said earlier, the complex R&D pharmaceutical process, is split in two stages: the 
R&D stage and the commercialization stage. As a consequence, the R&D stage is an 
option for the second and final stage. This means that the process can been seen as a 1-
fold option. Accordingly, I can model it with the above described Black and Sholes 
approach, which ensures the flexibility offered by the option to decide further 
investments when more information is available. As already discussed in the second 
chapter, adopting such an approach means assuming that the value of the project V0 at 
the beginning of the first stage follows a geometric Brownian motion causing that this 
value, at maturity T (i.e. at the end of the first stage or alternatively at the beginning of 
the second stage), is a known realization (specifically, as illustrated in section 2.1.1, it is 
a known realization from a lognormal distribution). As a consequence, the second stage 
payoffs are function of the known realization of the value of the project at maturity 
(VT). As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the second stage, uncertainty is solved and 
the realization of the underlying is known (see Figure 14, where a possible realization at 
maturity is indicated). In other words, after the R&D stage, the biotechnology company 
has more information about the value of cash flows at the moment of 
commercialization.  
 
Figure 14: Underlying drug value representation (considering 10 replications) from the 
beginning to the end of the first stage 
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In such a way, the payoffs in the first stage are computed as call European options 
(according to equation 19) in order to take into account uncertainty in this stage. 
Conversely, the simple NPV is used to compute the second stage payoffs.  
Specifically, the first stage payoffs are computed as the difference between the 
European call option C
j
mon (with underlying value S
j
mon and exercise price X
j
mon, 
depending of the different j scenario), which represents the gross payoff in the first 
stage, and the net investments in the same stage, NI
j
1mon (see table 19). The latter is 
actually computed as the difference between the investment needed in the first stage I1 
and the ex-ante payment in case of alliance at the first stage, P1. Of course, in case of no 
alliance or an alliance at the second stage, the net investment in the first stage is simply 
the investment required in the first stage I1. Note that both I1 and P1, as in the model 
illustrated in chapter 3, are sunk costs that do not affect, but just decrease, the option 
value. Table 19 reports all the elements necessary to compute first stage payoffs 
presented in Figure 13 in case of monopoly under all possible scenarios of equilibrium. 
Note that the exercise price, X
j
mon is equivalent to the investment required at the second 
stage, which, in case of alliance at the second stage, will be decreased by an amount 
equal to the expected payment E(P2) at the second stage. 
As far as the second stage payoffs are concerned, they are simply computed as the 
difference between the project value realized at maturity under the scenario j (V
j
mon),  
gross of the net investment in second stage, i.e., NI
j
mon, where the latter is actually 
computed as the difference between the investment needed in the second stage and the 
ex-ante payment in case of alliance P2. In case of no alliance, the net investment is 
simply the investment required in the second stage I2 (see table 20). 
Similarly, Table 20 reports all the elements necessary to compute the second stage 
payoffs . Note that the subscript mon. is used in this case, that is, in the monopoly case.  
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Qj=1,2,3 Q1 Q2 Q3 
    
 
     
      
      
  
Underlying  (    
 
) (1-α1)δV0 (1-α2)δV0 V0 
Exercise price  (    
 
) I2 I2-E(P2) I2 
(     
 
) I1- P1 I1 I1 
Table 19:  Elements necessary to compute first stage payoffs (monopoly case) 
 
Qj=2,3 Q2 Q3 
    
 
 (1-α2)δVT VT 
     
 
 I2- P2 I2 
Table 20:  Project value gross of net investments, and net investments in stage 2 (monopoly case) 
 
 
The game is solved by backward induction. Therefore, starting from the second stage 
(see Fig.15), it is possible to find the payment P2 which makes the “alliance” payoff  
     
 
 -      
 
) equal to the “no alliance payoff”      
 
 -      
 
).  
 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
Figure 15:  Second stage payoffs (monopoly case) 
 
Referring to table 20, the minimum value of P2 which satisfies this condition is given 
by the following expression: 
 
P2 =      
      
                 (33) 
 
NO 
Alliance  
 
BI0
0Oo 
         
        
 );0 
         
        
 );0 
Second  stage 
 Alliance  
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In fact, in case of alliance, the value of the project is increased by δ and (1-α2) is the 
part retained from the biotechnology company. 
Note that this payment is linear function of the value of the project VT.  
Clearly, in order to solve the model and find theoretical solutions at t=0, we need to 
find expected values of VT and, consequently, of P2.  
Particularly, at the beginning of the second stage (i.e. at t=T) the value of the project 
V(T), is  log-normally  distributed with expected value, E(VT), equal to    
   . 
As far as the expected second stage payment E(P2) is concerned, since P2 is linear 
function of VT, it is given by the following formulation: 
 
E(P2)        
      
                  =    
            ) (34) 
 
Then, if E(P2)is >        
      
    the solution of the sub-game in the second stage is  
“Alliance at second stage”. Backing to the first stage (please refer to Figure 16), we can 
find the P1 condition which makes BIO firm indifferent between the first stage alliance 
(     
       
  ) and the second stage alliance evaluated at t=0, computed as a call 
option  (     
       
  ). 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
 
                                             
                                           
Figure 16:  First stage payoffs if the solution of the second stage is “Alliance”(monopoly case) 
 
Referring to table 19, the minimum value of P1 which satisfies this condition is given 
by the following expression: 
       
      
  (35) 
 
First stage Alliance  
BI0
0Oo 
Second stage Alliance  
(evaluated at t=0)          
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Therefore, if P1 is higher than this threshold, the solution of the game will be the first 
stage alliance, otherwise, i.e. for values of P1 lower than the same threshold, the 
solution of the game will be the second stage alliance (see Table 23). 
Conversely,  if E(P2) is <        
      
    the solution of the sub-game in the second 
stage is “No alliance at second stage”. Backing to the first stage, we can find P1 
condition which makes BIO firm indifferent between allying at first stage (     
  
     
  ) or not allying neither at the second stage nor at the first stage (     
  
     
  ). 
 
       
      
  (36) 
 
So, if P1 is higher than this threshold, the solution of the game will be the first stage 
alliance, otherwise, i.e. for values of P1 lower than the same threshold, the solution of 
the game will be “No alliance” (see Table 23). 
It is straightforward to see that the game–solutions (equilibria) strongly dependent on 
both the expected value of the second stage payments, E(P2) and first stage payments P1 
conditions. 
Following this logic, I obtain Payments thresholds for the duopoly case as well (please 
refer to the next section where all payments conditions are reported in both monopoly 
and duopoly case). In the sake of space, I do not report all the process conducted to 
obtain payments thresholds in the duopoly case, but, to the sake of clarity, in Table 21 
and Table 22, all elements necessary to compute both second (Table 21) and first stage 
payoffs (table 22) in case of duopoly are reported. In such a case, the subscript i=1,2  is 
used to denote the specific biotechnology company involved in the game. 
 
 Ej=3,4,5 E3 E4 E5 
BIO1   
 
 (1-α2)βδVT (1-β)δVT γVT 
    
 
 I2-E(P2) I2 I2 
BIO2   
 
 (1-β)δVT (1-α2)βδVT (1-γ)VT 
    
 
 I2 I2-E(P2) I2 
Table 21: Project value gross of net investments, and net investments in stage 2 (duopoly). 
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 Ej=1,2,3,4,5 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 
BIO2   
 
   
    
    
    
    
  
 Underlying  (  
 
) (1-α1) βδV0 (1-β)δV0 (1-α2) βδV0 (1-β)δV0 γV0 
 Exercise price  (  
 
) I2 I2 I2-E(P2) I2 I2 
 (   
 
) I1- P1 I1 I1 I1 I1 
BIO2   
 
   
    
    
    
    
  
 Underlying  (  
 
) (1-β)δV0 (1-α1) βδV0 (1-β)δV0 (1-α2) βδV0 γV0 
 Exercise price  (  
 
) I2 I2 I2 I2-E(P2) I2 
 (   
 
) I1 I1- P1 I1 I1 I1 
Table 22: Elements necessary to compute first stage payoffs (duopoly) 
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5.4 Game solutions and results analysis 
To facilitate the understanding of the role of competition in the timing of 
biopharmaceutical alliances, the results in case of monopoly, where competition is 
obviously absent, are firstly presented. Under this setting, the contract terms offered by 
the pharmaceutical company as well as the value added to drug due to her presence are 
the fundamental determinants of alliance timing. As a matter of fact, in Table 23, I 
illustrate the threshold payments, i.e., P1 and E(P2), which help understand whether the 
alliance will be signed in the first stage, in the second stage, or no alliance will be 
established. In the same Table I also summarize the possible alliance outcomes 
depending on the level of ex-ante payments received by the biotech firm. 
 
           P1  
   Low  High 
 Low              
     
   
       
      
  
No Alliance 
 
       
      
  
BIO first stage 
E(P2)      
 High              
     
   
       
      
  
BIO second stage 
 
       
      
  
BIO first stage 
Table 23: Threshold payments (P1 and E(P2)) and possible scenarios of equilibrium in the 
monopoly game 
 
Specifically, the results suggest that, if the pharmaceutical company does not offer a 
considerable amount of payment in the initial stage, i.e., P1 low, the biotech firm might 
profit more from waiting until the second stage to possibly obtain better payment 
conditions. In the second stage, in fact, the biotech firm will ally with the 
pharmaceutical company only under favorable expected payment conditions, i.e., high 
values of E(P2). Otherwise, the biotech firm will prefer continue the R&D process on 
her own. Interestingly, if, in the first stage, the payment conditions are sufficiently high, 
the biotech company will sign an early alliance independently of any expected value of 
P2. 
To better visualize these results and provide a practical application of the relative 
insights, I complement the analytical derivation with a numerical analysis based on a 
case study available in the literature, which considers a drug in the third clinical phase 
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(Rogers et al., 2002). Specifically, I consider the following set of parameters: V0 = 
$400M, σ = 30%, r = 5%, I1 = $75M, I2 = $180M; T=2. In addition, different values of δ 
(1.1, 2.2 and 2.7 respectively) are assumed to include several scenarios of the value 
added by the pharmaceutical company. The numerical analysis allows to understand 
how δ combines with the payment conditions and affects firms’ alliance timing 
decisions. For sake of brevity, I illustrate such influence in case the alliance, if any, can 
only arise in the first stage, i.e. assuming low values of E(P2). In this case, Figure 17 
identifies the region of alliance as a function of P1  and a1. It suggests that when the 
total market size increases  due to the contribution of the pharmaceutical company (δ), 
the biotech firm has more chances to sign an early agreement with the pharmaceutical 
company in order to take advantage of the high synergies. These results are consistent 
with Rogers et al.  (2005), who find that early licensing agreements are worthy of 
consideration as the value added to the developed drug by the partnership increases.  
 
 
Figure 17: Monopoly thresholds (P1= Cmon
3
-Cmon
1
) when E(P2) is low and δ varies. 
 
Now I move to the case of competition. Interestingly, the introduction of competition 
may change the market outcomes significantly. In general, I show the timing 
decisions  depend on the level of the competition β, on the leverage effect of the 
alliance on the market δ, and on contract terms offered by the pharmaceutical 
company as well. As a direct consequence of competition introduction, we could 
δ=1,1 δ=2,2 
δ=2,7 
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expect that both biotech firms would have an incentive to move quickly and 
anticipate the rival. In fact, this argument seems to be supported by some real cases, 
such as the alliance between Forma Therapeutics and Celgene (Toonkel, 2013). 
Naturally, due to the Stackelberg game setting, one might argue that the first mover, 
i.e., BIO1, will be able to partner with the pharmaceutical company and pre-empt the 
follower.  
Actually, results show that also the follower might be able to partner with the 
pharmaceutical company. This occurs when the first mover has a competitive 
incentive to reach the market individually because of a high spillover effects and low 
payment conditions. I obtain different scenarios of equilibrium solutions depending 
on the value of δ, which describes the level of synergy or, alternatively, the 
contribution added by the pharmaceutical company. Thus, I illustrate them 
distinguishing between high synergy, i.e., δ > (1-γ)/(1-β), and low synergy, i.e., δ < 
(1-γ)/(1-β). Table 24 summarizes the possible alliance outcomes in both cases. For 
sake of simplicity, I have the C values referred to BIO1. The same condition hold for 
BIO2: the reported threshold values can be expressed also using C1
j
, I leave the 
reader to verify the correspondence between C1
j
 and C2
j
 using Table 22. 
Let me start with the high synergy case. I find that all the five scenarios of 
equilibrium solutions are possible. In this case, the leader firm, i.e., BIO1, might find 
more profitable that the other biotech, i.e., BIO2, partners with the pharmaceutical 
company to enjoy generous spillover effects. Specifically, this occurs when both first 
and expected second stage payments are intermediate or when one of them is low 
and the other is intermediate. Interestingly, if the first stage payments are 
intermediate the alliance will be established in the first stage. Alternatively, in 
presence of intermediate expected second stage payments and low first stage 
payments, the optimal timing is to ally in the second stage.  
Similarly to the case of monopoly, if, in the first stage, the payment conditions are 
sufficiently high, there is no room for BIO2’s alliance, as the first mover will sign an 
early alliance independently of any value of E(P2). Moreover, the first mover will 
pre-empt the rival partnering with the pharmaceutical company in the second stage 
also when the relative payment is sufficiently high, while the first stage payment is 
not appealing. Finally, if the pharmaceutical company does not offer attractive 
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payment conditions in both stages, i.e., P1 and E(P2) are low, no biotech firm will 
find optimal to sign an agreement with the pharmaceutical company. 
I use again the data from the same case study as above to unravel how all the 
parameters of interest combine with each other and affect firms’ alliance timing 
decisions. For sake of brevity, I illustrate such influence in case of low values of 
E(P2)  and varying the levels of P1, β (0.55; 0.65; 0.75 respectively), δ (2.2; 2.7). 
Specifically, Figure 18 shows that when the level of competition increases as implies 
a high value of β, the alliance region for BIO2 is more and more reduced whereas the 
early alliance region for BIO1 is increased. Figure 19 highlights the role of δ 
showing how a higher value of the amplification factor δ enlarges BIO2’s alliance 
zone.  
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1
1





   (High synergies) 
P1 
Low Medium High 
E(P2) 
Low           
    
   
     
    
  
No alliance 
  
    
 <      
    
  
BIO2 first stage 
     
    
  
BIO1 first stage 
Medium 
    
    
            
 
   
   
  
    
           
    
  
  
    
           
    
  
BIO2 second stage 
NA 
  
    
         
    
  
BIO2 first stage 
     
    
  
BIO1 first stage 
High           
    
    
         
    
    
    
   
BIO1 second stage 
NA 
         
    
    
    
   
BIO1 first stage 
1
1






  (Low synergies) 
P1 
Low High 
E(P2) 
Low           
    
   
     
    
  
No alliance 
     
    
  
BIO1 first stage 
High           
    
   
         
    
    
    
   
BIO1 second stage 
         
    
    
    
   
BIO1 first stage 
Table 24: Threshold payments (P1 and E(P2) and possible scenarios of equilibrium in duopoly game. 
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Figure 18:  Duopoly thresholds (P1= C2
2
-C1
1
, if P1 is high, and P1 = C2
5
-C1
1
, if P1 is low) in case 
of high synergy when E(P2) is low, δ = 2.2 and β varies. 
 
 
Figure 19:  Duopoly thresholds (P1 = C2
2
-C1
1
, if P1 is high, and P1 = C2
5
-C1
1
, if P1 is low) in case 
of high synergy when E(P2) is low, δ = 2.7 and β varies. 
 
 
β=0,55 β=0,65 
β=0,75 
β=0,75 
β=0,65 β=0,55 
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Moving to the case of (δ < (1-γ)/(1-β)11), I find that there is no possibility for the second 
mover to partner with the pharmaceutical company. Interestingly, in this case, the 
market outcomes are identical to the case of monopoly and similar considerations can 
be done. The intuition behind this result is that the market pie has not been enlarged 
enough so that BIO1’s competitive advantage of being a first mover more than 
outweighs the benefits derived from the spillover effect. As a result, the alliance 
“window” is closed to BIO2. Based on the data of the above case study, in Figure 20, I 
show how a higher level of β, determines an increase of the region of BIO1’s first stage 
alliance. Furthermore, by comparing Figures 17 and 20, it can be observed that 
competition leads to lower threshold payments than the monopoly structure. In fact, as 
the level of competition increases, lower payments are required by the first mover to 
ally. This result can be demonstrated by comparing the conditions P1 MONOPOLY = Cmon
3
-
Cmon
1 
and P1 DUOPOLY = C2
5
-C1
1
. As the call options have the same exercise price, I can 
simply compare their underlying values, which are V0 - (1-α1) δV0 in case of monopoly 
and γV0- (1-α1)δβV0 in case of duopoly, respectively. Comparison yields that payments 
are lower in case of competition if the condition δ < (1-γ)/((1-β)(1-α1)) holds. It is 
straightforward to prove that such condition is always satisfied given that the case of 
low synergy is considered. 
 
 
Figure 20: Duopoly thresholds (P1 = C2
5
-C1
1
) in case of low synergy when E(P2 ) is low, δ = 1.1 
and β varies. 
                                                 
11
 I impose δ to be greater than 1. Note that the ratio (1-γ)/(1-β) is always greater than 1, with γ = 0.5 and β > γ. 
Thus, feasible values of δ are in the following range: 1 < δ < (1-γ)/(1-β).  
β=0,75 
β=0,65 β=0,55 
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A final important remark is that the ROA offers more opportunities to biotech firms to 
ally compared to the traditional use of NPV because only positive values of future 
opportunities are considered. In fact, the region where alliance arises is larger when the 
ROA approach is utilized. Figure 21 shortly summarizes this implication of ROA 
flexibility. 
 
Figure 21:  P1 thresholds (the same as in Figure 20) evaluated with both net present value 
(NPV) and real options analysis (ROA). 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
Pharmaceutical companies more and more partner with biotechnology companies to 
develop new products. The emergence of numerous alliances between these two types 
of actors poses several relevant questions to the innovation management community. 
From the perspective of innovative biotech firms, one is certainly related to the alliance 
timing, which is currently discussed in the biotech industry world. As pharmaceutical 
companies become more attracted to biotech products and search more collaboration 
opportunities, biotech firms face decisions such whether and, possibly, when to ally 
with pharmaceutical companies. Adopting a real options game approach, I have 
investigated this type of decisions in presence of competition between two biotech firms 
who can partner with a pharmaceutical company offering a mutually exclusive take-it-
or-leave-it contract. 
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Research findings suggest that under a Stackelberg game, where one biotech firm is the 
first mover, whereas the other is the follower, whether and when to ally with the 
pharmaceutical company depend on the contract terms offered by the pharmaceutical 
company, the market value increase due to the presence of the pharmaceutical industry, 
as well as the competitive advantage one biotech firm gains against the competitor due 
to the alliance. Specifically, there are numerous interesting cases. In case the market 
potential due to the contribution from the pharmaceutical company is high we can 
notice that all events are possible. The first mover can pre-empt or she can wait for 
better alliance conditions or she can leave to the follower the possibility to ally, and, in 
the latter case, the follower might or might not take advantage of this opportunity. The 
intuition behind the above findings relates to the fact that the first mover in presence of 
high market potential (or, alternatively, low competition level) allies with the 
pharmaceutical company when the payment conditions are satisfactory. Otherwise, the 
first mover prefers to continue the project individually as she can receive indirect 
benefits from the potential alliance between the follower and the pharmaceutical 
company. As a matter of fact, what is interesting, however, is that, in the latter case, the 
follower will not always follow the first mover and compete with her without the 
support of the pharmaceutical company. Rather, the follower will sometimes prefer 
allying with the pharmaceutical company, thus determining an increase of the market 
potential and providing indirect benefits to the first mover. Essentially, under 
competition, the first mover will not always preempt the follower alliance. On the other 
hand, if payment conditions are acceptable, the first mover will choose to ally, instead 
of competing individually, due to the overall benefits that will be generated through the 
alliance.  
A less complex picture is obtained when the market potential due to the contribution 
from the pharmaceutical company is not high. In this case, only the first mover will 
partner with the pharmaceutical company: when first-stage payment is high, the alliance 
will be established in the first stage, otherwise this will happen in the second stage. 
However, if both first stage and expected second stage payments are low, no alliance 
will be signed. Under this scenario, as the market potential is not high (or, alternatively, 
the competition level is very high), the first mover will never leave room to the follower 
to ally with the pharmaceutical company as the market potential increase is mild. In this 
119 
 
case, the equilibrium scenarios are the same as the monopoly case. 
This chapter has provided evidence of contrasting arguments from the industry world on 
whether and when biotech firms should partner with big pharma. Based on this analysis, 
none of them is completely right or wrong, in the sense that all alliance timing outcomes 
are possible. In fact, biotech firms can actually anticipate, postpone or forgo on alliance 
with big pharma in presence of competitors. However, each outcome will occur under 
specific conditions. In this regard, the results help provide some guidelines for 
practitioners with regard to the hot issue of alliance timing in presence of competition. 
As a matter of fact, in a first mover-follower setting, e.g., the example of Forma 
Therapeutics vs. new entrants in the protein homeostasis field, the market value added 
and payments offered by big pharma play a crucial role. Biotech firms, who enjoy first 
mover advantage, should always anticipate the follower in signing the licensing 
agreement when the market value does not increase significantly as a consequence of 
the alliance with the pharmaceutical company. A restricted market potential forces the 
first mover to adopt always a pre-emptive strategy in order to maintain the competitive 
advantage over the follower. As discussed earlier, in this case, the amount of payments 
offered by the pharmaceutical company in different stages determines whether the deal 
should be signed in the first, in the second stage or never be signed. On the other hand, 
when the market value added by the presence of big pharma is notably high, first mover 
should not always choose to partner with big pharma. Rather, when contract terms are 
not  appealing, first mover should let the follower ally to profit more in the final market 
due to the fact that she does not share the profit with the pharmaceutical company, 
while still benefiting from positive spillover. Even when the market potential increases 
due to the presence of the pharmaceutical company, the amount of payments offered by 
the pharmaceutical company in different stages determines whether the deal should be 
signed in the first, in the second stage or never be signed.  
There are several directions to build upon this work for future research. For instance, I 
have analyzed alliance timing decisions, where the pharmaceutical company has the 
bargaining to offer a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the competing biotech firms. 
However, in some cases, very innovative biotech firms might enjoy some bargaining 
power, so a more fair negotiation environment (e.g., Nash bargaining game) could be 
considered in future studies. Also, I considered the competition between biotech firms. 
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It is of considerable interest and practical relevance to analyze also a setting where two 
pharmaceutical companies compete to ally with an innovative biotech firm to 
investigate whether the implications of above are robust in such new environment. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and future developments 
 
6.1 Summary of results and contributions 
This thesis deals with the evaluation of R&D alliances under uncertainty. The main 
objective of  this dissertation is to suggest when, and under what circumstances it is 
advantageous for firms to engage in the use of either in-house R&D activity, or R&D 
alliances when a stochastic environment is considered. Particularly, the analysis focused 
on two issues that strongly characterize the turbulent and competitive world in which 
nowadays firms try to foster innovation. On the one hand the important choice of the 
optimal R&D projects portfolio including the option to carry out projects through R&D 
collaborations. On the other hand, assuming a dynamic perspective, the choice of the 
optimal time to sign an R&D partnership by considering the important role of 
competition.  
This thesis looks at both topics by adopting a real options approach in order to take into 
account and model uncertainty of the economic environment in which those decisions 
are made. Therefore, from a theoretical point of view, my thesis contributes to the 
growing and important stream of research that develops real options valuation models 
for investments under uncertainty. The particular focus is on R&D alliances. 
Surprisingly, there is very little specific theoretical work that considers theoretical 
modeling in the (dynamic) setting of R&D collaborations and it neglects the important 
issues of above. Specifically the main results of this research are now discussed in 
details together with the identification of the main contributions. In particular I will 
briefly discuss both the findings and the major contributions of each chapter, except for 
chapter 1 (which sets the context and the motivation of this research) and chapter 2 
(where a discussion of the relevant literature has related the present dissertation to prior 
works and has assessed different stands of literature in order to collect necessary 
elements for the models proposed in the further chapters).  
Chapter 3 and chapter 4 give an important contribution to the portfolio management 
literature. Specifically, Chapter 3 provides a closed-form real options framework for 
portfolio evaluation which hands important portfolio features that have not been 
covered so far in literature. The tool aims to contribute to the available models 
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considering the possibility to create a financially balanced portfolio. In fact, the model 
is set up as a multi-dimensional real options analysis problem based on n projects 
(underlying assets) and support two critical aspects: (i) R&D projects selection given a 
set of limited resources; and (ii) how to carry out the selected projects (internally or 
externally), that is, the R&D alliance option is included in the model. A self-financing 
policy is also taken into account. Moreover, since different closed-solutions formulae 
(NPV method, B&S formula and Geske model) are adopted, the proposed tool 
presented in chapter 3 gives an important contribution from a methodological point of 
view. First, the model fits better the R&D environment by distinguishing among 
projects that are not options, simple options, and compound options, depending on how 
far the project is from the last phase in its R&D development process (i.e. depending to 
what extent managers can defer the decision to exercise the option). Second, adopting 
closed-solutions makes the mathematics of the model less complex than adopting 
numerical approaches in terms of constraints and variables involved in the problem.  
Starting from this model, in chapter 4, a DSS is illustrated to understand which are the 
portfolio parameters that influence the important choice of conducting R&D activity 
internally or externally. As widely discussed in the second chapter, which reviews 
several existing models to evaluate and select an R&D portfolio, the most recent trend 
in the portfolio management literature, is to integrate both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques, such as mapping tools, in an integrated decision support system. However 
such tools neglect real option analysis. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
DSS which includes projects evaluated as real options. In such a way, the research 
presented in this part of the dissertation gives an important contribution to the real 
options theory as well. As a matter of fact, while it is well known in literature the 
impact of the important key variables (the underlying value, the volatility, the interest 
rate and so on) on the single real option, what is still not known is their impact on a 
considered options portfolio. The tool proposed in chapter 4 does exactly so and, 
specifically, sheds light on the influence of some of the above parameters on the 
important choice of conducting the R&D activity according to a closed or an open 
innovation strategy. Finally, through the analysis conducted in chapter 5, this thesis also 
provides insights to the alliance timing literature. Previous research has focused on the 
optimal alliance design without considering the role of competition. In chapter 5, a two-
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stages real options game is presented that includes the effect of the competition in 
choosing the optimal time to sign a partnership. In fact whether and when ally (i.e. in 
the first stages of the R&D development process or later) depend on competition, on the 
value added to the project by the potential alliance as well as on the partnership 
contracts terms. In addition to this theoretical contribution, the real options game model 
also presents an important contribution from a methodological standpoint. As shown in 
chapter 2, literature on real options games offers discrete-time real options games and 
continuous-time real options games, dependently if the choices to “invest” or to “defer” 
are made, according to the underlying movements, in a discrete or continuous time 
respectively. Generally, the former are easier to implement but are solved numerically 
whereas the latter can be solved analytically but are harder to implement. The modeling 
involved in the proposed model presents somewhat which is new: since I adopt the 
closed B&S formula, I assume that the underlying asset follows a continuous process 
(in particular a geometric Brownian motion) whereas the choices to “invest” or to 
“defer” are made in discrete points of time. In such a way, I can capture advantages of 
the above methods, obtaining a model easy to implement that can be solved analytically. 
Moreover, making decisions in discrete points in time fits better the R&D environment 
(such as pharmaceutical) where decisions are traditionally made in discrete points, such 
as at the beginning of a new stage of the R&D development process.    
 
6.2 Managerial Implications 
The research provided in this thesis has also several important managerial implications. 
Overall the analysis conducted offers managerial guidelines and a set of practical 
recommendations for supporting managers in the important decision of  undertaking a 
new relation with another firm, i.e. when considering enter in partnership with another 
firm. This important decision is traditionally made in a stochastic environment, 
characterized by an amount of uncertainty over the future rewards from the investment. 
On the one hand this research enhances financially constrained managers understanding 
about important portfolio choices in terms of which factors would influence the 
selection and the development in alliance of the projects from a considered portfolio. 
The focus should be given to the underlying value (future value of product 
commercialization) and the value added from the collaboration to the product. 
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Specifically, the higher the value of the underlying, the greater the opportunity to select 
the project and develop it in house. Conversely, the higher the value added from the 
collaboration, the higher the convenience to select licensable products and to develop 
them in alliance. On the other hand, assuming a dynamic perspective, this research 
enhances managers understanding about the alliance timing decisions, by suggesting 
whether and when they should collaborate with other firms in a competitive 
environment. In this regard, the results obtained help provide some guidelines for 
practitioners with regard to the hot issue of alliance timing in presence of competition. 
Particularly, managers should pay attention to the market value increase due to the 
alliance, the contract terms offered by the company partner as well as to the level of 
competition. In fact, supposing that managers enjoy first mover advantage, as the 
market potential is high enough (or, alternatively, the competition level is very low), 
they should not always choose to sign licensing agreements. Rather, when contract 
terms are not appealing, first mover should let the follower ally to profit more in the 
final market due to the fact that he does not share the profit with the partner company, 
while still benefiting from positive spillover coming from the follower alliance. 
Conversely, when contract terms are satisfactory, the first mover should always pre-
empt the follower in signing the R&D alliance. Specifically, when early payment 
conditions are high enough, an early alliance should be established, otherwise managers 
should wait for better payment conditions in later stages. A less complex picture is 
obtained when the market potential due to the contribution from the partner company is 
not high (or, alternatively, the competition level is very high). In this case, a restricted 
market potential forces the first mover to adopt always a pre-emptive strategy in order 
to maintain the competitive advantage over the follower. Once again, when early 
payment conditions are high enough, an early alliance should be established, otherwise 
managers should wait for better payment conditions in later stages. Finally, in both 
cases, i.e. when the market potential is high or low, if the payments offered from the 
partner are very low either in early or in later stages, neither the first mover nor the 
second mover should sign the R&D collaboration. In such a case, they should prefer 
continuing the development process on their own.  
It is also important to highlight the adoption of the real options methodology 
(particularly closed-solutions) in this research. From a managerial point of view, the 
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real options approach has often been criticized for its apparent complexity. This 
consideration is especially true when applying real options in a portfolio context or 
when integrating real options aspects with strategic aspects (real option games). Of 
course, it is important to discuss and structure the option valuation models with 
managers. However, it could be hard to communicate the valuation framework in details 
mainly because it presumes a detailed understanding of the underlying option valuation 
concepts (Brosch, 2008). Therefore making the essence of the model more transparent, 
that is, in this specific case, making the understanding of the underlying continuous 
process as clear as possible, could bring managers to be more inclined to accept the 
model. In fact, once this apparent complex process is clear, adopting closed-solutions 
makes the implementation of the real options models very easy and simple. As a prove 
of this, the models presented in this dissertation have been implemented in simple 
spreadsheets that mangers can easily handle.  
 
6.3 Limitations and further developments 
While this research makes important contributions to different research streams, it has 
also some limitations. At the same time, these limitations represent potential avenues 
for future researches. From a methodological standpoint, two possible shortcomings 
arise that, in turn, are attributable to limitations owned by the adopted closed–solutions 
approaches, i.e. the B&S formula and the Geske model. First, as highlighted earlier in 
this dissertation, one of the main assumptions of these models is the assumption of the 
geometrical Brownian motion for the underlying which implies a continuous arrival of 
information that changes the underlying variable. Actually, information that affects 
future net cash flows of research projects arrives at discrete points in time, causing that 
managers not continuously adjust the underlying, but only when information arrives. To 
overcome the limitation of the Brownian motion, different authors propose jump-
process models both for the B&S formula (Brach and Paxson, 2011) and for the Geske 
model (Pennings and Sereno, 2011). As a matter of fact, a Poisson (jump) process 
would be able to describe these movements in the underlying variable in a more realistic 
way. Second, whereas numerical approaches are able to capture the technical 
uncertainties and commercial risk of the R&D process, closed-form solutions, capture 
only the economic risk (or alternatively both technical and economic risks are captured 
by one measure, i.e. the volatility of the underlying). However, Cassimon et al. (2011a) 
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incorporated the technical risk  in the n-fold compound option model, preserving the 
closed-form formula. It follows that, even if it could result more difficult from an 
implementation standpoint, future research could integrate these models (i.e. Brach and 
Paxson, 2001; Pennings and Sereno, 2011; Cassimon et al. 2011a) with both portfolio 
and strategic aspects in order to better address the topics discussed in this dissertation.  
Moreover, the present thesis may have limitations from a theoretical point of view. 
First,  in chapter 3 and chapter 4, I considered projects as only budgetary interrelated in 
the given portfolio. Considering resources limitations is an important issue. However, 
future research could extend this analysis by integrating other forms of interaction 
among projects, involving physical or technical properties of the underlying assets. For 
instance, projects could be mutual exclusive or depend on one another. Also, logic 
interactions such as precedence constraints may be considered (Brosch, 2008). 
Similarly, further developments could investigate the diversification side of the 
problem: in order to accomplish this task, correlation between each couple of products 
should be taken into account. This is an interesting task because, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, in van Bekkum et al. (2009), correlation among R&D products with real-
options characteristics acts differently than it usually does in evaluation contexts that 
use NPV, and, in particular, negative correlation only slightly reduces portfolio risk.  
Second, in chapter 5, alliance timing decisions have been analyzed considering 
numerous important variables as exogenously given. Future studies could consider 
endogenous decisions about some of the contract terms offered by the partner firm, or 
investment levels and research efforts. This kind of analysis is important to provide a 
complete picture of alliance design and timing decisions.  
In addition, R&D collaborations are unstable and, sometimes, they could be problematic 
to manage. Indeed, when an alliance if formed, a firm becomes exposed, among other 
ex-post risks, to the unplanned termination (Pangarkar,2009), i.e. the risk of one partner 
unilaterally withdrawing from the relationship before its objectives have been achieved. 
Further research could address this important issue by modelling, also in the research 
context I propose, the exit strategies, i.e. possible divestments highlighting which 
factors could influence this situation.  
Finally, a very interesting development of this dissertation aims at testing some of 
results in laboratory using experimental methodology in order to investigate human 
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choice behavior in making alliances decisions under uncertainty. This is a very 
stimulating issue which deserves a deeper discussion in the following section. 
.  
6.4 Behavioral economics as further development 
As Yavas and Sirmanas (2005) point out, in spite of its significant practical implications 
for various investment decisions, empirical testing of real options has been scarce. To 
use Moel and Tufano (2002) words, “ empirical research on real options has lagged 
considerably behind the conceptual and theoretical contribution”.  
This is primarily due to the problems that researchers face in obtaining “key variables” 
in real options, i.e. reliable data on such components of the real options approach as the 
current and future value of the underlying asset and the variability of value (Yavas and 
Sirmanas, 2005; Opera 2009).  In addition, even if data are available, very often they are 
not available in the form that would respect the assumptions of the theoretical models. 
This is particularly true in individual choice problems and game theoretical analysis 
(Yavas and Sirmanas, 2005). As a consequence, in the last decade, researches have been 
using laboratory experiments to generate the data for the analysis and study people’s 
abilities or propensity to follow the dictates of optimal decision policies (Murphy and 
Knaus, 2011). In Miller and Shapira (2004) work, decision makers are presented with 
simple binary lotteries and asked to specify the price for selling or buying a call or a put 
option for the gambles. The results show that the value of the price specified for selling 
and buying the derivate do not coincide, suggesting inadequacy with the normative 
model’s descriptive power (Murphy and Knaus, 2011). Yavas and Sirmanas (2005) 
investigate the option “wait and see” in laboratory. The results of their experiments 
highlight that fundamental insights of real options theory are not so evident to 
individual investors. As a matter of fact, the majority of subjects tends to invest too 
early compared to the optimal timing suggested by the theoretical model and thus fails 
to realize the benefits of waiting. Close to the spirit of this paper, Oprea et al. (2009) 
investigate behaviour in uncertain investment opportunities governed by Brownian 
Motion. Their results indicate that people can closely approximate optimal exercise of 
wait options if they have decent chance to learn from personal experience (Oprea et al. 
2009). In fact, while at the beginning investors tend to exercise the option prematurely, 
over time their average behaviour converges close to the optimum. In Murphy and 
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Knaus (2011) work, a decision maker must choose how much to invest in a risky 
environment that evolves over time. Their experimental results contrast predictions 
from theory.  
These findings suggest innate behavioural tendencies that are contrary to the normative 
dictates since most of the above works highlights that essentially people have biases in 
their decision-making. In addition, these studies have investigated human choice 
behaviour in investment decisions under uncertainty. Future studies could investigate 
human behaviour in R&D alliance decisions in a stochastic environment. For example, 
it could be very interesting to study the alliance timing decisions -modeled in chapter 5- 
in an experimental way. This is equivalent to study if individuals make decisions 
conforming to the theoretical model - thus maximizing potential earnings - both in the 
simplest case (the monopoly case) and in a more complex case (the duopoly case). In 
the next and final section a simple possible design of experiment for the monopoly case 
is provided. 
  
6.4.1 Design of experiment (the monopoly case) 
 
Problem description  
 
To better understand the design of the experiment, let me briefly recall the theoretical 
model in the monopoly case. Consider a Firm, named Firm A, which is working on a 
research and development (R&D) project. Also, consider a simple setup in which there 
are two stages of the development process. In the first stage, the project in its early 
phases of the development, and in the second and final stage the project is approaching 
commercialization.  At each stage, the firm will have the option to form an alliance with 
firm B. Firm A can also choose to forgo the alliance and choose to enter the market 
alone. The sequence of the game is as follows. At the beginning of the first stage (t=0), 
Firm A’s project value is given by V0. Firm B offers an alliance contract to Firm A as 
consisting of an ex-ante payment P1 and percentage of royalties retained by Firm A 
equal to 1- α1, 0<α1<1. If Firm A rejects the offer, the decision game is repeated. In the 
second stage (t=T, with T the length of the first stage), Firm B offers a different alliance 
contract consisting of an ex-ante payment P2 and a percentage of royalties equal to 1-α2, 
0<α2<1. If Firm A rejects this offer, the firm proceeds to the final market unassisted.  
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In each stage i, an investment payment Ii must be made. If an alliance is formed at stage 
i, the size of the project’s market increases relatively to the case of no alliance by an 
amplification factor δ > 1. This factor reflects the value added to the project by the 
synergies derived from the alliance. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, I 
assume royalty payments are the same regardless of when alliance was formed (i.e. α1= 
α2 = α). Thus, if an alliance is signed, the value of the project will be multiplied by K, 
with K equal to δ(1- α). As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, I can model the first stage 
payoffs with the above Black and Sholes approach, which ensures the flexibility offered 
by the option to decide further investments when more information is available, whereas 
the second stage payoffs are simply computed with the NPV methodology. This 
modeling (please refer to figure 22) causes that if Firm A signs an alliance at the first 
stage, she will receive a sure payment P1 computed as a difference of two calls options 
(please refer to the previous chapter, p. 107). Conversely, since the payments in the 
second stage are linear function of the value of the project (which follows a diffusion 
process with a log-normal distribution at maturity, i.e. at the beginning of the second 
stage), if Firm A decides to wait and sign an alliance at the second stage, she will 
receive a P2, which is a realization from  a log-normal distribution with mean and 
variance equal to: 
 (37) 
 
 (38) 
 
Therefore, in this decision task, the decision maker (assuming she is playing the role of 
firm A) has to choose between a sure thing and a risky alternative from a continuous 
distribution, that is, between a sure payment if she decides to ally at the first stage and a 
risky payment if she decides to ally at the second stage.  
 
2 0[ ( )] (1 )
rTE P T V K e 
22 2 2
2 0[ ( )] (1 ) ( 1)
TrTVar P T K V e e  
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Figure 22: Payments in the two different stages. 
 
Numerical example: 
Consider the following set of parameters: V0 = $400, σ = 30%, r = 5%, I1 = $75, I2 = 
$180; T=2, δ (2.2). With these values, alliance can arise either in the first or in the 
second stage. Figure 23 identifies the region of alliance as a function of P1  and α. 
Therefore, assuming a payment P1 equal to 17.8 and α =0.6, the theoretical equilibrium 
of the game is the alliance at the second stage. 
 
 
Figure 23: Monopoly  P1 threshold  when E(P2) is high. 
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In order to study this specific situation in laboratory, students should be provided with 
comprehensive instructions describing the task and the interface of the computer 
program that could be used to administer the experiment. Therefore a possible example 
of instructions is offered: 
Instructions 
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision 
making. If you listen carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable 
amount of money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The rules 
for the experiment are as follows. Do not talk or communicate with other participants. 
Do not attempt to use the computer for any other purpose than what is explicitly 
required by the experiment. This means you are not allowed to browse the internet, 
check emails, etc. If you violate any of these rules, you will be asked leave without pay. 
Feel free to ask questions by raising your hand or signaling to the experimenter. During 
the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the 
experiment the total amount of points you have earned will be converted to dollars at 
the following rate: 
(Some points)=1$ 
Your Task 
You are in control of a company that is working on a risky R&D (research and 
development) project with potential significant profit. A large firm that specializes in 
taking these kinds of projects to the final market will offer to form an alliance with you 
that will make your profit higher. Specifically, the large company will offer you two 
different kinds of contracts: a sure contract and an uncertain one. Consequentially, you 
could receive a certain payoff or a payoff with uncertain outcome, which could be 
higher or lower than the certain one. Your TASK in this game is to choose between a 
certain payoff and a payoff with uncertain outcome. You will be shown both the 
amount of the certain payoff and the distribution of possible outcomes for the uncertain 
payoff before being asked to make a decision.  
The sequence of the game is as follows. At the beginning of each round, the large firm 
will offer you an alliance contract. You may use to accept this payoff:  in which case the 
round will conclude. However, you may also choose to forgo the guaranteed payoff, and 
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instead take a payoff tied to the value of your project. Because the development of the 
project is risky, its value changes random. As a consequence, the alliance contract 
offered by the large firm –and hence your payoff- changes randomly. This means that it 
might go higher than the certain payoff, earning you more points. It is also possible that 
the payoff will be lower, earning you less points. If you choose this option, you will 
take a payoff randomly picked up from a given distribution, that is shown to you on the 
screen. You will be playing several rounds of this game, but your decision in a given 
round does NOT affect any other round.  
 
 
Figure 24: Possible screen to show during the experimental game 
Of course, to effectively test the theoretical model, several rounds of the game afore-
mentioned should be played. Contracts licensing in the first stage (i.e. payment P1 and 
royalties a) should be random selected from the region of alliance illustrated in fig 23, 
in order to provide different scenarios of equilibrium and observe if people, in average, 
make decisions according to the theoretical model.  
Moreover, the situation above illustrated is just an example, and one can easily imagine 
other several cases which allow to study empirically the influence of important factors 
involved in the model. For instance, Figure 17 (in chapter 5) highlights how δ (the total 
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market size) affects firm’ alliance timing decisions. Specifically, it suggests that when 
the total market size increases due to the contribution of alliance (δ), the firm has more 
chances to sign an early agreement with the partner company in order to take advantage 
of the high synergies. Once again, it would be interesting to study how people update 
their preferences in such a situation.  
Finally, a comprehensive work should include the more complex duopoly case, in 
which people make decision regarding the optimal time considering not only 
uncertainty due to the nature (such that in the monopoly case), but also uncertainty 
about reactions of competitors. How does the presence of competition influence people 
decisions? For instance, it is recognized (see chapter 2) in option pricing literature that, 
in absence of competition, an incumbent firm would delay project initiation. 
Conversely, ceteris paribus, the presence of competition may speed up a firm’s planned 
investment (Boyer et al. 2004). Under particular values of the input parameters, I find 
the same situation in the alliance timing problem under uncertainty (see fig. 25). In fact, 
given the same input parameters, the optimal time to sign the alliance is the second 
stage when the monopoly case is considered, whereas it is the first stage when the 
duopoly case is considered. 
  
Figure 25:  P1 threshold  when E(P2) is high (monopoly and duopoly case) 
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When  “waiting” is the optimal strategy in the monopoly case, do investors postpone the 
alliance decision until uncertainty is resolved (i.e. in the second stage)? Given the same 
payments conditions in the duopoly structure, does the first mover anticipate the 
alliance at the first stage in order to pre-empt the follower? It is very interesting to study 
what it can happen empirically in such a situation. Naturally, several other hypotheses 
could  be tested when also the competition is taken into account.  
Of course, in this section I provided some possible examples only referring to the model 
discussed in chapter 5, but, more in general, future research could integrate the 
mathematical models illustrated in this thesis with experimental economics methods in 
order to develop quantitative models that aim at predicting and explaining the decision 
process, preferences as well as cognitive limitations that the real decision makers 
exhibit when deliberating over complex options.  
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